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EU’s primary aim and objective is to achieve further integration within the internal 
market and to ensure cross border trade between the Member States is not distorted by 
restrictive measures. The EU requires compliance with its fundamental provisions under 
the Treaties to reach its aims and objectives. With this mind set, the EU regulates any 
sector constituting economic activity and affecting cross border trade within the internal 
market. Initially autonomous self-regulated world of sport faced with a difficult 
challenge under the organisational structures of the EU towards its traditional values 
because of growing commercial interests of sport, such as broadcasting and sponsorship. 
 
No sector, including sport, is exempt from the application of EU law. While sport is 
entitled to have its specificity recognised, this status must be earned. EU and sport are 
not mutually exclusive. Established case law in the area provides guidance on how EU 
law is applicable to sporting practices and rules. In line with the established case law, 
the specificity and autonomy of sport is recognised, but it could not be construed to 
justify a general exemption from the application of EU law to sport. Nevertheless, 
defining the boundaries of the European model of sport and the EU law has not been 
easy. However, with the recent developments in EU sports law it has become clear that 
the organisational structures of the EU and the European model of sport can co-exist on 
dual condition of complying with the fundamental provisions of EU law and accepting 
supervision of the EU through policy and dialogue to achieve European standards of 
good governance in sport. Currently, European model of sport enjoys supervised 
conditional autonomy under the organisational structures of the EU.  
 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) model of sport sets an example on the 
recognition of the autonomy of sport in a deeply divided region within Europe. TRNC 
is under international isolation and the organisational structures of the EU does not have 
any impact on the TRNC model of sport. Nevertheless, TRNC model of sport would not 
have been treated differently than the European model of sport under the organisational 
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I. General Introduction; II. Research Questions; III.  Methodology; IV. Structure 
of the Thesis 
I. General Introduction 
This research intends to identify the impact of the EU on the European model of sport.  
The term sport in everyday language refers to an activity characterised by a significant 
physical effort and skill1.  The meaning of the term ‘sport’ has undergone substantial 
changes since the first Olympic Games in Greece in ancient times and the 21st century. 
Originally, when the term was introduced into the English language in the 14th century, 
‘sport’ meant ‘leisure’2. Meaning of sport involving physical effort was first recorded 
in 1520s. In 2012, Council of Europe defined sport as all forms of physical activity 
aiming to improve health3. Physical element of sport is demonstrated as a condition4. 
However, this definition of sport involving physical effort is not universal5. In 2011, 
the SportAccord Council has developed a pragmatic definition of sport to verify 
whether an applicant federation would qualify as a sport federation and whether sport 
require physical effort and skill. Sport is defined as an activity with an element of 
competition which does not rely on luck or equipment that is provided by a single 
supplier and it is not harmful to living creatures6. The International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) expressly include mental sports or endorse activities without a 
physical element such as chess7. Where a physical element is not necessary, sport is 
defined by competition and not relying on an equipment provided by one supplier 
excluding activities with commercial products designed for pure consumption such as 
 
1 Cambridge Dictionary, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/sport>  accessed on 7 July 2020. 
2 Online Etymology Dictionary, <https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=sport> accessed on 06 July 2020. 
3 Council of Europe, ‘Committee of Ministers Recommendation’ No. R (92) 13 Rev, 
<https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016804c9dbb> accessed on 7 July 2020. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Opinion of A.G. Mr Szpunar - Case C-90/16  The English Bridge Union Limited v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s 
Revenue & Customs [2017] ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2017:814 at para 37. 
6 SportAccord International Sports Federations, 
<http://www.sportaccord.com/en/members/index.php?idIndex=32&idContent=14881> accessed on 7 July 2020. 
7 <IOC, Recognised Federations List, https://www.olympic.org/recognised-federations> accessed on 7 July 2020. 
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video games8. Chess is a unique game. However, even though IOC considers chess as 
a sport, it is not included in the Olympic games9. Instead chess has its own international 
league held bi-annually under Fédération Internationale des Échecs (FIDE)10. This 
demonstrates the lack of thorough uniformity towards the definition of sport in the 
sporting world11. Nevertheless, legal meaning of sport in Europe is recently defined 
under the Bridge12 case. The Directive referred to under the case did not define sport. 
Therefore, sport had to be defined by considering its usual meaning in everyday 
language, while considering the context in which it is used and the purposes of the 
Directive13. From this point, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) favoured an 
interpretation where the concept of sport is limited to activities satisfying the ordinary 
meaning of the term sport and characterised by a not negligible physical element14.  
 
In today’s world, millions of people are being distracted, carried away and amused by 
the love of sport. Sport is a natural outcome of a universal love of play and man’s 
innate desire to compete with and to outshine others.15 After the Second World War, 
with the emergence of rapid globalisation of the world, sport has created one of the 
most significant self-organised international civil societies. Sport has established its 
own specific set of rules and remedies both at national and international levels. Sport 
has become one of the most important business sectors and an inalienable part of the 
popular culture in the world.16 KPMG17 estimated that the worldwide sport industry, 
including sports infrastructure, sports hospitality, training, and manufacturing  and 
retailing sports products, is worth around $700 billion a year and it forms one per cent  
 
8 Opinion of A.G. Mr Szpunar - Case C-90/16  The English Bridge Union Limited v Commissioners for Her 
Majesty’s Revenue & Customs [2017] ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2017:814 at para 38. 
9 IOC, List of Olympic Games, <https://www.olympic.org/sports> accessed on 7 July 2020. 
10 International Chess Federation <https://www.fide.com/> accessed on 7 July 2020. 
11 Opinion of A.G. Mr Szpunar - Case C-90/16  The English Bridge Union Limited v Commissioners for Her 
Majesty’s Revenue & Customs [2017] ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2017:814 at para 38. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid  at para 18. 
14 Ibid  at para 22. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Blake, A, The Body Language: The Meaning of Modern Sport (Lawrence & Wishart, 1996) at p 11. 
17 Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG in short) is a multinational professional services network, and one of 
the Big Four accounting organizations. Headquartered in Amstelveen, the Netherlands, KPMG is a network of firms 
in 147 countries, with over 219,000 employees and has three lines of services: financial audit, tax, and advisory. Its 
tax and advisory services are further divided into various service groups. 
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of the world GDP18. Sport exercised self-governance via self-organising 
interorganisational networks characterized by interdependence, resource exchange, 
rules of the game and noteworthy autonomy from the state without significant 
interference or challenge19. However, in the last 20 years, sport has commercially 
evolved dramatically. High commercialisation and publicity of the sport market has 
pulled the attention of the global capitalism and exposed serious governance failures 
in the organisation of sport20. In the recent years, accumulation of scandals in sport has 
increased greatly and shook the credibility of sport while its organisation threatened 
the public trust and the social importance of sport21. Therefore, the traditional system 
of hierarchical self-governance and autonomy of the European model of sport enjoyed 
for over a century faced serious challenge under the organisational structures of the 
EU.  
 
This research aims to discover the impact of the EU on the European model of sport. 
The EU’s primary aim and objective is to achieve integration within the internal market 
and to ensure cross border trade between the Member States is not distorted by 
restrictive measures. The EU requires compliance with its fundamental provisions 
under the EU Treaties to reach its aims and objectives. With this mind set, the EU 
regulates any sector constituting economic activity and affecting cross border trade 
within the internal market. No sector, including sport, is exempted from this 
application. The general objective of this thesis is to understand and analyse the 
relationship between the organisational structures of the EU and the European model 
of sport to establish the effect of the EU on sport. This consists of analysing the 
approach of the EU Institutions, the EU law, and the EU policy towards the 
organisation of sport in Europe, including the deeply divided island of Cyprus. 
 
18 KPMG, ‘The Business of Sport’ <https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/in/pdf/2016/09/the-business-of-
sports.pdf > accessed on 7 July 2020. 
19 European Commission, Developing the European Dimension in Sport, COM (2011) 12 Final, 18.1.2011, p 3. 
19 M Mrkonjic, Sport Organisations, Autonomy and Good Governance, Working Paper for Action for Good 
Governance in Internatinal Sport Organisations (AGGIS) Project, Danish Institute for Sport Studies, January 2013 p 
133. 
20 The Guardian, ‘2002 Winter Olympic Bid Scandal in Salt Lake City’ 
<https://www.theguardian.com/sport/1999/mar/17/ioc-expels-members-bribes-scandal> accessed on 7 July 2020. 
21 Action for Good Governance in International Sport (AGGIS), Jens Alm (eds),  Action for Good Governance in 
International Sport Organisations, (2013) p 2. 
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II. Research Questions 
Based on the general objective stated above, this research aims to answer three 
fundamental questions: 
1. To what extent are the organisational structures of the EU and the European 
model of sport mutually exclusive?  
2. What is the impact of EU law and policy on the twin principles underpinning 
the European Model of Sport, namely the specificity and autonomy of sport?  
3. To what extent can the organisational structures of EU and the European model 
of sport co-exist?  
4. What is the impact of the EU on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(TRNC) model of sport which exists under international isolation in the deeply 
divided European island of Cyprus?  
 
III. Methodology 
This research has adopted a black letter law approach to answer the research questions 
and to provide an original contribution to knowledge. A common feature of legal 
research, a black letter law approach is essentially doctrinal research that analyses Court 
judgments and statutes to explain the law22. A black letter law approach focuses on the 
law itself as an internal self-sustaining set of principles which can be accessed through 
reading Court judgments and statutes with little or no reference to the world outside the 
law23. It mainly analysis the case law, derives principles and values while compiling the 
cases into a coherent structure to achieve order, rationality, and theoretical structure24. 
It aims to remedy, organise, and clarify the law on the topic while analysing primary 
and secondary sources25. Much of the past and current legal research has adopted the 
doctrinal research approach which asks the simple question of what the law is in a 
particular area and how does it apply?26 The answer to this question is sought by 
 
22 Action for Good Governance in International Sport (AGGIS), Jens Alm (eds),  Action for Good Governance in 
International Sport Organisations, (2013) p 3. 
23 M McConville, et al., Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2010) p 1. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid at p 4. 
26 Ibid at p 19. 
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analysing the primary sources which are accepted as the body of case law and any 
relevant legislation. However, secondary sources such as journal articles and written 
commentaries on the case law and on the legislation could be included27. After analysing 
the sources, the law is explored to demonstrate how it has been developed through 
judicial reasoning and legislative enactment. Therefore, this type of research could be 
said to be purely theoretical and as King and Epstein state not empirical28. However, it 
has been stated that it is not important whether the legal research is empirical or not 
especially when the main aim is to consider the application of law29. 
 
A black letter law methodology consists of a critical legal analysis of relevant 
legislation, including European Treaties, policy measures, case law and decisional 
practice concerning the area under study. In the proposed area of research, a black letter 
law approach means analysing European Court of Justice judgments, European 
Commission decisions, the EU treaties and the key constitutional foundations of the 
European model of sport which are essentially rules promulgated by private sport 
bodies. In addition, relevant reports, press releases and academic literature is used to 
interpret the main sources mentioned. Therefore, this research has relied on primary and 
secondary sources obtained from the libraries and the official websites of the institutions 
and the sport governing bodies (SBGs). The research has implemented both deductive, 
inductive, and analytical reasoning. The findings of law are applied to factual scenarios 
in a deductive logic, the reasoning from specific cases are used to create a framework 
of the general rules to fill the gap in the law in an inductive logic30 and the principles 
drawn from a set of cases are used under another set of events in an analytical 






28 L Epstein and G King, ‘Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: The Rules of Inference’ (2006) 
University of Chicago Law Review 1 p 2-3. 
29 M McConville, et al., Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2010) p 1. 
30 P Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research Methods in the 
Built Environment, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008) p 33. 
31 J H Farrar, Legal Reasoning, (Thomson Reuters 2010) p 92. 
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IV. Structure of the Thesis 
Due to the methodology adopted in this research, the comprehensive literature review 
undertaken is presented throughout the research rather than being discussed in a 
separate chapter.  
 
Chapter I examines the organisational structures of the EU to determine whether the 
organisational structures of the EU and the European model of sport are mutually 
exclusive. The chapter explores the theories behind the European integration, the 
development and status of European integration, the nature and effect of EU law and 
the identification of the fundamental treaty provisions applicable to sport.  
 
Chapter II analysis the organisational structures of the European model of sport. It 
establishes whether the commercialised organisational features of the European model 
of sport could conflict with the organisational structures of the EU eliminating the 
possibility of both being mutually exclusive. This chapter comprises of identifying the 
features of the European model of sport and the EU supervision on it to demonstrate 
difficulties of the organisation of sport under the EU law. 
 
Chapter III has the objective to establish the impact of European sports policy on the 
European model of sport to understand whether the organisational structures of EU and 
sport are mutually exclusive. This intends to answer the first research question together 
with Chapter I and Chapter II. This chapter comprises of analysing the aim, 
establishment, and development of European sports policy in the European Union. The 
horizontality and impact of Article 165 TFEU on sport will be discussed to discover 
whether it has altered the historical approaches taken by the EU institutions towards the 
significance and autonomy of sport.  
 
Chapter IV aims to establish the impact of EU law on the European model of sport in 
relation to the specificity and autonomy of sport through analysing the ECJ judgments. 
The chapter attempts to establish the ECJ jurisprudence on sport to develop an 
11 
 
understanding of the EU’s approach towards sport with an intention to prepare the 
ground of answering the second research question collectively with Chapter V. 
 
Chapter V seeks to establish the impact of the EU law on the organisation of sport.  This 
intends to prepare the ground of answering the second research question of what the 
impact of EU law and policy on the governance of the European Model of Sport 
regarding the specificity and autonomy of sport is together with Chapter IV.  The 
chapter analyses the application of EU law to individual sporting rules on unsanctioned 
and rival events, home and away rule, club location, breakaway leagues, club 
ownership, mandatory player release rules, licensing requirements, and third party 
ownership under the organisation of the European model of sport. 
 
Chapter VI explores to what extent the organisational structures of EU and the European 
model of sport could co-exist. This intends to answer the third research question. The 
chapter comprises of defining good governance and proposes supervised conditional 
autonomy of sport as a dual solution for the European model of sport to co-exist with 
the EU.  
 
Chapter VII aims to discover the impact of the EU on the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC) model of sport which exists under international isolation in the deeply 
divided European island of Cyprus.  This chapter explores the autonomy of sport in 
TRNC, the Cyprus issue, existence of the TRNC model of sport under international 
isolation and restrictions, the key features of the TRNC model of sport, and the 








CHAPTER I: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES OF THE EU 
 
I. Introduction; II. Neofunctionalism of EU Sports Law; III. European 
Integration; IV. Sports policy during European Integration; V. Nature and Effect 
of EU Law; V.I. Principle of Conferral; V.II . Principle of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality; V.III. Categories and Areas of Union Competences; V.III.I. Exclusive 
Competence; V.III.II.  Shared Competence; V.III.III. Supporting, Coordination 
or Supplementary Action; VI. Identification of Fundamental Treaty Provisions; VI.I 
General Principles and Founding Principles of EU; VI.II   Internal Market; VI.III. 
Fundamental Freedoms; VI.III.I   Scope of Application of the Fundamental Freedoms; 
VI.III.II.   Broadening of Application through ECJ Judgments; VI.III.III.   Direct Effect: 
Personal Scope of Application; VI.III.IV. Justification of Restrictions of the 
Fundamental Freedoms; VI.III.V. Proportionality Test; VI.IV. European Citizenship 
Provisions; VI.V. Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination Provisions; VI.VI. 
Competition Law Provisions; VI.VI.I. Basic Definitions; VII. Chapter Conclusion. 
 
I. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to establish the organisational structures of the EU to 
help determine whether the organisational structures of the EU and the European model 
of sport are mutually exclusive. The chapter explores the theories behind the European 
integration, the development and current status of European integration, the nature and 
effect of EU law and the identification of the fundamental treaty provisions applicable 
to sport with a brief introduction to the EU sports policy under Article 165 TFEU.  
 
II. Neofunctionalism of EU Sports Law  
European integration can be analysed under different stages and theoretical 
explanations, commencing with the functionalism of the 1950s32. Initially, it was 
believed that the European integration would best be developed by concentrating first 
 
32 D Chryssochoou, Theorizing European Integration (Routledge, 2nd edn, 2009); A Wiener and T Diez (eds), 
European Integration Theory (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2009). 
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on separate economic sectors, which could be supervised efficiently and 
technocratically by supranational institutions, and not being dominated by politics33. In 
1960s, after the shift from the European Coal and Steel Union towards the more 
expansive economic union, neofunctionalist theory, most notably explained by Ernst 
Haas34, materialized as a substitute way of describing the evolving integration process35. 
Functionalists and neofunctionalists have a similar foundation in their devotion to 
achieve peace in Europe through the mutual pursuit of equally beneficial goal of 
economic prosperity . Both claim that competitive economic and political bodies 
mediate in the process and become main players while actively involving in the 
system36. However, neofunctionalists assume that integration is a process initiated by 
political and economic elites who accept that significant difficulties could not be 
handled beneficially at the level of Member States and consequently they encourage 
political powers to be transferred to supranational institutions37. Once such powers are 
transferred a new self-reinforcing dynamic depending on the spill-over mechanism is 
triggered38. Neofunctionalists consider that integration is an ongoing process based on 
spill-over from one initially agreeable and technical area to other areas of possibly 
greater political controversy. The concept of spill-over is one of the most arguable 
aspects of the neofunctionalist approach39. It has a crucial role for the neofunctionalists 
in describing how the integration process could take place without an explicit proactive 
choice by Member State governments to increase the Union’s competences40. Spill-over 
is an automatic process where economic interests would join in with supranational 
players and direct politics towards further integration41. Once the sovereignty in a policy 
area had been pooled to the Union, supranational players look for further integration 
 
33 P Craig and G De Burca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn, Oxford University Press, 2011) p 2. 
34 EB Haas, Beyond the Nation State (Stanford University Press, 1964). 
35 Paul Craig and Grainne De Burca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn, Oxford University Press, 2011) p 
2. 
36 Juliet Lodge, The European Union, and the Challenge of the Future (Pinter, 1993) Introduction, xix. 
37 EB Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stevens & Sons 1958). 
38 HE Meier, ‘Emergence, Dynamics and Impact of European Sports policy – Perspectives from Political Science’ in 
S Gardiner, R Parrish, RCR Siekmann, eds., EU, Sport, Law and Policy Regulation, Re-Regulation and 
Representation (TMC Asser Press 2009) p 10.    
39 A Warleigh-Lack and R Drachenberg, ‘Spillover in a soft policy era? Evidence from the Open Method of Co-
ordination in education and training’ [2011] Journal of European Public Policy 999, p 1001. 
40 Ibid. 
41 B Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (Macmillan, 2000) p 59-65. 
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grounds starting with connected areas42. The literature on the European integration 
agrees that the supranational players, especially the ECJ and the European Commission 
have dynamically enlarged competences of the Union in central policy areas43.  Mainly, 
ECJ judgments demonstrated that supranational actors drive forward the integration 
process44. The ECJ not only supported the interpretation and constitutionalisation of 
European law, but it also created the principle of direct effect which offered the 
European institutions an uncodified means for imposing and developing Union law45.  
 
The emergence of EU sports law has supported the classical approach of 
neofunctionalist spill-over of European law into a policy area not predicted and/or 
intended by the Member States46. The European institutions initially only interfered 
with the sporting practices due to the competences conferred to them to control and 
facilitate the functioning of the single market47. Initially, the ECJ in Walrave48 ruled that 
EC law is applicable to sporting practices in so far as it constitutes an economic activity 
within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty49. In the case, the ECJ expanded its 
integrationist judicature into sport domain50 while establishing that EC law is 
applicable to sport with a condition of the presence of economic activity. The 
foundations set by the ECJ for the EU law to regulate the activities of the sporting bodies 
were supported by the European Parliament and the Commission51. Prior to the 
 
42 A Warleigh-Lack and Ralf Drachenberg, ‘Spillover in a soft policy era? Evidence from the Open Method of Co-
ordination in education and training’ [2011] Journal of European Public Policy 999, p 1001. 
43 MD Aspinwall and G Schneider, ‘Same Menu, Separate Tables: The Institutionalist Turn in Political Science and 
the Study of European Integration’ [2001] European Journal of Political Research 1.  
44 AM Burley and W Mattli, ‘Europe before ECJ: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’, [1993] International 
Organization 41; JHH Weiler, ‘Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of ECJ in the 
Arena of Political Integration’ [1993] Journal of Common market Studies 417; N Fligstein, ‘Participation and Policy-
Making in the EU’ [1998] Journal of Common market Studies 445. 
45 HE Meier, ‘Emergence, Dynamics and Impact of European Sports policy – Perspectives from Political Science’ in 
S Gardiner, R Parrish, RCR Siekmann, eds., EU, Sport, Law and Policy Regulation, Re-Regulation and 
Representation (TMC Asser Press 2009) p 11. 
46 S Weatherill, ‘ “Fair Play Please!”: Recent Developments in the Application of EC law to Sport’ [2003] Common 
market Law Review 40, 51; L Barani, ‘The Role of ECJ as a Political Actor in the Integration Process: The Case of 
Sport Regulation after the Bosman Ruling’ [2005] Journal of Contemporary European Research p 42. 
47 B Garcia, ‘From Regulation to Governance and Representation: Agenda-Setting and the EU’s Involvement in 
Sport’ [2007] Entertainment and Sports Law Journal 5. 
48 Case C-36/74 Walrave & Koch [1974] ECR 1405. 
49 Ibid at para 4. 
50 HE Meier, ‘Emergence, Dynamics and Impact of European Sports policy – Perspectives from Political Science’ in 
S Gardiner, R Parrish, RCR Siekmann, eds., EU, Sport, Law and Policy Regulation, Re-Regulation and 
Representation (TMC Asser Press 2009) p 11. 
51 HE Meier, ‘Emergence, Dynamics and Impact of European Sports policy – Perspectives from Political Science’ in 
S Gardiner, R Parrish, RCR Siekmann, eds., EU, Sport, Law and Policy Regulation, Re-Regulation and 
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development of a post-Bosman EU sports policy, a study on The Impact of European 
Union Activities on Sport undertaken by Coopers and Lybrand for the European 
Commission, anaylsed the EU involvement in the European model of sport52. The study 
demonstrated the extensive involvement of the EU in regulating European model of 
sport without a co-ordinated policy approach53. However, the study also exposed a 
growing institutional awareness towards this difficulty and revealed progress designed 
to encounter this through the increase in the numbers of sporting institutions54.  
Nevertheless, the lack of a Treaty competence to develop a common sports policy 
formed an obstacle to achieve a uniform EU sports policy55.  
 
As a response to the Member States reluctance towards the Union’s interference in the 
sporting practices, the Commission chose a cautious approach towards the sporting 
practices and the ECJ criticised the approach of the Commission in the Bosman 
judgment56. In the case, the ECJ defined the legal limits for sporting practices in the 
Union while establishing the application of the competition law principles against 
sporting bodies57. With Bosman58, the spill-over of EU law to sport governance was 
triggered. After Bosman, besides the European Parliament, the Commission attempted 
to promote sport as a method to encourage European integration and set an agenda for 
positive integration in sport59. 
 
Representation (TMC Asser Press 2009) 12; European Parliament, ‘Resolution of the European Parliament on the 
free movement of professional football players in the Union, Rapporteur: James L. Jassen van Raay (A2-415/88), 
C69 OJ (1989) . 
52 Coopers and Lybrand, ‘The Impact of European Union Activities on Sport’ (Study for DG X of the European 
Commission, 1995). 
53 R Parrish, Sports Law and Policy in the EU (Manchester University Press 2003) p 62. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 HE Meier, ‘Emergence, Dynamics and Impact of European Sports policy – Perspectives from Political Science’ in 
S Gardiner, R Parrish, RCR Siekmann, eds., EU, Sport, Law and Policy Regulation, Re-Regulation and 
Representation (TMC Asser Press 2009) 12;  Zuleeg, ‘Der Sport im Europaischen Gemeinschaftsrecht’ [Sport within 
Union Law], in M R Will, eds., Sportrecht in Europa (Muller 1993) 1. 
57 HE Meier, ‘Emergence, Dynamics and Impact of European Sports policy – Perspectives from Political Science’ in 
S Gardiner, R Parrish, RCR Siekmann, eds., EU, Sport, Law and Policy Regulation, Re-Regulation and 
Representation (TMC Asser Press 2009) 12;  Zuleeg, ‘Der Sport im Europaischen Gemeinschaftsrecht’ [Sport within 
Union Law], in M R Will, eds., Sportrecht in Europa (Muller 1993) 1. 
58 Case C-415/93Union Royale Belge Societes de Football Association v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
59 Ad hoc Committee ‘On People’s of Europe’, ‘Report to the European Council: Adonnino report’, 85 A 10.04 COM 
(1985); European Parliament, ‘Resolution of the European Parliament on the Free Movement of Professional Football 
Players in the Union, Rapporteur: James L. Janssen van Raay (A2-415/88)’, C 69 OJ (1989), 33; European 
Parliament, ‘Report on the Commission Report to the European Council with a View to Safeguarding Current Sports 
Structures and Maintaining the Social Function of Sport within the Union Framework: The Helsinki Report on Sport, 




Member States have been reluctant towards the EU’s policy making motivations in sport 
and argued against classical attempts of supranational competence creeping60. Sport 
challenged the theory of neofunctionalism since technical spill-over has not evolved 
into a political spill-over due to the Member States reluctance of transferring 
competences to the Union until the Lisbon Treaty61. However, the Member States 
continuous resistance towards European sporting regulation and classifying it as an 
unintended and superfluous consequence of market integration did not prevent the EU 
from regulating sport. The Commission’s attempts in the White Paper 200762 has been 
noted as demonstrating more supranational involvement in the process of identifying 
the Union’s legal framework for sporting practices63.  This forms an empirical evidence 
for the neofunctionalist approach in the Union64. With the Lisbon Treaty, under Article 
6 TFEU on supporting competences and Article 165 TFEU on sport, the Union has 
acquired a formal competence in sport for the first time since its founding. 
Consequently, the technical spill-over has translated into a political spill-over. This has 
strengthened the neo-functionalist explanation of the development of EU sports policy. 
 
III. European Integration 
European integration commenced in the early 1950s with six sovereign founding 
members who wished to create more peaceful relations post-WWII. This integration 
came into being by way of freely agreed international law treaties having economic 
inspirations as well as an effort to restore relations between France and Germany65. The 
European Coal and Steel Union (ECSC) was established under the Treaty of Paris for a 
limited period of fifty years, expiring in 2002. The supporters of the ECSC Treaty 
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considered it as the first steps for European integration aiming to achieve a European 
Federation instead of a simple economic unity of coal and steel66. Nevertheless, the 
period between 1951 and 1957 was difficult for European integration67. The European 
Defence Community (EDC) which would have a European army, a common budget and 
joint institutions had to be put on hold when its ratification was refused by the French 
National Assembly due to German remilitarization68. Consequently, the integration 
process to achieve defence and political union was put on hold for thirty-nine years until 
the Member States signed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and established the EU69. 
 
Meanwhile, the progress to achieve economic integration has not discontinued. Instead, 
to obtain economic integration, the object moved towards low politics which paved the 
way for the establishment of the European Atomic Energy Union (EURATOM) and the 
European Economic Community (EEC) under the Treaty of Rome in 195770.  Even 
though EURATOM and the EEC were politically encouraged, their sole focuses were 
economic and unlike the ECSC, there was no limited lifespan for the treaties. The 
economic focus of the treaty was clearly stated and political objectives which were 
previously expressed under the draft EDC were excluded due to national resistance71.  
Primary Treaty objectives identified in the preamble of the Treaty mainly were to lay 
the foundations of an ever-closer union and to ensure the economic and social progress 
of the Member States and similar72. These objectives were achieved with the 
establishment of a common market as well as a customs union and by developing 
common policies.  
 
For the time being, the European Community has enhanced its competences paving its 
way to achieve economic and monetary union while political integration had mainly 
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been suspended73. The Single European Act was prepared to encourage completion of 
the internal market. To achieve this, decision making processes at the Council, which 
required unanimity for the harmonisation of legislation, needed to be amended. The 
SEA may not be considered as a dramatic improvement, but it made important 
institutional amendments to establish the internal market over a period expiring on 
31 December 199274. The Single Market was defined clearly as an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured 
in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty75. This drive of the SEA to realise the 
Single European Market project created an unprecedented functional link with sport76. 
The ideology behind the legal foundations of the Single European Market exposed that 
no sector, including sport, can be exempted from the application of EU law77. On the  
other hand, EU’s legal framework took into account the specificity of sport as long as it 
did not hinder the application of EU law in the Single Market78.With the SEA, sport 
constituting economic activity within the single market operated under the regulatory 
system of the EU79.  
 
The impetus created by the SEA continued after its adoption. To achieve economic and 
monetary union, the European Council held an intergovernmental conference (IGC) and 
later a second one on political union with an aim to balance economic integration with 
political integration80. Following the IGCs, the draft treaty prepared and signed by the 
Member States in 1992 became known as the Maastricht Treaty, Treaty on EU (TEU)81. 
The TEU sought to achieve five key goals of strengthening the democratic legitimacy 
of the institutions; improving the effectiveness of the institutions; establishing economic 
and monetary union; developing the Union social dimension; and, establishing a 
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common foreign and security policy82. To achieve these goals, the concept of European 
citizenship was introduced while the powers of the directly elected Parliament were 
increased. In addition, the name of the organisation changed from European Community 
to European Union demonstrating a shift away from a Community founded on economic 
grounds to a Union supported by social values83. Maastricht Treaty demonstrated an 
attempt to change the cultural context of integration84. With the Maastricht Treaty, the 
EU has acquired a greater socio-cultural expression in its policy remit where sport sat 
more comfortably within the EU’s policy architecture85. Sport was considered as one of 
the tools to bring European citizens closer to EU86. With the adoption of the TEU, EU 
evidently went beyond its original economic objective, which was mainly the 
establishment of a common market, and its desire towards political integration surfaced.  
 
The following intergovernmental conference (IGC) in 1996 led to the adoption of the 
Amsterdam Treaty with a declaration on sport. The Treaty was about consolidation 
rather than extending the powers of the Union87. The main idea behind it was to facilitate 
the expansion in number of the Member States which was later postponed until the Nice 
IGC. The Nice Treaty made certain amendments to the EC Treaty in relation to the 
Union’s institutional structure. The main political success was the consensus obtained 
on the issues of enlargement regarding weighting of votes in the Council, the 
distribution of seats in the European Parliament, and the composition of Commission88. 
The Amsterdam Declaration on Sport and the Nice Declaration together with the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ and Competition Policy DG reflected the effective functioning 
and sensitivity of the EU institutions to sport89. After Bosman, sport governing bodies 
lobbied for a legal base, a sport article, which would limit the application of EU law to 
sport while providing the EU with a tool to develop a sociocultural common sports 
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policy90. Member States responded to calls for sport to be granted a legal base within a 
European Treaty by annexing a non-binding Declaration on Sport to the Amsterdam 
Treaty which invited the EU to acknowledge the social significance of sports91. While 
the Declaration failed to meet the expectations to have a legal competence for sport 
within the EU, it was significant that Bosman was indirectly criticised. This helped to 
politicise sport and the law in the EU92. Member states complied with the Amsterdam 
Declaration and published guidelines on the necessity to recognise the specificity of 
sport within the EU’s legal framework93. The series of Presidency Conclusions of the 
EU on this subject resulted in the publication of the Nice Declaration. This declaration 
recognised that while the EU does not have direct powers in this area, the Community 
must, in its action under the various Treaty provisions, consider the social, educational 
and cultural functions of sport which are making it special94. The Nice Declaration 
indicated that sporting rules designed to maintain a competitive balance should be 
treated differently under the EU law95.  
 
In 2001, the European Council meeting in Laeken achieved a consensus on the method 
of reform, which would be a convention, and the agenda was set for discussion. 
However, due to difficulties of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in the 
Netherlands and France, the European Council launched a period of reflection on the 
future of Europe and the Constitutional Treaty never recovered and did not become 
law96. Consequently, to find an alternative way to reform the founding Treaties of the 
EU, an IGC was organised in Lisbon in July 2007. The plan for achieving a European 
Constitution was discarded and further discussions undertaken with the object of 
preparing an amending Treaty97. The new amending Treaty of Lisbon was drafted and 
signed in 2007 and came into force in 2009.  
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The Treaty of Lisbon made changes on the composition of institutions, simplified the 
legislative procedure and amended the decision making of the Council by reformulating 
the qualified majority voting system.  In addition, the Treaty terminated the three-pillar 
structure of the Union and set up a formulation for the distribution of competences 
between the Member States and the EU to achieve clarity and increase the functioning 
of EU98. Generally, the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon received positive reactions99. 
The current standpoint of European integration fulfils the standard of being a 
constitutional form of a union100. Initially, the European integration was established 
under an international agreement administered through by the ECSC Treaty. However, 
after 60 years since its founding, it has evolved greatly from having only an economic 
focus to having an overreaching range of goals both in legal and political areas101. Based 
on de Burca’s findings, the EU was established as a kind of pilot project of limited 
economic integration with a view to securing greater peace and prosperity for the 
Member States102. However, the EU has evolved into something much larger, more 
complex, and more ambitious103. The EU is now a legally and politically autonomous 
supranational entity established by the two founding constitutionalised treaties104.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty has played an important for the development of the EU sports policy. 
The interaction between sport and the EU law pre-dates the adoption of Article 165 
TFEU under the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. However, for the first time since the founding 
treaties, with the Lisbon Treaty, sport has been brought under the coverage of the 
European Treaty framework. Under Article 165 TFEU sport gained a supporting 
competence within the EU and sport has legally been brought under the coverage of the 
EU law. Even though this competence has been regarded as less remarkable105, for not 
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creating a dramatic change in the field, it has established that sport is explicitly and 
unambiguously affected and regulated by the application of EU law106. Therefore, 
governance of sport enjoyed conditional autonomy under the organisational structures 
of the EU. 
 
IV. Sports policy during European Integration 
The development of EU sports policy is discussed thoroughly in the following chapters. 
However, it is beneficial to make an introduction in this chapter while the European 
integration process and the European Treaties are analysed.  During its establishment in 
the 1950s, the EU did not have an official sports policy. Nevertheless, many other EU 
policies had an influence on sporting practices constituting economic activities. The 
EU’s legal framework approach to sport has been greatly formed by the ECJ’s 
judgments that sporting practices should comply with EU law if it constitutes an 
economic activity. It was the ECJ who established the means to connect sport with the 
EU’s legal framework107. As European integration has deepened to cover many policy 
areas, the institutions have regulated sporting practices more often through judgments 
and decisions, and, lately through Article 165 TFEU.   
 
Sport has attracted the interest of Member States mainly after Bosman and the urge to 
have a legal competence for sport under a Treaty has deepened108. The supporters for 
the Union to have a sport competence have acknowledged that obtaining a legal base 
would provide the means to develop a social and cultural common sports policy. 
However, they also feared that this would limit the wide application of general European 
law to sporting practices109. As a result, the heads of state and government of the 
Member States meeting in Amsterdam in 1997 agreed to obtain a non-binding 
Declaration on Sport, attached to the Amsterdam Treaty, mainly to promote 
acknowledgement of the specific nature of sport by the European institutions. Even 
though sport did not achieve legal competence within the Union, it served the need to 
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politicise sport and the law in EU110. The Amsterdam Treaty was the first European 
Treaty to officially mention sport. Following this, the Helsinki Report on Sport was 
published forming the framework for applying EU law to sport111. The Helsinki report 
was the first attempt to co-ordinate the single market and socio-cultural policy strands 
of its involvement in sport, although it was not attached to the Treaty112. In 2007, the 
Commission’s White Paper on Sport provided the means to develop a comprehensive 
European sports policy in anticipation of sport’s inclusion into the Lisbon Treaty. With 
the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU achieved definite competence to carry 
out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States for 
sport under Article 6 and 165 TFEU. With this, European sports policy has started to 
gain a momentum in progress and new initiatives were adopted113. The European 
Commission has accepted a Communication on Developing the European Dimension in 
Sport in January 2011 while the EU Sport Ministers approved EU Work Plan on sporting 
practices114. The EU sports law and policy shall be discussed with further details in the 
following chapters. 
 
V. Nature and Effect of EU Law 
The initial objective of achieving permanent peace in Western Europe has bonded with 
the ultimate objective of creating a union and consequently European integration’s legal 
and political nature had gone through a serious transformation115. Subsequently, it has 
become clear that by deepening the integration of Europe, the Communities had moved 
away from ordinary international organisations with repercussions for the nature of 
their legal order as well as their objectives116. To achieve the original largely economic 
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objectives of the Communities, deeper integration with more politically charged 
domains became necessary. This was the effect of spill-over which has ultimately 
transformed the nature of the Communities117.  This dynamic is a main denominator in 
the traditionally leading integration theory of neo-functionalism118. The powers of the 
EU have been stretched by the conferral of new powers to the Union through successive 
Treaty amendments mainly triggered by an extensive legal interpretation of the Treaty 
provisions, most importantly by a teleological view of old Art 308 EC (now 352 TFEU) 
which stated that if an action is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Union and the 
Treaties do not confer the necessary powers, then the Council acting unanimously could 
adopt the appropriate measures119. Moreover, the ECJ and the Commission could adopt 
a broad judicial interpretation of the Treaty provisions120. The ECJ has played an 
important initiative role during this transformation especially through the decisions in 
Van Gend121 and Costa122 by developing the notion that the Union has a new legal 
order123 and it has its own source of law with a special and original nature124. Union law 
is independent of both the national and international legal order125. The ECJ further 
ruled that the existence of the Union’s own supranational autonomous legal order is 
created by its own hierarchically supreme legal act, which is the Treaty, unlike 
international organisations. The Treaty is separate from the national legal orders and 
could ultimately be interpreted by the ECJ itself126. The impact of the Union’s 
organisational structures has continued to develop through the emerging case law of the 
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ECJ. The ECJ has established the principles of direct effect127, supremacy128, consistent 
interpretation129, effectiveness and equivalence130, and state liability131. These principles 
make sure that once a Union measure is adopted it could not be disregarded by the 
Member States and domestic Courts should apply them in practice132. However, the ECJ 
was established as an EU institution and in its core, there has been the desire to facilitate 
the European integration rather than limiting it133. It has been argued the ECJ has 
considerably neglected to take seriously the principles of conferral and subsidiarity 
outlined in Article 5 EC134 to facilitate persistent growth of the European integration to 
achieve an ever-closer union135.  
 
V.I. Principle of Conferral 
The EU is established under the principle of conferral. Unlike sovereign states, the EU 
has no inherent powers136. It is constitutionally rooted that the EU can only act within 
the limits of powers which has been assigned to it by the Member States. Therefore, the 
Union operates under conferred competences only. Article 4 TEU states that 
competences not conferred to the Union under the Treaties stay with the Member States. 
Article 5(1) TEU reaffirms Article 4(1) TEU and states that the boundaries of Union 
competences are administered by the principle of conferral and the use of Union 
competences is administered by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The 
EU is founded on the principle of attributed powers and it does not enjoy unlimited 
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competence to act and it must respect the limits of powers conferred to it by the Member 
States under the Treaties137. In addition to the competences granted by the Treaties to 
the Union, the competences need to be exercised as demanded by the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality138. This provides slight protection to the rights of the 
Member States as well as a limited shield against constantly rising transfer of power 
from the Member States to the Union139. Before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
EU did not have a competence of sport and could not regulate sporting activity solely 
based on the principle of conferral. Nevertheless, the EU regulated sport indirectly 
through the ECJ judgments and Commission decisions under the application of the 
fundamental treaty provisions since certain aspects of sport constituted economic 
activity and caught under the EU law.  
 
V.II. Principle of Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
Various justifications could be identified for the presence of the principle of subsidiarity 
within the EU framework. The most important role of subsidiarity is to ease the disputes 
over the separation of competence between the Union and the Member States140. It is a 
tool to improve the competence problem. Secondly, it clarifies the division between the 
exclusive and shared competence141. Thirdly, it helps the fears of Member States and 
prevents over centralization of the Union142. Finally, it encourages pluralism and 
diversity of national values143. The principle of subsidiarity is an essential tool during 
the decision-making process of EU since it regulates the Union’s competence to 
legislate144. It is laid down in Article 5 of the TEU alongside two other essential 
principles of conferral and proportionality. Subsidiarity and proportionality are 
corollary principles of the principle of conferral145. Together, they decide on the extent 
to which the EU could employ the competences attained to it by the Treaties. 
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Subsidiarity justifies whether the EU should exercise those powers and the principle of 
proportionality justifies to what extend those powers should be exercised146. Likewise, 
the principle of proportionality monitors the exercise of conferred competences by the 
EU and makes sure that the actions taken are necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties147.  
 
V.III. Categories and Areas of Union Competences 
It has always been difficult to distinguish the boundaries of competence148. One of the 
main reasons behind the competence problem, or the competence creep, is the Union, 
since its founding, has always had attributed competences which it could only action 
within the limits of these competences granted to it by the Member States149. On the 
other hand, it has been argued that the protection provided to the Member States under 
Article 5 TEU does not provide sufficient safeguards against an ever-increasing shift of 
power from the Member States to the Union150. This shift of powers resulted in 
unwarranted arrogation of power by the Union’s institutions to the detriment of the 
Member State’s while Article 5 TEU is considered as not capable in protecting the 
interests of the Member States151. With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, 
competences are re-organised and clarified while a system for monitoring competence 
creep is introduced152.  
 
V.III.I. Exclusive Competence 
Article 2(1) TFEU establishes the category of exclusive competence in a specific area 
which ensures that only the Union could legislate and adopt legally binding acts in the 
particular area while the Member States could only act should the Union empowers 
them or to implement the Union acts. The specific areas where the Union has an 
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exclusive competence is set out under Article 3(1) TFEU. The areas which fall under 
the category of EU’s exclusive competence are least in amount and quite distinct in 
nature153. Yet, there could possibly be difficulties in setting a boundary between certain 
policy areas which fall under the shared competence of the Union154. For example, the 
customs union is established as an exclusive competence for the Union. However, it 
could easily fall under the policy area of the internal market which has been identified 
under Article 4(2) TFEU as a shared competence.  In addition, further ambiguities are 
present regarding the competition rules which are expressed as exclusive competence 
yet could come under the internal market which is a shared competence155. 
 
V.III.II.  Shared Competence 
Article 2(2) TFEU establishes the category of shared competence and states that when 
the Union has a shared competence with the Member States in a specific area, the EU 
and the Member States could legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area 
provided that the Member States only exercise their competence to the extent that the 
Union has not exercised its competence. Article 4 TFEU explains the specific policy 
areas which fall under the category of shared competence. Shared competence is the 
general residual category156 and the Union shall share competence with the Member 
States if it does not relate to exclusive competence and supporting competence. The 
category of shared competence has always been and still is central to the policy making 
of the Union157. Member States could only exercise its powers under shared competence 
if the Union has opted not to. This eventually decreases the powers of the Member 
States158. On the other hand, the scope of and arrangements for exercising the EU’s 
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V.III.III. Supporting, Coordination or Supplementary Action 
Article 2(5) TFEU establishes the third general category of competences which states 
that the Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or 
supplement the actions of the Member States without thereby superseding their 
competence in these areas. Since Lisbon, sport falls into this area of competence which 
is discussed in following chapters this thesis. Acts of Union under these areas shall not 
entail harmonisation of Member States’ laws or regulations. Article 6 TFEU further lists 
the areas, and the Union has powers of influence in these areas but no powers of 
harmonisation160.  
 
VI. Identification of Fundamental Treaty Provisions 
At the launch of European integration, the core of the challenge and the objectives of 
the Treaties were at developing an extensive perception of Europe161.  This approach 
has lost its persuasiveness in due course while the objectives have increased in numbers. 
Lately, by abolishing the specific goals of the Union which were previously expressly 
stated under Article 2 EC, the Lisbon Treaty has opted for a principle based approach 
as a useful alternative to facilitate an independent legal analysis, enrich the autonomy 
of Courts and allow for an internal advancement of EU law162. Principles such as direct 
effect and supremacy developed by the ECJ form the fundamental bases for the 
constitutionalisation of EU law. While the course to achieve European integration has 
initiated as a neo-functional move and the objectives of integration were determined 
clearly under the Treaties, the ECJ has gradually adopted the principles of 
proportionality, good administration, legal certainty and the protection of fundamental 
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VI.I. General Principles and Founding Principles of EU 
Principles are special legal norms within the complete legal framework164 which consist 
of a degree of innate generality in the sense of a borderless, hypothetical, non-conclusive 
or orientative character165. Principles are commonly not found in written form and 
generally they are not a part of legislation despite subsequent codification. They 
commonly encompass values and morality and may reflect ideologies166. It has been 
commonly accepted that there is no systematic legal framework for general principles 
of the EU law167. General principles of EU law are accepted as unwritten, yet 
subsequently codified judge made norms which often lack a clearly defined content168. 
On the other hand, founding principles are a general standard of framework of reference 
for all primary law within the entire EU legal system169. It is essential to understand the 
founding principles as constitutional principles and to manage them appropriately170. 
The EU has transformed and developed into a political union at the beginning of 1990s, 
and, in 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty, after lengthy discussions, established the EU on 
the fundamental principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law171. The founding principles of the EU were 
expressed under Article 6(1) EU and areas regarding the allocation of competences, 
loyal cooperation, structural compatibility and principles regarding the relationship 
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VI.II.   Internal Market 
Internal market philosophy has been accepted as the main idea behind European 
integration and has formed both the essence and course of law making in the EU173. It 
has been defined as an engine for building a stronger and fairer EU economy174. With 
the adoption of the Treaty of Rome, the common market was established aiming to 
abolish trade barriers between Member States to facilitate economic prosperity and 
contribute to an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe175. Furthermore, in 
1986, under the Single European Act, the objective of the internal market has been 
described as an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services, and capital is ensured176. It has been noted that while the legal 
framework of the internal market has now been positioned, current discussions on the 
internal market has focused on the effectiveness and impact of EU legislation177. 
Beginning as a neo-functionalist entity of economic integration, the primary normative 
component of the EU’s political action has been nourished by its economic purpose to 
establish the common or internal market178. Eventually, this objective has facilitated an 
extensive body of knowledge which has provided the intellectual base of its political 
rationality179. Starting from the activation of EU integration, European institutions had 
to clarify and interpret what the common market is and what it needs, and, how to 
intervene in the market180. The fabrication of an extensive body of knowledge, through 
reports, impact assessments, policy documents and expert opinions, is the consequence 
of this demand for interpretation to clarify and identify the problems of the internal 
market, such as barriers to trade or what is a transaction cost, and propose possible 
solutions, such as harmonisation, learning, empowerment and mutual recognition181.  
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The ECJ encouraged the negative integration method of market integration through its 
judgments on free movement provisions by applying internal market laws to strike down 
national laws having an adverse effect on the free circulation of economic resources on 
interstate trade182. The development of the internal market law through negative 
integration and the acceptance of the principle of mutual recognition have created a 
conflict between social policy at the national level and the principles of the internal 
market183.  Policy areas originally maintained under the sole autonomy of the Member 
States at the national level have come to be caught in the ideology of internal market184. 
Sporting practices in the EU is caught under the same ideology of the Union to ensure 
proper functioning of the internal market. Even though sport has distinct character 
compared to other market sectors, it has not been granted a general exception from the 
application of EU law if it constitutes an economic activity. Further discussion will take 
place in the following chapters. 
 
VI.III. Fundamental Freedoms 
Free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital are considered as the 
fundamental principles of primary law and they have significant importance in the legal 
framework of the EU185. The free movement principles and the competition law 
principles are often considered as two separate and crucial areas of Union law which 
regulates the effective functioning of the internal market while aiming to avoid the 
compartmentalisation of the market186. While competition law provisions prohibit anti-
competitive agreements having the effect or object of preventing, restricting or 
distorting competition and abuse of dominant position in the internal market, the free 
movement principles prohibit restrictions on the free movement of goods, services and 
workers between Member States187. The ECJ has gradually expanded the respective 
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scope of the application of the free movement provisions by not only applying them in 
the most diverse fields of law but also by applying them to the extensive category of 
parties188. As a result, the ECJ has broadened the obligations which were initially laid 
under these provisions189.  
 
VI.III.I.   Scope of Application of the Fundamental Freedoms 
The TFEU provisions on the fundamental freedoms expressly states that Member States 
are prohibited from discriminating against goods, persons, services and capital on 
imports and exports between Member States. Moreover, custom duties on imports and 
exports between Member States and charges having equivalent effect are prohibited in 
principle190, as well as non-fiscal quantitative restrictions and measures having 
equivalent effect191 on trade in goods originating both in Member States and third-
countries192 which are in free circulation193. In addition, discrimination based on 
nationality between the workers194 or self-employed and the companies or the firms195 
of Member States is not allowed. Besides, discriminatory restrictions on the freedom to 
provide services by nationals, companies, or firms of another Member State196 are in 
principle forbidden. The same applies to restrictions on the movement of capital 
between Member States, and, between Member States and third countries197. 
 
Firstly, free movement of goods is one of the four fundamental freedoms of the internal 
market and is defined under article 28 of the TFEU. This protects the right to free 
movement of goods originating in Member States as well as goods originating from 
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third countries which are imported in the Member States198. Secondly, freedom of 
movement and residence for persons in the EU is the foundation of Union citizenship199 
and it is secured and defined under Article 3(2) of the Treaty on EU (TEU), Article 21 
of the TFEU (TFEU), Titles IV and V TFEU. Freedom of movement for workers is one 
of the founding principles of the EU and it is explained under Article 45 of the TFEU. 
It regulates the rights of workers eliminating any nationality-based discrimination 
between workers of the Member States during employment. The free movement of 
persons has altered in definition since its establishment200. However, the term worker 
has not been defined under the Treaty. Nevertheless, the ECJ ruled that, to have a 
consistency, defining the meaning of a worker is a matter of EU law201 and defined 
worker as any person pursuing employment activities which are effective and genuine, 
to the exclusion of small scale marginal and ancillary activities, is treated as a worker202.  
Thirdly, the freedom to provide services and establishment secures movement of 
businesses and professionals within the EU. Proper functioning of these two freedoms 
are important for the achievement of the internal market203. Freedom to provide services 
and establishment is secured and defined under Articles 26 (internal market), 49 to 55 
(establishment) and 56 to 62 (services) of the TFEU. The objectives of these freedom 
indicate avoiding discrimination on the grounds of nationality and, to facilitate the 
exercise of these freedoms effectively by implementing measures, including but not 
limited to the harmonisation of national access rules or their mutual recognition204. 
Finally, the free movement of capital is the last freedom which has joined all other 
Treaty freedoms and it is considered as the broadest of all free movement provisions 
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because of its third-country element205. Free movement of capital is defined and secured 
under Articles 63 to 66 of the TFEU, supplemented by Articles 75 and 215 TFEU for 
sanctions. At the beginning, the Treaties did not interfere with the movement of capital 
but only regulated that the Member States remove all the restrictions necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market. However, as the economic and political conditions 
evolved in Europe, the European Council accomplished the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) in 1988206. This required intensified harmonisation of national economic 
and monetary policies. As a result of the initiation of EMU, the Union has announced 
absolute freedom for capital transactions. After this introduction, the Treaty abolished 
any restriction on capital movements, both between Member States and between 
Member States and third countries207.  
 
VI.III.II.   Broadening of Application through ECJ Judgments 
Effective expansion of fundamental freedoms scope of application has been facilitated 
by the series of important judgments of the ECJ on the Treaty provisions on freedom of 
movement as well as increase in the freedom’s relevance and similarity between the 
legal frameworks of the Member States208. One of the most important milestone rulings 
of the ECJ within the area is considered to be the case Van Gend & Loos209 where the 
ECJ introduced a new dimension of the Treaty provisions on free movement and ruled 
that duties imposed under the fundamental freedoms provisions not only bind Member 
States but are also directly applicable rights of citizens which are enforceable against 
Member States in domestic Courts210. The adopted approach and introduced legal 
principle of direct effect in the Van Gend & Loos judgment has been confirmed and 
applied in the later judgments of ECJ on the other fundamental freedoms of the free 
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movement of capital211, free movement of goods212, freedom of movement of workers213 
and freedom of establishment214. The Van Gend & Loos judgment has initiated the 
ability of EU law to generate direct effect on the legal orders of the Member States by 
bestowing rights on citizens which need to be safeguarded and respected by domestic 
Courts215.  
 
The ECJ has taken another important action in the judgment of Dassonville216 and has 
relocated the protection of the fundamental freedoms, based on the Treaty’s non-
discrimination rules, to extensive prohibitions on restrictive measures217. The ECJ has 
held that all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Union trade are to be considered as 
measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions218 on imports and 
exports in the similar implication of Article 34 and 35 of the current TFEU.  
Subsequently, the Dassonville understanding and explanation on the free movement of 
goods provisions has spilled over to include other fundamental freedoms to provide 
services219, freedom of movement for workers220 and free movement of capital221. This 
development was followed by a flood of diverse judgments by the ECJ regarding the 
interpretation of the term goods under the free movement of goods provisions of the 
Treaty222, the interpretation of the freedom to provide services to include the freedom 
to receive services on cross border elements223 and the broadening of the free movement 
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of capital to heritages224, monetary donations and donations with a cross border 
situations225.  
 
A further major step was taken in the case Factortame226 where ECJ held that Member 
States, including the areas where they have exclusive competences, must exercise their 
powers and competences in harmony with the general EU law and fundamental 
freedoms provisions of the Treaty227. Therefore, the ECJ ruled that Member States must 
exercise their powers in consistency of and with due respect to the fundamental 
freedoms’ provisions of the Treaty. Finally, it should also be stated here that as 
expressed under the Article 114 and 115 TFEU, it is crucial to remember that there must 
be a cross border element for the application of free movement provisions228. 
Additionally, they do not apply to the measures which their effect is too indirect or 
uncertain229, and they accord rights only to the market participants who engage in 
economic activity230. As long as an activity has an economic element, it will be caught 
and regulated under EU law. Sport in Europe has been caught under EU regulations if 
it constituted economic activity231. 
 
VI.III.III.   Direct Effect: Personal Scope of Application 
Initially, only Member States could seek their rights under the Treaty provisions. 
However, the ECJ was willingness to extend the scope of application of the free 
movement provisions to produce legal effects between the Member States and the 
citizens, and, the case law on direct effect of EU law has triggered the application of 
vertical direct effect of the fundamental freedoms232. Moreover, the ECJ has developed 
 
224 Case C-31/11 Scheunemann v Finanzamt Bremerhaven [2012] 3 CMLR 51 at [22]. 
225 Case C-10/10 Commission v Austria [2011] 3 CMLR 26 at [24] – [27]. 
226 Case C-221/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport Ex P Factortame Ltd [1991] ECR I-3905; [1991] 3 CMLR 
589. 
227 Ibid  at [14]. 
228 H Jarass, ‘Elemente einer Dogmatik der Grundfreiheiten’ [1995] EuR 202 p 204-208. 
229 A Tryfonidou, ‘Further Steps on the Road to Convergence among the Market Freedoms’ (2010) European Law 
Review 36 p 38. 
230 PC de Sousa, ‘Quest for the Holy Grail – Is a Unified Approach to the Market Freedoms and European Citizenship 
Justified?’ (2014) European Law Journal 499 p 501. 
231 Case C-63/74 B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405 at para 4. 
232 V Trstenjak and E Beysen, ‘The Growing Overlap of Fundamental Freedom and Fundamental Rights in the Case-
law of the CJEU’ (2013) European Law Review 293 p 297-298. 
38 
 
an overly broad definition of Member State’s actions to catch actions of private 
organisations or individuals under certain circumstances233. Furthermore, the ECJ has 
broadened the scope of the application of the fundamental freedoms to include private 
individual’s actions even when they have not been exercising similar powers to Member 
States234. The ECJ has further expanded the rules of direct effect to have horizontal 
direct effect on the fundamental freedoms to rules adopted by private bodies.  
 
After its sport related judgment in Walrave235, it is established that freedom of 
movement for workers, freedom of establishment, freedom to provide services and free 
movement of goods not only covers the actions of public authorities but also applies to 
the rules aiming to regulate collectively to achieve gainful employment and services in 
order to protect individuals from discrimination on the grounds of nationality236. 
Moreover, in Bosman237 the ECJ held that even though the rules under scrutiny did not 
discriminate on grounds of nationality they were still directly affecting player access to 
the employment market in another Member State238. In 2007, under the Viking and Laval 
cases, the ECJ ruled that a trade union’s right of joint action is within the jurisdiction of 
the Treaty provisions on the fundamental freedoms239. Therefore, it has been observed 
that the ECJ has ruled under the principle of horizontal direct effect on the cases relating 
to the fundamental freedoms where the measures were discriminatory on the grounds of 
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nationality and organisations engaged in collective regulation while exercising their 
legal autonomy240. It is yet to be seen in the future judgment of ECJ whether the 
horizontal direct effect application of the fundamental freedoms is limited with the 
above mentioned two requirements of discrimination and/or collective regulation or not. 
However, it is worth noting here that sport has not been treated differently than other 
sectors within the legal framework of EU. 
 
VI.III.IV.   Justification of Restrictions of the Fundamental Freedoms 
In time, the improvement on the scope of application of the fundamental freedom 
provisions through case law has been complimented and balanced by expanding the 
basis for justification of restrictions on the free movement provisions241. Accordingly, 
the ECJ has ruled that restrictions on the free movement provisions, which are forbidden 
in principle, can be justified with reference not only to the written grounds expressly 
stated in the Treaty242, but also on the basis of public interest243. In the case of Casis de 
Dijon, the ECJ held that national obstacles to the free movement of goods must be 
accepted in so far as the national provisions at issue may be recognised as being 
necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of 
commercial transactions and the defence on the consumer244. This justification of public 
interest to a restriction provided a reasonable explanation to a national restriction of the 
free movement provisions under the Treaty and this resolution was later identified as 
the ‘rule of reason’ and since been applied to all free movement provisions245. In specific 
cases regarding restrictions of the free movement provisions by collective regulations 
with a non-public law character, the ECJ has scrutinised private interest for the 
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evaluation of the legitimacy of restrictions246. In the case of Bernard247 the ECJ 
considered the possibility of relying on the objective of promoting the recruitment and 
training of young players in order to justify the regulation of a football association which 
restricted freedom of movement for workers248. Also in Bosman249, the ECJ scrutinised 
the possibility of justifying the transfer regulations of football associations which 
restricted freedom of movement for workers by relying on the objective of guaranteeing 
a balance among the clubs, while preserving a certain degree of equal opportunity and 
uncertainty of results, and to promote the recruitment and training of young players250. 
The ECJ has adopted the same line of reasoning for different types of market sectors 
and the rule of reason adopted by the Court under Casis de Dijon is applied to the above-
mentioned sport related cases without exception. 
 
VI.III.V.   Proportionality Test 
Nevertheless, the scrutiny of the ECJ under the above mentioned cases seem to provide 
an exception to the general rule that justification of a restriction of the free movement 
provisions by collective regulations of a non-public law nature either needs to be 
expressly stated under the TFEU or needs to provide evidence of public interest251. 
Justification of a restriction stage in the Court’s assessment consists of two parts. First, 
the measure which poses a restriction on the fundamental freedoms needs to have a 
legitimate aim to have an acceptable ground for justification. Secondly, the measure 
needs to be proportionate252. In Gebhard253, the ECJ ruled that national measures which 
hinder or make less attractive the exercise of free movement provisions guaranteed by 
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the Treaty can only be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest if 
they are applied in a non-discriminatory manner.254 The Gebhard method of 1995 has 
since been used by the ECJ to determine whether a restriction could be justified and 
accepted as legal. Restrictions of fundamental freedoms can only be justified if four 
conditions are fulfilled. First, a restriction must be applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner. Secondly, it must be justified by overriding reasons based on the general 
interest. Thirdly, it must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which 
it pursues. Lastly, it must not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective255. 
The ECJ has summarised this test in subsequent judgments as an obstacle can be 
justified under Union law only if it is based on objective considerations independent of 
nationality of the persons concerned and is proportionate to the legitimate aim of the 
national provisions256.  
 
VI.IV. European Citizenship Provisions 
The citizenship of the EU has been inspired by the freedom of movement for persons. 
Advocate General Poiares Maduro explained in Alfa Vita257 that the harmonisation of 
free movement provisions is essential to achieve genuine objectives of European 
Citizenship since it would be ideal for the same approach to be applied to the citizens 
wishing to benefit from the fundamental market rights of free movement258. As a 
response, it seems from the approach adopted by the ECJ that the fundamental market 
freedoms are on the road for convergence to answer the needs of European Citizenship 
in the most effective way259. Even though this understanding of convergence mainly 
concerns market freedoms, it has been identified that there is no reason why it should 
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not relate to the European Citizenship260. Even though there are significant substantive 
normative differences between the two, the ECJ has applied a common methodological 
approach to both261. Fundamental freedoms under the EU law generate subjective public 
rights262 and protect public and private rights while imposing obligations on public 
authorities which could be enforced by individuals263. 
 
EU citizenship concerns the rights, duties and political involvement of the EU citizens 
while regulating the relationship between the citizens and the EU264. EU citizenship is 
stated and defined under Articles 9 to 12 and 18 to 25 of the TFEU (TFEU). The 
citizenship provisions play an important part in creating European identity and is 
considered as a complement to the citizenship of a Member State265. The main difference 
between the citizenship of EU and a citizenship of a Member State is that European 
citizenship rights are not matched with duties266. The Union law on the economic 
fundamental free movement provisions has reached a level of maturity267. Therefore, 
the ECJ became willing to re-evaluate certain central doctrines and principles of the free 
movement provisions initially developed by the Court to facilitate the proper 
functioning of the internal market268. After the Union opted to become an organisation 
with certain non-economic objectives and established the concept of Citizenship, the 
notion to create an internal market has no longer been treated as the lone and spoiled 
child of the Union policy269. The internal market has started to be regarded as a broader 
concept which needs to function in harmony with non-economic objectives, such as the 
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social and consumer policy, environmental protection, human rights, and European 
Citizenship270. 
 
The personal application of the EU law matured in time and taken the form of European 
Citizenship under the Maastricht Treaty. This is an example of a natural spill-over 
inherently related to the functioning of the internal market271. The ECJ has clarified that 
the simple exercise of free movement provisions by an individual does not necessarily 
give rise to the application of EU law. There must be a connection between the free 
movement rights as expressed under the Treaty and the rights exercised272. 
Nevertheless, the ECJ has not relied on this condition strictly in cases relating to the 
free movement of individuals273. As an example, in cases related to the family re-
unification rights274 and cases where the cross-border activity did not relate to an 
economic activity,275 the ECJ ruled that these situations fall within the application of 
fundamental provisions of free movement rights. The Court has extended the main 
rights which were originally attached only to the individuals’ activities which 
constituted an economic activity to economically inactive individuals who are European 
Citizens276. In practice, it has been identified that the free movement provisions on 
people reveal fundamental human right provisions and they are combined with the 
European Citizenship.277 In D’Hoop278 the ECJ dealt with free movement provisions 
and Citizenship in a similar manner by examining whether a national measure restricts 
Treaty provisions, and if it does, whether it could it be justified279. This is the same 
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approach adopted by the ECJ to give a ruling on the cases relating to the fundamental 
rights. In addition, in Brickel and Franz the ECJ combined the right of free movement 
and European Citizenship and held that Article 18 TFEU on the prohibition of 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality applies equally to both free movement of 
services and to European Citizenship280. Moreover, in Ursula Elsen, the ECJ gave a 
judgment without ruling whether the situation was regulated under the free movement 
provisions of workers or European Citizenship281. Recently in TopFit282 the ECJ held 
that sporting rules with no economic interests falls under the application of EU law and 
they are regulated under Article 21 on non-discrimination and citizenship provision of 
the EU. Moreover, Article 21 TFEU may horizontally be applied by an EU citizen 
exercising his/her right to free movement within the meaning of Article 21 TFEU. 
Nevertheless, this horizontal application would depend on the nature of the relationship 
and power irregularity between the parties. The more unbalanced the relationship, the 
more likely Article 21 TFEU might be relied on horizontally283. Future decisions might 
provide clarification in the area.  However, meanwhile, such an interpretation of the 
horizontal direct effect of Article 21 TFEU is in line with the relatively limited 
horizontal direct effect described by de Mol for Article 18 TFEU that concerns private 
relations in which one party is weaker than the other party284. 
 
VI.V. Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination Provisions 
Ever since its introduction under the Treaty of Rome, the principle of equal treatment 
and non-discrimination has deepened and widened into a sophisticated principle of EU 
law with the involvement of the ECJ285. Equality between women and men has been 
one of the main objectives of the EU. The concept of equality and non-discrimination 
was introduced in the Treaty of Rome simply for economic reasons to avoid Member 
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States achieving a competitive advantage over others by offering lower salaries 
conditions of work to women286.  The key aim behind the equal treatment and non-
discrimination objectives were to maximise the efficiency of the workforce and to 
achieve greater amount of economic involvement in the Union287. As a result of this 
logical approach, equal treatment has spilled over across various areas of the Union.  
 
The Court has established and developed the principles of direct and indirect 
discrimination. Direct discrimination applies to situations where an individual is treated 
less favourably compared others based on specific grounds such as gender. The 
principle of indirect discrimination applies to situations where a measure or a practice 
causes an effect which has a disproportionately adverse impact on an individual or on a 
certain group of individuals288.  The indirect discrimination principle is considered as 
the Court’s greatest achievement in gender equality289. This principle, while accepting 
the presence of social and material differences between individuals, contains elements 
of genuine equality and seeks to achieve actual equality290. Therefore, based on this 
approach of the ECJ to achieve actual equality, an important distinction is made 
regarding the justification of a discriminatory measure or action. In cases of direct 
discrimination, justification is achieved only in limited circumstances and it must be 
carefully reasoned291. On the other hand, in cases of indirect discrimination, 
justification is possible through the method of objective justification292 discussed earlier 
under fundamental freedoms. While some sport cases, such as Lehtonen and Bernard 
are classic examples of objective justification test undertaken by ECJ to decide on the 
validity of a discriminatory sporting rule, recently TopFit provided a room for direct 
nationality discrimination of a sporting rule to be justified based on the social 
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importance of sport promoting further integration293. In the case ECJ observed that the 
EU law does now clearly mention sport under Article 165 TFEU and the right of EU 
citizens to reside in another Member State without discrimination294 do not dependent 
on the exercise of an economic activity295. Therefore, discrimination provisions of the 
EU law296 should be read in conjunction with Article 165 TFEU and be interpreted as 
amateur sport, as well as participation in sporting competitions at all levels, allows EU 
citizens to create bonds with the society of another State which he is residing297.  
 
VI.VI. Competition Law Provisions 
Competition law consists of rules intending to protect the system of competition to 
safeguard and increase consumer welfare298. Competition law deals with practices 
which are distorting the competitive process. Competition law is concerned with anti-
competitive agreements, abusive behaviour, mergers, and public restrictions of 
competition299. Competition law in the EU fulfils a unique function. The primary goal 
of European integration was to create a common market and establish the necessary 
circumstances to ensure the highest level of productivity and the lowest level of price 
for the steel and coal300. Competition law has played an important role in achieving the 
single market integration on the EU301. The method to reach this goal was identified as 
the establishment of the competition law principles302 which had to be the means to an 
end303. Secondly, it was called upon to ensure a competitive production to benefit 
consumers in terms of both price and quality while ensuring product prices within the 
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Common market are not discriminatory based on nationality304. Finally, competition 
principles aimed at protecting manufacturers against unfair competition while ensuring 
normal functioning of competition with no distorted discriminatory practices and, 
ideally, to develop a policy for exploitation and protection of the natural resources 
within the common market305. It was identified that to achieve a logical distribution of 
production at the highest level of productivity, elimination of barriers is not enough on 
its own. The establishment of expanding competition within the common market was 
crucial and, therefore, provisions which would ensure that the game of competition is 
not distorted must have been introduced306.  
 
Until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the competition law provisions were never 
altered. Competition law provisions under the Article 81-89 EC remains untouched 
under the new Articles 101-109 TFEU and the European Council agrees to attach a new 
protocol to the Treaties to make sure that internal market is a system which ensures 
competition is not distorted307. Articles 101 to 109 of the TFEU consists of the 
provisions on competition within the internal market and they abolish the anti-
competitive agreements between undertakings to make sure that an undertaking with a 
dominant position does not abuse its position in a way which would unfavourably 
disturb trade between Member States308.  These provisions should be interpreted in 
conjunction with the objectives and principles laid down in the TFEU and the Treaty on 
European Union (‘TEU’)309. Article 3(3) TEU states that one of the EU’s objectives is 
to achieve a highly competitive social market economy310. Article 3(3) TEU also states 
that the EU shall establish an internal market, in accordance with Protocol 27 on the 
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internal market and competition attached to the TEU and the TFEU and ensure that 
competition is not distorted. The Protocol has the same force as a Treaty provision311.   
 
Within Chapter 1 of Title VII of Part Three of the TFEU, Article 101(1) prohibits 
agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices that have 
as their object or effect the restriction of competition, although this prohibition may be 
declared inapplicable where the conditions in Article 101(3) are satisfied. Article 102 
prohibits the abuse by an undertaking or undertakings of a dominant position. Article 
106(1) imposes obligations on Member States in relation to the Treaty generally and the 
competition rules specifically, while Article 106(2) concerns the application of the 
competition rules to public undertakings and private undertakings to which a Member 
State entrusts responsibilities. Articles 107 to 109 prohibit state aid to undertakings by 
Member States which might distort competition in the internal market. An important 
additional instrument of EU competition law is the EU Merger Regulation (‘the 
EUMR’) which applies to concentrations between undertakings that have a Community 
dimension. 
 
VI.VI.I. Basic Definitions 
It is necessary to define certain terms which will be referred to in this research under 
the organisational structures of the EU to understand the approach of the EU 
competition law to sport. The Treaty does not define an undertaking. Therefore, it has 
been a task for the ECJ to clarify its meaning312. However, defining an undertaking is 
crucial since only agreements and concerted practices between undertakings are caught 
by Article 101, and Article 102 applies only to abuses committed by dominant 
undertakings313. Under the EU law, the term undertaking is interpreted by the Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT) to include any natural or legal person capable of carrying on 
commercial or economic activities relating to goods or services and an entity may 
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engage in economic activity in relation to some of its functions but not others314. The 
ECJ has granted broad meanings to an undertaking and to an economic activity. In the 
case of Hofner and Elser315, the ECJ stated that the concept of an undertaking 
encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of the legal status 
of the entity and the way in which it is financed. Sport Governing Bodies and Sport 
Clubs falls under this definition of an undertaking if they are engaged in an economic 
activity. Therefore, there activities are regulated under the application of the EU 
competition law. In the case of Pavlov316, the ECJ defined economic activity to include 
any activity consisting in offering goods or services on a given market is an economic 
activity. The ECJ ruled that the competition provisions of the EU law does not apply to 
an activity where its nature, aim and rules does not belong to the sphere of economic 
activity and it is connected with the exercise of the powers of a public authority317.  
Activities provided based on solidarity and exercise of public power is not classified as 
an economic activity318. In addition, Whish explains that procurement pursuant to a non-
economic activity is not economic319. 
 
Apart from others, competition law is concerned with the problems that occur where 
one undertaking possess the market power320. Market power has the possibility of 
profitably raising prices over a period by limiting output, suppressing innovation, 
reducing the variety or quality of goods or services or by depriving consumers of choice 
and therefore damaging the consumer welfare321. In an ideal competitive market, market 
power should not be controlled absolutely by a single undertaking. Competition law 
attaches particular significance to ‘substantial market power’ which often equated with 
a ‘dominant position’322. While pure monopoly is rare, an undertaking or undertakings 
 
314 Agreements and concerted practices, OFT 401, para 2.5. 
315 Case C- 41/90 Hofner and Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I- 1979, [1993] 4 CMLR 306, para 21. 
316 Cases C- 180/98 Pavlov etc. [2000] ECR I- 6451, [2001] 4 CMLR 30, para 75. 
317 Case C- 309/99 Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandsche Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR I- 1577, [2002] 
4 CMLR 913, para 57. 
318 R Whish and D Bailey, Competition Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2012) p 87. 
319 Ibid  p 87. 
320 Ibid  p 25. 
321 See Landes and Posner ‘Market power in antitrust cases’ (1981) 94 Harvard Law Review 937; Vickers ‘Market 
power in competition cases’ (2006) 2 European Competition Journal 3; R Whish and D Bailey, Competition Law 
(7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2012) p 25. 
322 For example, in Article 102 TFEU; R Whish and D Bailey, Competition Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 
2012) p 25. 
50 
 
collectively may have significant power over the market to enjoy certain benefits which 
would be only available to a true monopoly323. Since the notion of ‘power over the 
market’ is essential to analysing competition issues, it is necessary to define ‘the market’ 
or, the ‘relevant market’ for this purpose324. Relevant market definition is an analytical 
tool which assists to determine whether an undertaking or undertakings have market 
power. The relevant market concept is an economic one. The European Commission 
has defined the concept325. While determining the relevant market, the relevant product 
market, the relevant geographic market, and the relevant temporal market, where 
applicable, must be analysed. Details of this analysis is beyond the reach of this 
research. 
 
Based on the basic definitions provided, sport organisations are considered as 
undertakings if they are engaged in economic or commercial activities even if their 
activities do not generate any profit326. Moreover, sporting rules relating to the sporting 
practices, such as transfer of players, constitute agreements between the undertakings327. 
Besides, apart from the rules with minor effect on competition, vertical and horizontal 
sporting agreements have the potential to prevent or distort competition law 
provisions328.  Finally, many sports rules have international implications, and they have 
the potential to infringe cross border trade between the Member States. Therefore, sport 
will be open for a challenge under the competition law provisions of the EU. 
 
To conclude, requirements of the competition law provisions of the EU is not the same 
as the free movement provisions329. In Meca-Medina330 on the anti-doping rules of the 
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IOC, the Court held that to ensure compatibility of sporting rules with the EU law they 
need to be tested under both free movement and competition law provisions331. Even 
though anti-doping rules of the IOC did not form a restriction on the free movement 
provisions, they were caught under the application of the competition law provisions332.  
 
VII. Chapter Conclusion 
This Chapter has explored the aims and objective of the EU through analysing the 
theories behind the European integration. The nature and effect of EU law is established 
and the fundamental treaty provisions applicable to sport is identified. The chapter 
discovered the organisational structures of the EU which would challenge the European 
model of sport. The chapter concluded that the main aim and objective of the Union has 
been to establish and ensure the proper functioning of the internal market in accordance 
with the Treaties with no exceptions. EU legal framework is designed to regulate all 
markets which could put it at odds with how sport is organised under the European 
model. 
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The objective of this chapter is to establish whether the commercialised organisational 
features of the European model of sport could conflict with the organisational structures 
of the EU eliminating the possibility of both being mutually exclusive. This chapter 
comprises of identifying the features of the European model of sport and the EU 
supervision to demonstrate difficulties of the organisation of sport under the EU law. 
II. Organisation of Sport 
Europe has always been the seat for the development of modern sport such as 
International Olympic Committee, European Athletics, UEFA, and FIFA 333. Since the 
birth of the ancient Olympic Games until the present, organizational innovations have 
been developed and implemented in Europe and later distributed around the world. This 
historical leadership in the development of sport provides the European Union with a 
great opportunity to set the trend in the formulation and articulation of the rules and 
management system334. The EU interest in sport is two-fold. First the EU regulates 
economic activity, and sport is an economic sector. Second, sport performs many public 
interest functions, such as health and social inclusion. Therefore, the EU could help 
define what amounts to public interest thus shaping the margin of appreciation it can 
offer to sport while regulating it.   
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The EU’s leading role in shaping the regulatory basis of sport has been ensured by the 
size of the sports market in Europe335. According to a recent study336, sport accounts for 
2.12% of the EU GDP and sport-related employment is accountable for 5.67 m people 
(2.72% of EU employment). The results also show that, when the economy was 
suffering, sport was a very resilient sector, generating growth and jobs337. The 
involvement of the EU institutions in regulating European model sports plays an 
important role in deepening regional integration processes, the promotion of the 
European values and interests outside the region and the EU’s transformation into one 
of the major drivers of the global sports management system338. In Europe, before the 
end of the cold war there were two different models of sport. In Eastern Europe, highly 
state-regulated communist model of sport was present. The Eastern European model of 
sport played an important ideological role in the Soviet Union and the old Eastern bloc 
political and ideological propaganda339. Under the Soviet’s ideology of sport, the sport 
movement was not implemented as a civilian device bringing the society together, but 
rather as a military device340.  Programs created during the growth of Soviet Russia, 
such as the Vsevobuch, Red Star International and All-Union Sports Committee pushed 
the emerging nation toward political autonomy, military readiness, and athletic 
dominance341. The political, military, and civilian sectors of society melded together for 
the promotion of the idea of the physical culture342. Physical culture meant physical 
health for purposes of sport, work, and leisure; however, it also meant, mental, political, 
and military control343. On the other hand, in Western Europe, a privately regulated 
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model of sport was present where democracies developed a mixed sports model344. After 
the fall of the communist regime, while the idea of state regulation of sport still survived 
in certain counties such as Poland345, Eastern bloc countries have largely adopted the 
Western European model of sport346.  
 
Today, the European model of sport is the continuance of the former Western European 
model of sport. It is based on the system created by the English Football Association 
during the final decades of the 19th century347. This model was characterised by a 
hierarchical pyramid structure which run from the local levels to national levels to 
continental levels and to global levels348. Generally, International sports federations 
stand at the apex of a vertical chain of command for each individual sport349. Continental 
sports federations stand under global federations, national federations stand under the 
continental organisations. These mostly private organisations have a competence in 
regulating their sport while they are subordinate to the organisations standing above 
them350. At the base of the pyramid stand the athletes and clubs who must conform to 
the rules adopted by the organisations standing higher up in the pyramid. International 
sports governance is very intricately connected to and defined by the European model 
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II.I. Specificity of Sport 
Sport has been one of the most important business sectors in the world353. As Blake 
explains, sport is an important part of popular culture.354 Many people around the world 
either participate in sport or observe it. Sport is a way in which we understand our bodies 
as well as our minds and sport is the crucial component of contemporary society.355 This 
is true not only because of mass participations and observations but also sport infuses 
the language around us. Sporting activity is continuously reported in newspapers, 
magazines, books, and electronic media. Sport is one of the most powerful presences 
within the broadcasting356. As a result, sport is the background noise of the 
contemporary culture and therefore it is different than other economic sectors357. After 
the Second World War, with the rapid globalisation of the world, sport has created one 
of the most significant self-organised international civil societies. Sport has established 
its own specific set of rules and remedies both at national and international levels. 
Particularly through the arbitral resolution of disputes, sports law has been developed 
as a set of unwritten legal principles and consolidated along the years358. Sport is the 
biggest social movement in Europe  with nearly 700,000 sport clubs and associations 
within the EU while taking its place in a global arena359. Within the last two decades, 
sports policy has been developing at the EU level360. A non-binding Declaration was 
annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and the December 1999 Nice European 
Council adopted conclusions giving a mandate for sport to be examined at Community 
level. The European Commission issued a White Paper on Sport in July 2007361. 
Nevertheless, until the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU had no competence for sport in general 
to initiate a legal framework to supervise but only to regulate through the EU’s general 
decisional practice. The Lisbon Treaty introduced sport as a new area of competence 
within the EU and emphasised the specific character of sport while recognising the 
distinctive contribution of sport to the European society.  
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II.II. Autonomy of Sport 
The autonomy of sport is an important tool where the inherent values of sport, in other 
words specificity of sport, is protected from political, legal, and commercial 
influences362. Sporting autonomy embraces a range of sporting competences including 
the ability of a sport organisation, without facing an undue external influence, to 
establish, amend and interpret sporting rules, to select sporting leaders and governance 
styles and to secure and use public funding without disproportionate obligations363. One 
of the main challenges against the sporting autonomy is the application of the laws of 
the land. Sporting authorities have long argued against the intervention of the EU 
institutions to sustain their autonomy over regulating sport364. Sporting organisations 
have claimed that due to the specificity of sport, justice and redress in sport is better 
bestowed by those with expertise in the practical know-how, rather than the judiciary 
through the application of the laws of the land such as the EU law365. The autonomy of 
sport is curtailed as much as the law of the land interferes to regulate it.  
SGBs have identified three main strategies to protect their regulatory autonomy from 
mainly the interference of the EU law. These are contractual, legislative, and 
interpretative in nature366. The most effective way for SBGs to defend their autonomy 
is through the contractual solution which involves inserting a clause into the contracts 
of sports participants to the effect that disputes must be resolved through arbitration 
rather than litigation367. Where the contractual route somehow fails to protect sporting 
autonomy through arbitration, the second-best available solution is to persuade the EU 
to adopt lex sportiva within the Treaties to ensure a certain amount of autonomy to the 
SGBs368. The inclusion of the Article 165 TFEU was intended as a legislative solution. 
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This treaty-based solution sought to achieve an autonomy from the application of the 
fundamental EU law. However, it has not worked out well for the SGBs. The 
interpretative approach has been the least attractive to the SGBs of the three available 
options due to the fact that it is quite difficult for them to convince the adjudicator to 
interpret and yield the EU law in favour of the SGBs369. Even though, these solutions 
have helped, they have not provided an absolute means to the organisation of sport to 
avoid the EU’s intervention370.  
 
II.III. Specific Character of Sport 
While being subject to the general law of the EU, the specific characteristics of sport is 
acknowledged during the application of EU law371. This specific characteristic is 
inherent in the nature of sporting activities and rules, such as; separate competitions for 
men and women; limitations on the number of participants in competitions; the need to 
ensure uncertainty of outcomes; the maintenance of competitive balance between teams 
in a league; the autonomy and diversity of sport organizations; a pyramid competition 
structure from grass roots to the elite level; solidarity measures between different levels 
and operators; the national organisation of sport; and the principle of a single federation 
per sport372. These rules inherent in the sport’s identity are collectively named as the 
rules of the. These rules do not have economic intentions and they are necessary for the 
proper functioning of sport373. These rules are motivated by a desire to ensure sporting 
values prevails over the self-serving economic interests374. Rules of the game with no 
economic effects on the cross-border trade between the Member States in the internal 
market do enjoy autonomy under the organisational structures of the EU. Further 
discussion is present under the following chapters. In addition, the sport sector operates 
differently compared to other market sectors. In most sectors, the financial failure of an 
actor is positive for the remaining competitors and to society at large since the actor is 
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considered as a victim of its own inefficiency375. Sport is different as the victory of one 
team is based on the survival of other teams with which it can compete376. Sport teams, 
clubs and athletes have a direct interest not only in there being other teams, clubs, and 
athletes, but also in their economic viability as competitors377. The EU recognises the 
specific nature of sport. However, specificity does not justify a general exemption from 
the application of EU law to sport378.  
 
Nevertheless, the world of sport has been tracking objectives to justify specific 
treatment for sport under the application of EU law379. Certain objectives put forward 
by the SGBs approved by the EU as legitimate and necessary to ensure fairness of sport 
competitions, uncertainty of results, protect health of sportsmen, protect the safety of 
spectators, promote the training of young sportsmen, and ensure the financial stability 
of sport clubs380. However, the question of whether sport is special and should be treated 
differently to other economic sectors under the EU law has been much debated381. 
Should there be no difference between sport sector and the general market sectors, then, 
writing about free movement and sport would be no different than writing about free 
movement and short people382. Weatherill summarises that sport has a special character, 
and this special character lies in its eccentric cultural and economic nature383. In theory, 
the European Parliament considers that European sport is an inalienable part of the 
European identity, European culture and citizenship384; that sport has a special role in 
society as an instrument of social inclusion and integration; that due to the special 
characteristics of sport, certain allowance or exceptions should be made in the 
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application of general EU law to sport385. Besides, the European Parliament comments 
that in certain circumstances, in view of the specific characteristics and essential and 
singular features of sport, it should not be compared with an ordinary economic 
activity386.  
 
II.IV. Today’s Sport 
Modern SGBs have become complex organisations which should not be immune from 
the application of the laws of land, specifically the EU law. Currently, sporting 
organisations do not only act as sport regulators, but also follow commercial ambitions. 
This dual role has given rise to conflicts of interest and abusive conduct387. The 
commercialisation of sport has brought with it the need to protect the interests of 
economically active athletes and undertakings which have not been fully respected by 
the sport organisations388. Since Bosman, the EU has attracted criticism from the 
sporting organisations for purportedly exchanging the knowledge and expertise of the 
SGBs with its own mechanism to ensure application and enforcement of the EU law389. 
Unlike SGBs main aims and objectives, the EU regulates sport for the sake of the proper 
functioning of the internal market based on its own aims and objectives and not for the 
sake of the sporting sector. Both the EU and the European model of sport have diverse 
approaches and objectives. However, in case of conflict between the organisational 
structures of the European model of sport and the EU law, the latter prevails, and the 
former cannot exist 390.  
 
While the ECJ and the Commission accepted that sport is different to other sectors, they 
have not been as sensitive as the SGBs would have liked. The EU institutions have opted 
to adopt a narrow approach towards the specific nature of sport than the sporting 
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authorities have long desired391. The SGBs could not manage to convince the EU 
institutions that sport could not be of any interest to EU but succeed in securing that 
some sporting practices, known as the rules of the game with no negative effect on the 
cross border trade between the Member States in the internal market, are compatible 
with the EU law392. This has been the most rational strategy of the SGBs to convince 
the EU institutions that not all sporting practices are incompatible with the EU law393. 
Engagement and co-operation with the EU softened the effects of EU law on the 
autonomy of sport. UEFA summarised their strategy of co-operation with the EU as the 
most promising way to promote awareness of sporting exceptionalism in the decisional 
practice of EU institutions394. This strategy of accepting supervision of the EU to 
restrain the interventionist bite395 of the EU institutions has led to the negotiations 
between the SGBs and the EU institutions leading the way to the adoption of Article 
165 TFEU396. 
With the emergence of the EU’s governance strategy in sport, sporting autonomy, while 
not an absolute autonomy, is supervised by the European institutions involvement and 
conditioned on sporting organisations to implement and respect the EU standards of 
governance and fair dispute resolution. Without these adaptations, disputes involving 
sporting organisations would end up in the decisional practice of the EU institutions 
through the general application of the EU law with no difference in application to sport. 
II.V. Lex Sportiva 
An area of law evolves after it is treated as a distinct part of the general law depending 
on the history, economic development, and political preferences397. Whether sport has 
completed its development to be classified as a substantial area of law or it remains as 
an esoteric area of law is outside the coverage of this thesis. Lex sportiva is the term 
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referred to when defending autonomy of sport398. Lex sportiva defines the co-existence 
of various internal administrative regulations and dispute-resolving mechanisms of 
sport under domestic, supra-national and international law399. Sports law on the other 
hand defines the intersection of two types of legal order: lex sportiva and the laws of 
the land400. Therefore, sports law contains a claim to certain degree of autonomy of sport 
from the application of the ordinary laws of land under lex sportiva and retains 
coherence and procedural integrity to be treated as a legitimate system of ordering401. 
EU sports law discovers the approach of the organisational structures of the EU towards 
lex sportiva. Intellectually, European sports law examines ways to achieve a normative 
assessment on the strengths of the claims in favour of the autonomy of sport402. The EU 
sports law explores to what extent the organisational structures of the EU and sport co-
exist. 
 
III. European Model of Sport  
There is no one standard organisational structure for sport403. Even though there are 
certain common features, sport is organised based on its own characteristic and 
ideology404. Each sport usually has an international federation responsible for 
promoting, establishing the laws of the game, and regulating the sport at an international 
level while imposing certain requirements to be fulfilled by their member associations 
at national level405. The international federation is the association of all the national 
federations. It exists to provide a set of uniform rules   for sport and to ensure these are 
enforced406. In the areas of developed sports, there will be a layer of continental 
association standing under the international federation407. The national federation will 
also be a member of the continental association for the continent. The continental 
association will be responsible for representing national federations and for organising 
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competitions within its geographic area408. Consequently, there might be tensions 
throughout different sports due to the presence of interlocking associations responsible 
for sport’s governance at each level. The involvement of the ECJ and the Commission 
in regulating European sport creates a further tension by affecting the uniformity of 
sporting rules409.   
 
III.I. The Pyramid System of the European Model of Sport 
The European model of sport is characterised by two main features: the pyramid 
structure and the promotion and relegation system. Perhaps the main distinctive feature 
of the European model of sport is the way sport is organized under a pyramid 
structure410. This structure is traditionally described as a monopolistic pyramid, with 
one federation per sport and per country411. In this system, federations organise 
competitions, promote and regulate their sport at their respective levels. They operate 
under the umbrella of a single regional, a single national, a single European and a single 
global federation that sits at the top of the pyramid. Amateur, semi-professional and 
professional athletes and local clubs are at the bottom of the pyramid. They are members 
of their respective national federations and participate in various leagues according to 
their sporting achievements. National federations organise sports competitions and 
select national teams412. The pyramid structure implies interdependence between the 
levels, not only on the organisational front, but also on the competitive side, because 
competitions are organised on all levels413. These federations in turn are members of 
European and International federations414. Even though the pyramid notion brings with 
it the ideas of hierarchy, the European model has the idea of participation and 
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representation at each layer of authority in the hierarchy415. On the other hand, the 
autonomy of lower-ranking sports organisations of the pyramid is restricted by the 
higher-ranking ones. For example, a club is bound by the rules of its national federation 
(NF), which is itself bound by those of the international federation (IF) for its sport and 
of the national Olympic committee (NOC) for its country416.  
 
Even though there is no uniform organisational structure of European sports, the 
architecture of most sports corresponds to this broad pyramid417. SGBs have an 
extensive mandate to regulate their discipline. They pass the rules concerning the access 
to competitions, take care of disciplinary and integrity matters, guarantee uniform rules 
of the game, ensure the rules relating to safety at events are in place and promote their 
sport at all levels. At the same time, they are also commercial actors with economic 
interests in the sport they regulate418. In their role as organisers of competitions, they 
enter several business deals to sell merchandise, tickets, hospitality packages, media, 
and other commercial rights in sporting events. This intermingling of regulatory and 
commercial functions in a single body could lead to potential conflicts of interest and 
could cause a detriment to actual or potential competitors in the relevant market419. For 
example, sports federations strive to maintain monopoly via the market restrictions in 
their statutes and rulebooks seeking to prevent the operation or even emergence of a 
rival, competing league or other organisational market for ‘their’ sporting events. In 
doing so, they could infringe fundamental EU law provisions such as free movement, 
nationality discrimination and competition law.420. From the organisational structures 
of EU law point of view, the pyramid structure creates one of the main weaknesses of 
the European model of sport. The application of one federation for each sport creates an 
automatic monopoly and a dominant position for the SGB regulating each sport421. This 
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segments the single market notion into national market paving the way for a potential 
conflict of EU competition law. Therefore, the organisation of sport under the pyramid 
structure creates possible conflict with the EU and it is open to be challenged under EU 
law.   
 
III.II. Promotion and Relegation System 
The second distinctive feature of the European sport model is the system of promotion 
and relegation. There is strong interdependence between amateur and professional sport 
in Europe. It is designed to reward merit and promote equality of opportunity and 
balance competition among teams. The promotion and relegation system also perform 
an ethical function by mandating relegation to a lower tier of any team that has engaged 
in specified questionable practices422. It creates the formal link between professional 
and amateur sport423. SGBs aim to control both professional and semi-professional sport 
and amateur sport. This facilitates the distribution of revenue from top-level sport to 
grassroots sport424. This is consolidated through the system based on promotion and 
relegation. At the end of the season, the worst performing teams are demoted to a league 
one level below and the best performing teams are promoted to replace the ones 
demoted. Perhaps this is the strongest feature of the European model of sport since it 
encourages promotion of fairness and equal opportunities in compliance with the 
general application of EU law. 
 
III.III. Delegated Duties 
The third distinctive feature of the European model of sport is the fact that SGBs 
delegates duties to international bodies425. SGBs and the organisations under them 
participate under international regulatory regimes such as the Olympic movement, sport 
arbitration (CAS) and anti-doping agency (WADA). Therefore, SGBs are subject to the 
rules and regulations of these international regulatory regimes. Consequently, all other 
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organisations lower in the pyramidal hierarchy are also subject to these rules and 
regulations. In practice, global SGBs delegate the duty to organise Olympic Games to 
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) who has acquired an international 
legitimacy by associating with the United Nations (UN)426. In return, the IOC distributes 
90% of its revenue to organisations throughout the Olympic Movement, to support the 
staging of the Olympic Games and to promote the worldwide development of sport. The 
IOC retains 10% of its revenue for the operational and administrative costs of governing 
the Olympic Movement427. The UN acknowledged the contribution of sport for 
development and peace and collaboration between the IOC and the UN has played a 
crucial part in spreading the acceptance of sport to promote internationally agreed 
development goals428. In 2015, sport was officially recognised as an important enabler 
of sustainable development and included in the UN’s Agenda 2030429. This was a 
historic moment for sport and the Olympic Movement. Unlike under the US model of 
sport, this feature of the European model of sport secures the global impact of the 
European model of sport.   
 
III.IV. European Model of Sport v. American Model of Sport 
The European model of sport has been contrasted with an American model of sport by 
many scholars430. The US model of sport does not have a pyramidal structure and it 
operates independently from the international regulatory regimes431. In US, sport has 
long been regarded as a commercial activity and the top leagues were established under 
profit oriented managerial control without the presence of any international regulatory 
body432. US anti-trust law has proven to be tolerant to the pro-competitive nature of the 
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US model of sport organisations433. Unlike under EU law, US regulators have 
acknowledged the special economic nature of sport and allows exemptions to be made 
under the application of anti-trust law to certain sporting activities in US434. In contrast 
to the regulatory issues creating problem under EU competition law, a variety of 
restrictive practices are exempted in US through collective agreements between the 
stakeholders to ensure competitive and commercial nature of sport leagues. As an 
example, restrictive transfer clauses, salary caps, revenue sharing, payroll taxes and a 
draft system allocating new talent to poorly performing teams are used to counter natural 
market power435. 
 
US leagues have their own arbitration systems and anti-doping agencies. Consequently, 
WADA and CAS have had a limited impact on the rules governing competition in US 
leagues436. Moreover, the US model of sport does not have a formal promotion and 
relegation system. Unlike in Europe, sports competitions at the top leagues takes place 
in closed leagues implying a clear-cut separation between amateur and professional 
sports avoiding redistribution which would link the top level and lower level sports 
competitions437. In 2017, Miami FC and Kingston Stockade FC submitted a claim to 
Court of Arbitration for Sport’s (CAS) against FIFA challenging the closed league 
system in the US which prevents promotion and relegation438. CAS decided that FIFA 
does not require the principle of promotion and relegation to be implemented in US 
professional soccer439. The CAS decision demonstrated that FIFA is not legally required 
to enforce promotion and relegation within the US football pyramid. This has raised 
some questions over the FIFA’s ability to interpret and enforce its statutes440. Therefore, 
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the European model of sport is applied globally throughout the world and the US model 
of sport is only applied in North America. Lately it is put forward that the European 
model of sport has increasingly resembled the American model of sport especially in 
football441. Increasing numbers of independently operating national level leagues and 
new actors intending to establish continental leagues ECA which are not formally 
separated from national football governing bodies is the main reason for this 
criticism442. However, unlike US anti-trust law, EU law does not automatically exclude 
sporting rules from the scope of EU law. In the EU context, each sporting rule must be 
tested by the Court on a case by case basis, taking into consideration the proportionality 
of the measure, in order to identify whether it qualifies to fall under the specificity of 
sport and therefore establish if it should be protected under EU law. Moreover, 
considering the current strong presence of the pyramidal structure and the role of SBGs 
under the European model of sport there remains serious distinctions between the two 
models of sport443. 
 
IV. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
During the 1980s, the steady increase in the number of international sport related 
disputes and the lack of impartial organisation concentrating in sport related issues with 
an authority to take binding decisions guided the top sport federations to consider 
possible ways for dispute resolution in sport444. Therefore, the notion to establish an 
arbitral jurisdiction specialised on resolving international disputes directly or indirectly 
related to sport with flexibility, speed and low costs was launched445.  In 1982, IOC 
President H.E. Juan Antonio Samaranch446 with the notion of establishing sport specific 
jurisdiction supported a working group with an aim of drafting the statutes of what 
become known as the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). CAS is based in Lausanne, 
with sub-offices elsewhere, under the guidance of IOC in 1983 as a unique and sole 
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global international arbitration body dedicated to resolve sport disputes447. All Olympic 
federations under IOC448, as well as certain non-Olympic federations, consent to CAS 
jurisdiction. Since 2004, the World Anti-Doping Code449 has instructed all the rule 
violation appeals to be made to CAS. 
 
Until the first years of 1990s, a variety of cases were filed to CAS regarding the 
nationality of athletes and contracts concerning employment, television rights, 
sponsorship, and licensing450. In 1991 CAS published a guidance to arbitration which 
initially was encouraged to be incorporated into the statues of its member federations 
and later made a mandatory requirement of the IOC Charter451. This guidance clause 
established that any dispute arising from the rules of the member federation and cannot 
be settled amicably shall be settled by the Court of Arbitration for Sport452. 
After the adoption of this clause, various doping cases were filed to CAS which 
facilitated the structure of CAS to evolve453. The International Equestrian Federation 
(FEI) was the earliest sport federation to implement this clause which resulted in several 
“appeals” procedures even though formally such a procedure did not yet exist. Other 
sport federations adopted this clause which caused an important increase in the 
workload of the CAS454. 
 
In 1994, CAS issued a decision in Gundel v FEI455 regarding a doping offence. Soon 
after, Gundel filed proceedings before the Swiss Federal Tribunal claiming CAS is an 
organ of IOC and it did not satisfy the conditions of impartiality and independence 
required from an arbitral body under Swiss Law. Even though the tribunal ruled against 
Gundel’s claim, in obiter dicta it signalled that different judgment would take place in 
respect of proceeding where the IOC was a party456. As a result of this obiter dicta, CAS 
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was re-structured in 1994. To improve efficiency and avoid unacceptable IOC control, 
supervision and funding was delegated to a new body, the International Council of 
Arbitration (ICAS)457. CAS has revised its code multiple times since, and currently the 
2019 Code applies. However, the 1994 Code was accepted as sufficiently independent 
of IOC and its awards were recognised and enforced by the Swiss Courts458. The 
autonomy of CAS was challenged in 2000 under the Raguaz459 case in Court of Appeal 
of New South Wales. The New South Wales CA agreed with CAS and dismissed the 
challenge stating that CAS arbitration proceedings were not domestic proceedings since 
CAS arbitration proceedings is in Lausanne, Switzerland. Even though, in principle, 
CAS is accepted as an independent arbitral institution, each arbitrator needs to be 
reviewed to ensure each CAS panel established meets the necessary standards required 
under specific cases including independence and lack of conflict of interest,460. The 
European Court of Human Rights involved in regulating and supervising independence 
and impartiality of CAS to ensure fairness under mainly Article 6(1) ECHR on the right 
of a fair trial. In the case of Mutu and Pechstein461 the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) considered the lawfulness of proceedings of CAS on independence and 
impartiality and the right to have a public hearing and did not find a violation. However, 
recently in Riza462 case, the ECtHR ruled that Turkey violated Article 6(1) ECHR. The 
Court made a finding that the independence and impartiality required by Article 6 of the 
Convention was not fulfilled by the Turkish Football Federation (TFF)463. As a result, 
the respondent state was ordered to take general measures to address the underlying 
systemic problem concerning the Arbitration Committee of the TFF which violated 
Article 6(1) ECHR464. The Judgment is likely to have a wider impact on the structure 
and governance of sports tribunals at other federations and in other jurisdictions465.  
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Arbitration proceedings require a foundation in a specific legal system’s arbitration laws 
regulating conditions where the proceedings must operate for the final award to be 
recognised and enforceable in the Courts around the world466. The seat of arbitration 
determines the applicable arbitration law and the grounds for challenge. CAS is in 
Lausanne and arbitration laws of Switzerland apply to CAS proceedings and challenges 
can only be bought before the Swiss Federal Tribunal. A sport dispute may be submitted 
to CAS only when the parties to an agreement have undertaken that CAS will have a 
jurisdiction to resolve disputes467. Enforceability and validity of arbitration clauses in 
the agreements could be questioned since there is no real choice on the athletes’ side. 
Provided that an athlete refuses to sign up to the rule, (s)he will not be eligible to 
compete468. However, the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that the need for a quick and 
uniform dispute resolution system in international sports prevails over the right of an 
athlete to have their case adjudicated by ordinary Courts as long as the dispute resolution 
system strictly observes the fundamental requirements of due process469. Although the 
Swiss Court would not enforce an indirect waiver of the right to challenge an arbitration 
award in Courts it was happy to enforce the provision in the rules providing for 
arbitration of the underlying dispute in the first place470. Moreover,  in the Stretford 
case, the UK Court of Appeal held that the arbitration agreement in the FA’s Rule K is 
valid and compatible with Article 6 ECHR, because of firstly the content of the 
arbitration scheme under the FA Rules and the contents of the 1996 Act including the 
possibility of appeals and applications for removal of arbitrators for lack of impartiality 
and secondly the waiver constituted by the arbitration agreement and subsequent 
conduct of the parties. Moreover, the CA ruled that the waiver also satisfied the relevant 
Convention jurisprudence, being neither equivocal, nor made by undue compulsion, a 
concept adequately addressed by the relevant rules of the common law and equity, none 
of which applied to the facts, nor contrary to any public interest471. The scope of the 
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obligation to arbitrate and the scope of review of the CAS will depend on the wording 
of the arbitration agreement. The arbitration clause should carefully be analysed to 
determine whether CAS is competent to decide on a dispute472. 
 
The CAS panel is competent to rule upon any challenge to its own jurisdiction while 
Swiss Fedaral Tribunal accepts appeals challenging CAS decision. However, under the 
organisational structures of EU law, an applicant is free to not appeal against the CAS 
award to the Swiss Federal Court. Here it is necessary to reference Meca Medina, a case 
discussed more fully in subsequent chapters. In 2006 in Meca Medina, the applicants 
challenged the compatibility of certain regulations adopted by the IOC and implemented 
by FINA and certain practices relating to doping control with the Community rules on 
competition and freedom to provide services473 under then Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty. Initially the Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal and apart from other 
conclusions, held that, challenging sporting rules fell within the jurisdiction of the 
sporting dispute settlement bodies474.  The ECJ set aside this judgment of the Court of 
First Instance and held that having regard to the objectives of the Community, sport is 
subject to Community law in so far as it constitutes an economic activity within the 
meaning of then Article 2 EC475. Where a sporting activity takes the form of gainful 
employment or the provision of services for remuneration, which is true of the activities, 
it falls within the coverage of EU476.  
 
Arbitration procedure in sport has been criticised by the EU. The Commission decision 
in the ISU case acknowledged that arbitration is a generally accepted method of binding 
dispute resolution in sport and agreeing on an arbitration clause does not necessarily 
 
472 A Lewis QC and Jonathan Taylor, Sport: Law and Practice, (3rd eds, Bloomsbury Professional, 2014) p 1049. 
473 Case C-519/04 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991. 
474 Ibid at  para 11. 
475 Ibid at  para 22; (see Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405, paragraph 4; Case 13/76 Donà [1976] ECR 
1333, paragraph 12; Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 73; Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 
Deliège [2000] ECR I-2549, paragraph 41; and Case C-176/96 Lehtonen and Castors Braine [2000] ECR I-2681, 
paragraph 32) 
476 Case C-519/04 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991 at para 23. (see, to this 
effect, Walrave and Koch, paragraph 5, Donà, paragraph 12, and Bosman, paragraph 73). 
72 
 
restrict competition477. However, eligibility rules of ISU did restrict competition478 and 
were declared incompatible under the EU law. Nevertheless, EU law has no automatic 
application over sporting disputes and for it to regulate a sporting dispute application 
must be made to European institutions. However, once an application is made to the EU 
to regulate a sporting dispute, an arbitration clause under an agreement will not be 
binding on the EU. In the Eco Swiss case, after an application for a preliminary ruling 
on the possibility of an annulment of an arbitration award being contrary to Article 101 
TFEU (ex-Article 85 EC) the ECJ ruled that national Court must annul the arbitration 
award if it is in fact contrary to a fundamental provision479, based on its failure to 
observe national rules of public policy480. Therefore, arbitration awards do not have a 
binding effect on the EU and in case of incompatibility with the EU law, arbitration 
awards are annulled.  
 
V. EU Supervision on the European Model of Sport 
Until the 1990s sports economics and the anti-trust analysis of sport was primarily a 
concern under the American model of sport. Europe was mainly dominated by a single 
sporting activity, football, which had a little financial significance481. Revenue sharing 
was not known, broadcasting income was insignificant and joint merchandise was not 
recognised482. Competition policy was only used to avoid labour market restrictions. 
Since 1974483 the European Union has been dealing with sport and observing these 
changes from an economic point of view. The impact of EU law, including provisions 
and decisions, on sporting practices and activities have triggered problems for sport in 
Europe484. During the 1990s, sport in Europe has developed rapidly because of its 
increasing economic and commercial importance triggered by technological 
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developments and the broadcasting of sporting events485. The Commission in its 1998 
working paper identified sport as a rapidly growing sector accounting for 3% of world 
trade and one of the sectors most likely to generate new employment opportunities while 
executing educational, public health, social, cultural and recreational functions486. With 
the commercialisation of sport in Europe, the ECJ and the Commission have taken an 
interest in regulating European sport. In 1998, the European Commission used the term 
The European model of sport, to describe the long-standing pyramid structure of sport 
governance and regulations in Europe487. Mainly, after the Bosman ruling, until mid-
1998, the Directorate-General for Competition (DG IV) of the European Commission, 
received 55 complaints relating to sport, on matters such as the role of sports 
organisations, television rights or commercial sponsoring488. This increase in the 
number of actions revealed that there was a gap between the real world of sport and its 
regulatory framework489. Consequently, in September 1998, the Commission issued a 
working paper in which it identified its policy on sport. The paper recognised that sport 
is not only an economic activity but also a social activity forming part of European 
identity490. The Commission acknowledged that involvement of EU law in sport raised 
questions regarding the future organisation of sport in Europe and demonstrated a 
willingness to help sport organisations to find solutions on the basis of their own 
initiatives to reflect on the future development of sport in Europe491.  
 
The EU rejected the free market model for the future of European sport, resisting the 
pressures of ‘Americanisation’ which is seen as the ultimate evil of excessive 
commercialism leading to the destruction of European sporting values, the only true 
sporting values492. In the Opinion given by the Committee of Regions on the European 
model of sport, the special characteristics of the European model was emphasized and 
stressed that the inclusion of an economic factor should not be allowed to jeopardise 
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these traditional values493. This social function of sport was also identified by the 
Intergovernmental Conference set up to revise the Maastricht Treaty, and a Declaration 
on sport was annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam494. A political consensus regarding 
the need to preserve the structures of sport in Europe was apparent also in other policy 
documents, notably in the 1999 Commission Helsinki Report495. The 2007 Parliament 
Report on the future of professional football in Europe (Committee on Culture and 
Education) noted in a similar spirit that European sport, and football, is an inalienable 
part of the European identity 496. The growing concentration of economic wealth and 
power was a threat to the future of professional sport in Europe497.  
 
EU policy statements were based on the desire to preserve fundamental values such as 
the societal role of sport for all, self-regulation, and solidarity between professional and 
amateur levels, as well as the highly beneficial effects that sports have on youth, health 
and social inclusion policies498. The Commission Staff Working Paper annexed to the 
White Paper repeated the previous policy statements on the pyramid structure and 
labelled certain values and traditions of European sport as worthy of support which 
would fall under the specificity of sport and worthy of protection from the application 
of EU law. For a long time, the governance of European sport remained unchanged with 
a pyramidal structure that reinforced the vertical authority of international, European, 
and national governing bodies over other stakeholders499.  However, recent years have 
seen the EU institutions adopt numerous papers explicitly touching on good governance 
in sport500. To generalise, these documents defined the relationship between public 
authorities and sports organisations as one of supervised autonomy. Supervised 
autonomy implies that self-regulation is permitted on condition to have a proper rule of 
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law system of governance501. The European Commission has consistently described EU 
standards of good governance as a condition for the autonomy and self-regulation of 
sport organisations. EU standards of good governance in sport underpins autonomy 
within the limits of the law, democracy, transparency and accountability in decision-
making, and inclusiveness in the representation of interested stakeholders502. 
 
More recently, the Council of the European Union has become the key actor in this 
endeavour. In the 2011–2014 EU Work Plan for Sport, the Council specified ‘good 
governance’ as one of the key priorities in EU sports policy. To that end, the Council 
established an Expert Group on ‘Good Governance in Sport’, which was tasked with 
developing ‘principles of transparency concerning good governance’ by mid-2012503. 
The Expert Group on good governance released its deliverable in September 2013 in 
the form of a lengthy text defining ‘Principles for the good governance of sport in the 
EU’504. These principles are underpinned, again, by the idea of ‘supervised autonomy’, 
stating that ‘sports bodies that do not have in place good governance procedures and 
practices can expect their autonomy and self-regulatory practices to be curtailed’505 
under the application of EU law which will form a threat to such sporting rules. While 
intended for universal use, the recommendations are also limited: they represent 
minimum standards that can be flexibly implemented at various levels. The principles 
are addressed to governments and to the sports movement at three different levels: 
grassroots sport organisations; national sports governing bodies; and European/ 
international federations506. Among the recommendations is the principle that all 
organisations should adopt a ‘code of ethics’ and that the respective roles, 
responsibilities and objectives of sports bodies and their stakeholders should be 
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codified507. At the same time, the EU Member States have actively sought to 
disseminate these principles of good governance. The key development in this regard is 
the adoption of the second EU Work Plan for Sport for 2014–2017508. Here, the Council 
of the EU again identified good governance as one of its main priorities in the field of 
sport509. This decision includes a proposal for a new mechanism in EU sports policy, 
namely the establishment of so-called ‘pledge boards’. A pledge board is defined as an 
‘instrument where mainly sport organisations can voluntarily make public their 
commitment to certain issues’510. Importantly, in the 2014–2017 Work Plan, the Council 
agreed to continue the promotion of the good governance principles, ‘possibly followed 
by a pledge board’511. Indeed, the EU has already had some success in this regard. Thus, 
as reported by the European Commission in 2016, so far 31 sports organisations have 
signed the pledge board on good governance, a list which includes numerous national 
Olympic committees and sports federations, most notably perhaps UEFA512. Pledge 
boards did not directly represent a curtailment of the autonomy of sport organisations. 
Rather, they represent an implementation of the logic of ‘sincere cooperation’ between 
European public authorities and the sports movement as enshrined in the Treaties513. 
While the effects were limited, pledge boards nonetheless represented a new stage in 
systemic European sport governance, namely, a phase where European public 
authorities not only see their roles as providing normative guidance, but also expect a 
role in monitoring compliance514.  
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Under its third Work-Plan 2017-2020, the Council agreed to prioritise any possible new 
developments for the integrity of sport by promoting good governance including the 
safeguarding of minors, the specificity of sport, combatting corruption and match fixing, 
as well as fighting doping while ensuring a follow-up of the recommendations produced 
by the previous Expert Group515. However, no reference was made to the pledge boards. 
Instead, the Expert Group would exchange best practices in a report after applying 
internationally recognised general good governance and anti-corruption standards and 
initiatives to the field of sport516. Meanwhile, the Council and its preparatory bodies will 
make recommendations on possible future actions against corruption in sport at the EU 
level. The outcome is yet to be seen.  
 
SGBs have consistent rules for their respective sports and consolidates their 
monopolistic status as global regulating bodies517. Sport was accepted by the public as 
a cultural and amateur activity until the commercialisation of sport within the past three 
decades518. Consequently, the governance of international sport has long remained 
private and the sporting world still claimed it is best kept private519. In the recent years, 
with the involvement of the EU institutions in regulating sporting rules, SGBs sacrificed 
certain decision-making autonomy. However, they mostly remained unrestrained by 
public interventions of the legislative and the judiciary mainly because they operate 
beyond the reach of the states at an international level520. SGBs picked a favourable 
regulatory environment as their home base for their international activities, mainly 
Switzerland where they benefited from quasi-unregulated system521 and enjoyed a 
world without accountability and regulation. This was until the EU legal interventions 
 
515 Council of the European Union, Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States, meeting within the Council, on the European Union Work Plan for Sport (1 July 2017 - 31 December 
2020) 8938/17 SPORT 33, p 5. 
516 Council of the European Union, Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States, meeting within the Council, on the European Union Work Plan for Sport (1 July 2017 - 31 December 
2020) 8938/17 SPORT 33, p 13. 
517 A Geeraert, The EU in International Sports Governance: A Principle-Agent Perspective on EU Control of FIFA 
and UEFA (Palgrave macmillan, 2016) p 7.   
518 Ibid.   
519 Ibid.   
520 A Geeraert, The EU in International Sports Governance: A Principle-Agent Perspective on EU Control of FIFA 
and UEFA (Palgrave macmillan, 2016) p 15.   
521 Ibid p 16.   
78 
 
took place in sport 522 where a variety of sporting rules were identified as potentially 
infringing especially under the competition laws of the EU523. EU sports law remains a 
powerful and important element to understand the structures of sport in Europe. It is 
sometimes the threat of a legal challenge that may generate changes. The intervention 
of the EU, both legally and politically, has controlled the behaviour of sport governing 
bodies to a level that no other public institution in the world has been able to achieve to 
date524. 
 
VI. Chapter Conclusion 
This Chapter has attempted to demonstrate the main features of the European model and 
establish possibility of conflict with the EU. It is established that the main features of 
the European model of sport have the potential to create conflict with the fundamental 
treaty provisions of the EU regulating the internal market. To avoid conflict, 
organisation of sport should adopt good governance standards supervised by the EU.  In 
the following Chapter III, European sports policy is outlined to discover the answer of 
the first research question of whether the organisational structures of the EU and the 







522 ECJ has developed a solid body of case law after Bosman. Bosman has terminated the presumption of being free 
from public intervention and demonstrated that sport is subject to the application of EU law. 
523 Bosman and Meca-Medina; A Geeraert, The EU in International Sports Governance: A Principle-Agent 
Perspective on EU Control of FIFA and UEFA (Palgrave macmillan, 2016) p 16.   
524 B Garcia and Mads de Wolf, European Law and the Governance of Sport, Research Handbook on EU Sports Law 
and Policy, edited by Jack Anderson et al., Edward Elgar Publishing, Incorporated, 2018, p. 304. 
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CHAPTER III: EUROPEAN SPORTS POLICY 
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Criticisms on the Article 165 TFEU; VII. Chapter Conclusion. 
  
I. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to establish the impact of European sports policy on the 
European model of sport to understand whether the organisational structures of EU and 
sport are mutually exclusive. This chapter intends to answer the first research question 
together with Chapter I and Chapter II. The chapter comprises of analysing the aim, 
establishment, and development of European sports policy in the European Union. The 
horizontality and the overall impact of Article 165 TFEU on sport will be discussed to 
discover whether it has altered the historical approaches taken by the EU institutions 
towards the significance and autonomy of sport.  
 
II. European Sports Policy 
Prior to the ECJ’s first judgment on sport, the Walrave, sport was regarded as a self-
regulating sector immune from legal intervention525. EU policy discussions on sport 
followed the Bosman judgment of the ECJ. It was only during 1990s that academic and 
 
525 K Pijetlovic, EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International Sports Law Series (T.C.M. 
Asser Press, 2015) p 12. 
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legal commentaries first appeared in the area526. The EU’s involvement in regulating 
sporting rules to ensure compliance with EU law has been reactive and indirect527. The 
EU became involved in regulating sport in Europe due to the steady determination of 
task expansion to achieve the main objective of creating and maintaining a single 
internal market within the union528. This involvement of the EU is an example of spill-
over of European legal framework in an area outside the scope of EU but necessary to 
regulate to ensure the establishment and proper functioning of the internal market.    
 
Sport was not an aim nor an objective of the founders of the EU. There was neither a 
legal base and nor an intention to achieve an EU sports policy. Sport was anticipated as 
an activity mainly practiced by amateurs as a leisure activity and was not a priority on 
the EU’s political agenda529. The founding Treaties did not make any reference to the 
specificity or autonomy of sport. European Sports policy emerged in the absence of a 
legal base or competence under the founding treaties as an activity-led rather than rule-
led discipline. Prior to the adoption of Article 165 TFEU under the Lisbon Treaty, sport 
did not enjoy a legal competence. European sports law has been established and 
developed through the ECJ judgments and the Commission decisions while ensuring 
compliance with EU law and safeguarding establishment and functioning of the internal 
market as opposed to rules and regulations adopted by the SGBs530.  
 
II.I. Background of Article 165 TFEU: Policy Developments 
II.I.I. Adonnino Report; A People’s Europe 
During 1980s-1990s the role of sport in supporting the development of the European 
identity as well as the sense of belonging to the Union has been accepted in A People’s 
Europe531. In the report, the committee took the view that the best contribution to the 
 
526 K Pijetlovic, EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, ASSER International Sports Law Series (T.C.M. 
Asser Press, 2015) p 12. 
527 M de Wolff, EU Sports policy after Lisbon: The Implementation of Article 165 TFEU, Conference Paper, Evolving 
Europe: Voices of the Future, (Loughborough University, 2013) p 1; B Garcia and H Meier, Limits of Interest 
Empowerment in the European Union: The Case of Football [2012] Vol.34 Journal of European Integration 359. 
528 Ibid. 
 
530 M de Wolff, EU Sports policy after Lisbon: The Implementation of Article 165 TFEU, Conference Paper, Evolving 
Europe: Voices of the Future, (Loughborough University, 2013) p 1. 
531 European Parliament Adonnino’s Report, ‘A People’s Europe’, (1985, S7/85). 
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People’s of Europe should be by a combination of specific proposals to be implemented 
and long-term objectives to promote Community as a reality for its citizens. While 
stressing the need to simplify administration and avoid over regulation, the Community 
responded to the views of its citizens effectively by close cooperation and by providing 
channels for their ideals. One of these channels identified was sport along with youth, 
education, and exchanges532. Sport was considered as an essential element in 
encouraging the involvement and interest of young people to facilitate further 
integration of the Union. With this report, to facilitate further integration of the Union 
the social and cultural significance of sport was acknowledged as an EU policy for the 
first time533.  Sport was considered as an important element contributing for the citizens 
of Europe to have an active role as a participant in a Community. This would offer real 
influence on the citizens of Europe on matters of importance for his life, such as sport. 
At this stage, giving credit to the specific characteristics of sport benefited the EU to 
achieve further integration. Under the report, no express reference was made to the 
specificity of sport. However, sport was promoted due to its specific character beneficial 
to help achieve the main aim and objective of the Union which was to achieve further 
integration. Meanwhile, autonomy of sport under the EU law was not disputed. The 
report made no reference to the autonomy of sport. Therefore, Adonnino report did not 
have an impact on the autonomy or the specificity of sport. 
 
II.I.II. Bosman 
During 1990s-2000s, right after Bosman, sport attracted the attention of the Member 
States.  The ECJ and the Commission labelled certain aspects of sport as an economic 
activity and accepted that these fall under the jurisdiction of the Union. According to 
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union534 the EU regulates economic activities 
operating within the internal market. This was adopted as a base line by the ECJ for 
 
532 European Parliament Adonnino’s Report, ‘A People’s Europe’, (1985, S7/85). 
533 Ibid.  
534 Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union states: ‘The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common 
market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing the common policies or activities referred to in 
Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic 
activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of 
economic performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and 
quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.’ 
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sport535 and declared that sport is subject to the EU law if it constitutes an economic 
activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty’536. The freedom of movement for 
workers was directly applicable to football players, if they participated in an economic 
activity in the sense of Article 2 of the Treaty537. Purely social, cultural, or educational 
aspects of sport could have the nature of an economic activity due to their marketing538. 
Therefore, the principle of applicability of EU law to sport was established. Sport was 
since subjected to EU law if it constitutes an economic activity independent of the 
existence of an original sports policy of the European Union.539 Bosman changed the 
climate and brought sport and law together540. Within three years after the judgment, 
Directorate General IV of the Commission received more than 60 relevant 
complaints541. However, Bosman judgment was not alone to open the floodgates. It is 
true that the Court’s decision forced change in the governance of sport and reminded 
the role of litigation as one part of the battle to restructure markets in sport542. On the 
other hand, intense competition has forced up prices for broadcasting rights to club and 
international sports events, mainly football in Europe, to unprecedented levels. Income 
generation through sponsorship and sale of merchandise has accelerated. With the 
commercialisation of sport, for professional sportsmen and women, Bosman ensured 
better placed to claim their slice of the expanding cake543. In contrast, the SGBs framed 
sport as a socio-cultural activity emphasizing the social, cultural, and educational 
characteristics of sport while arguing for the specificity of sport and the diversity of 
sport from other sectors544. The birth of EU sports policy aroused because of the battle 
between the EU institutions and the SGBs. In Bosman, a football player was successful 
in confronting a sporting rule which limited player mobility and held incompatible with 
the fundamental right of freedom of movement under the EU law. This has been the 
 
535 Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 at para 73. 
536 The Court referred in paragraph 73 of its judgment to its Case 36/74, Walrave v Union Cycliste Internationale 
[1974] ECR 1405, paragraph 4. 
537 A Vahrenwald, ‘Am I so round with you as you with me? The Bosman case before the European Court of Justice’ 
Entertainment Law Review 1996 p 152. 
538 Ibid. 
539 Ibid. 




544 B Garcia, From Regulation to Governance and Representation: Agenda Setting and the EU’s Involvement in Sport 
(2007) Entertainment and Sports Law Journal 5. 
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landmark where the sport moved beyond regulation and become a political issue545. 
After Bosman, it became clear that sport operates under the legal framework of the EU 
law and sport must objectively justify why it should be treated differently from the 
application of EU law under certain circumstances546.   
 
Bosman was attacked by the SGBs. Gerhard Aigner, UEFA's former chief executive, 
said that Bosman ruling had a disastrous effect on the European football.547 While the 
challenge faced at the Court was certainly balancing commerce, money and political 
influence of sport, after Bosman, football has grown out of its world where it operated 
into the parallel world in which sporting practices constituting economic activity must 
be regulated under the organisational structures of the EU. Accordingly, sport was going 
to be challenged at the political and legal sphere, and maintaining its integrity, 
credibility and structures were the biggest challenges faced548. The ECJ was criticised 
by the SGBs on the lack of institutional competence in matters of proportionality549. 
This was inherent within the EU’s adjudication process or could arise from the limits of 
personal and professional expertise in sport of the judiciary and the lack of intelligent 
speculation and plausible intuition in sport550. Even though this criticism of the SGBs 
was challenged by Weatherill, arguing that the practice of the European Court and 
Commission reveals a thorough concern to piece together a sports policy at EU level 
which combines respect for the special needs of sport with an appreciation for the 
difficult balance to be struck between the need for a broad interpretation of the scope of 
EU trade law551, it was difficult for the ECJ to deny that the governing bodies of world 
football have greater institutional competence in matters of sporting activity552. Since 
then the urge to have a legal competence to validate EU’s involvement in sport has been 
 
545 B Garcia, From Regulation to Governance and Representation: Agenda Setting and the EU’s Involvement in Sport 
(2007) Entertainment and Sports Law Journal 5. 
R Parrish, Sports Law and Policy in the European Union (Manchester University Press 2003). 
547 M Scott, ‘Bosman a 'disaster' for football’ (07 January 2004 The Guardian) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/football/2004/jan/07/newsstory.sport7> accessed on 05 June 2018.  
548 Ibid. 
549 D Dixon, ‘The long life of Bosman’ (2008) Entertainment and Sports Law Journal 
<https://www.entsportslawjournal.com/articles/10.16997/eslj.60/> accessed on 05 June 2018. 
550 Ibid. 
551 S Weatherill, European Sports Law: Collected Papers (2nd Edition, Asser Press, 2015) p 505. 
552 D Dixon, ‘The long life of Bosman’ (2008) Entertainment and Sports Law Journal 
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initiated553. Bosman decision has triggered intensified efforts of SGBs to achieve 
recognition of sport under the European Treaties554.  
 
II.I.III. Amsterdam Declaration on Sport 
After Bosman SGBs sought to reduce the regulatory activity of the EU in sport. They 
longed to have a softer application of the EU law to sport and this to be introduced under 
a Treaty if not a complete exemption from it555. However, the sporting authorities were 
not able to present a unified front556. Big commercial sporting authorities, mainly UEFA 
and FIFA, wanted a blanket exemption from the application of the EU law and requested 
a protocol to prevent all involvement of the EU in sport557.  Small sporting authorities, 
mainly amateur sport wanted to have a sports policy developed by the EU through an 
adoption of a Treaty article which would consider the special characteristics of sport 
and not only its economic effects558. The Commission published a statement explaining 
the tensions it felt in this area in a Press Release issued in February 1999 and 
summarised a draft communication on the EU law and sport. The four main topics on 
the communication were: (i) the application of the competition rules, (ii) the 
development of a European sport model, (iii) sport as an instrument of social and 
employment policies and (iv) the fight against doping559. This sensitivity of the 
Community’s incursion into the sport was reflected under the Declaration on Sport 
which was attached to the Amsterdam Treaty. The Commission was neither competent 
nor anxious to impose solutions on sport560 . The main idea was to identify common 
features of European sport to ensure that some room was allowed by the EU for the 
maintenance of sport. This was a permissive rather than a compulsory agenda and 
whether this model would be tolerated rested with the SGBs561. 
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The lobbying of the SGBs achieved a modest result of a declaration which was attached 
to the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. The heads of Member States meeting in 
Amsterdam agreed to adopt a non-binding Declaration on Sport, mainly to promote 
acknowledgement to the specific nature of sport by the European institutions. The 
Declaration on Sport provided that the social significance of sport is mainly its role in 
forging identity and bringing people together. It concluded that it is particularly 
important to listen to sport governing bodies when important issues concerning sport is 
analysed and special consideration should be given to the characteristics of amateur 
sport562. The supporters for the EU to have a sport competence have acknowledged that 
obtaining a legal base would provide the means to develop a social and cultural common 
sports policy. However, they feared that having a legal base for sport might limit the 
wide application of the general EU law to sporting practices563. As a result, even though 
sport had not achieved a legal competence within the Union under the Amsterdam 
Treaty, it has served the need to politicise sport and law in the European Union by 
adopting a declaration564. The Amsterdam Treaty was the first European Treaty to 
officially mention sport and it was cited under ECJ judgments. The autonomy of sport 
under the organisational structures of the EU was not disputed. The declaration attached 
made no reference to the autonomy of sport. The social significance of sport, in 
particular its role in forging identity and bringing people together was emphasised and 
called the European Union to acknowledge sports associations when important 
questions affecting sport are at issue with special consideration to the particular 
characteristics of amateur sport. The social and cultural significance of sport was 
acknowledged again to facilitate further integration of the Union.  Giving credit to the 
specific characteristics of sport benefited the EU to achieve further integration.  
 
II.I.IV. Helsinki Report  
Shortly after the Amsterdam Declaration on Sport, the Sports Unit within the 
Commission’s Education and Culture DG emerged as a key actor to find the equilibrium 
 
562 Declaration on sport, accompanying the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) C 340/136. 
563 R Parrish, Sports Law and Policy in the European Union (Manchester University Press 2003) 15. 
564 R Parrish, Sports Law and Policy in the European Union (Manchester University Press 2003) 15. 
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between the commercial side of sport and a better attention to the amateur and 
educational dimension565. The Sports Unit initiated a process of dialogue and 
consultation with the sports world. Part of it were two working documents in which the 
Commission analysed the characteristics of the ‘European Model of Sport’566 and it 
explored the possible Community actions in the field of sport567. The Sports Unit 
identified the two main problems the European model of sport was facing because of 
the economic and commercial development of professional sport568. First was the effect 
of increased competition for financial resources, such as doping and second was the 
distortions to other markets that the commercial activities of the SGBs could cause, such 
as the selling of TV rights can affect the TV and entertaining market569. As a result, the 
European Council decided to invite the Commission ‘to submit a report to the Helsinki 
European Council with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining 
the social function of sport within the Community framework’570. Consequently, the 
Commission adopted the so-called Helsinki Report on Sport in December 1999. The 
Helsinki Report was prepared to preserve sports structures and the social function of 
sport within the Community framework571. The Report identified that the rise in the 
popularity of sport, the internationalisation of sport and the unprecedented development 
of the economic dimension of sport created a risk of weakening the educational and 
social function of sport572. To safeguard the sports structures and maintain the social 
function of sport, Commission proposed to preserve integrity and autonomy of sport 
while recognizing the role of sport in Europe573. The focus of the Commission’s 
Helsinki Report was on safeguarding current sports structures and on maintaining the 
social function of sport within the Community framework574. The Report analysed 
recent developments in sport in Europe, particularly its growing commercialisation, and 
 
565 R Parrish, Sports Law and Policy in the European Union (Manchester University Press 2003) p 178-179. 
566 European Commission, ‘The Development and Prospects for Community Action in the Field of Sport’ 
(Commission staff working paper 29 September 1998). 
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its positive effect on the society as an instrument of social democracy, helping to 
integrate the disadvantaged and to combat racism and to preserve educational and social 
function of sport in Europe. The Commission proposed to enhance the role of sport in 
education and training575.   
 
The Commission insisted that the basic freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty do not 
generally conflict with the regulatory measures of sports associations, provided that 
these measures are objectively justified, non-discriminatory, necessary, and 
proportional576. Therefore, the report was designed to leave space for sporting 
associations to abandon their confrontational attitude to the incursion of Community 
law on to their territory577. FIFA and UEFA welcomed the Helsinki Report and declared 
that it was in fact the first time that an official statement issued by the European 
Commission sympathised with the football authorities.  FIFA interpreted the report as 
constituting significant progress in acknowledging for the first time that the Bosman 
judgment has created problems for clubs training young players and in general, it had 
negative consequences on football in Europe with serious side effects on the rest of the 
world578.  
 
The report clearly demonstrated the impact of EU policy on the governance of the 
European model of sport regarding the specificity and autonomy of sport for the first 
time. The EU and sport were not mutually exclusive, and sport is subject to EU law. 
The report re-affirmed the previous ECJ judgments and stated that in terms of the 
economic activity that sport generates, the sporting sector is subject to the EU law, like 
the other sectors of the economy. There would be no difference of application of the EU 
law to sport. Nonetheless, the application of the Treaty's competition rules to the 
sporting sector must take account of the specific characteristics of sport, especially the 
interdependence between sporting activity and the economic activity that it generates, 
 
575 European Commission Press Release,  ‘Xenophobia’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-99-918_en.htm> 
accessed on accessed on 11 June 2018. 
576 Commission of The European Communities, ‘The Helsinki Report on Sport’ COM(1999) 644 final p 9. 
577 S Weatherill, European Sports Law: Collected Papers (2nd Edition, Asser Press, 2015) p 174. 




the principle of equal opportunities and the uncertainty of the results579 which 
contributes towards the sporting competition. Therefore, the specificity of sport which 
would contribute towards competition in sport sector would play an effective role in 
obtaining compliance with the EU law. The report hinted that the specificity of sport 
would be insufficient for a sporting rule to be granted an exemption from the application 
of the EU law but some room was provided for it to be justified under the organisational 
structures of the EU. On the other hand, the report also expressly referred to the 
necessity to preserve the integrity and autonomy of sport to encourage the promotion of 
sport in European society, while respecting sporting values580. However, the report 
acknowledged that sport is regulated under the organisational structures of the EU and 
sporting rules must comply with the EU law.  The report validated that sport enjoys 
conditional autonomy under the organisational structures of the EU, while the 
specificity of sport, especially contributing towards competition in sport, would play an 
important role for sport to meet the conditions set by the EU to have a standing within 
the EU. 
 
II.I.V. Nice Declaration 
Shortly after the Helsinki Report, under the Nice Treaty, the Declaration on the specific 
characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe was adopted. During the IGC 
for the adoption of Nice Treaty, the demands of the sport world to include a reference 
to sport in the Treaty of Nice was denied. Instead, the European Council adopted the 
Nice Declaration on Sport, where its aims were outlined by its title Declaration on the 
specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, which included the 
characteristics needed to be considered while implementing common policies581. The 
Nice Declaration on Sport established that even though the EU did not have any direct 
powers in the area, while taking action under the various Treaty provisions, social, 
educational and cultural functions inherent in sport and making it special, should be 
taken into account. In addition, sport federations must continue to be the key feature of 
 
579 Commission of The European Communities, ‘The Helsinki Report on Sport’ COM(1999) 644 final p 8. 
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the organisation providing a guarantee of sporting cohesion and participatory 
democracy.  
 
The declaration demonstrated the impact of EU policy on the governance of the 
European model of sport regarding the specificity and autonomy of sport. There would 
be no difference of application of the EU law to sport. Nonetheless, the organisational 
structures of the EU must consider the specific characteristics of sport582.   However, 
specificity of sport would not grant an exemption to a sporting rule from the application 
of the EU law but provide some room for it to be justified under the organisational 
structures of the EU. On the other hand, the report also expressly referred to the 
necessity of a form of sporting autonomy583. However, sport is regulated under the 
organisational structures of the EU and sporting rules must comply with the EU law.  
The declaration confirmed that sport enjoys conditional autonomy under the 
organisational structures of the EU, while the specificity of sport, would play an 
important role for sport to meet the conditions set by the EU to have a standing within 
the EU. 
 
II.I.VI.      Meca Medina 
The Amsterdam Declaration refers to the “social significance of sport”, especially 
“particular characteristics of amateur sport”. The Helsinki Report: in its entitlement 
refers to “safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of 
sport within the Community framework” and then stresses inter alia “the specific 
characteristics of sport, especially the interdependence between sporting activity and 
the economic activity that it generates, the principle of equal opportunities and the 
uncertainty of the results”. And the Nice Declaration in its entitlement refers to “the 
specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe”. This starting-point 
implies that in principle exemptions from the EU law are possible584.  However, 
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reference to the Amsterdam Declaration on Sport and the Helsinki Report on Sport only 
had been made by the Court and the Commission until the Meca Medina judgment and 
never been repeated since. The appeal decision by the Court in Meca-Medina refused 
the traditional general concept of sporting exception and declared that sporting rules 
shall be analysed and tested under the EU law.  
 
II.I.VII.             The Convention and the Constitution 
After the adoption of the Nice Declaration on Sport, the dialogue between sport and the 
European institutions deepened to find a way to fulfil the aims and objectives of the 
Declaration. After the Laeken Declaration assigned the duty to draft a new Treaty in the 
form of a European Constitution585, the sporting movement saw it could be the last 
chance to get political recognition for sport in the Treaty586. Primarily, sport was 
presented under the Convention’s first draft as a part of a common article on Youth, 
Education and Vocational Training. Even though there were demands to place sport 
under a specific sport article on its own during the IGC587, the Commission, dissented 
to this opinion. The Commission accepted that sport deserves some special treatment 
due to its characteristics. However, under the organisational structure of the EU it was 
not possible to create an article which could be interpreted as a blanket exception from 
the application of the EU law and more importantly this could end up creating 
unintended precedents for other sectors588. In the end, sport was given political 
recognition, but not a degree of independence for governing bodies as they were 
demanding589. Despite the Constitutional Treaty not entering into force, the 
commitment of the Member States to place sport under the EU was at hand. To 
conclude, conditional autonomy was granted to sport and specificity of sport was not 
enough to grant it an exemption from the application of the EU law. 
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II.I.VIII.          White Paper 
In 2007, the Commission’s White Paper on Sport provided the means to develop a 
comprehensive European sports policy and paved the way for sport to attain a 
competence under the Lisbon Treaty. The White Paper on Sport demonstrated that the 
wording of the sport competence is causally related to the pre-existing practice of EU 
sports jurisdiction590.  In the White Paper, the Commission analysed the sport related 
practice in the EU according to the specificity of sport and stated that the case law of 
the European Courts and decisions of the European Commission show that the 
specificity of sport has been recognized and considered591. The paper, at paragraph 4.1 
stipulated that the specificity of EU sports practice could be approached under two 
separate aspects. Firstly, the specificity of sporting activities and of sporting rules, such 
as separate competitions for men and women, limitations on the number of participants 
in competitions, or the need to ensure uncertainty concerning outcomes and to preserve 
a competitive balance between clubs taking part in the same competitions, and secondly, 
the specificity of sporting structure, including notably the autonomy and diversity of 
sport organisations, a pyramid structure of competitions from grassroots to elite level 
and organized solidarity mechanisms between different levels and operations, the 
organisations of sport on a national basis, and the principle of a single federation per 
sport. The European Commission emphasized that in line with the established case law, 
the specificity of sport will continue to be recognized but the specificity of sport cannot 
be construed so as to justify a general exemption from the application of the EU law592. 
With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU achieved a definite competence 
to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member 
States for sport under Article 6 TFEU and 165 TFEU in contrast to exclusive and shared 
competences. After the official sport competence of the Union, European sports policy 




590 Case C-519/04 P David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR 
I-6991. 
591 The Commission, ‘White paper on Sport’, (2007 391 final) 221. 
592 Ibid, 13. 
593 The European Olympic Committees, ‘Guide to EU Sports policy’ [2011] EOC EU Office, 4. 
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III. Background of Article 165 TFEU: Sporting Authorities 
Sporting authorities have long resisted the intervention of EU Institutions into sport due 
to the concerns that this would limit the autonomy of sport594. It has been argued that 
the autonomy of sport is curtailed as much as the EU Treaties apply to sport and 
consequently two separate territories are created. These two territories have been 
explained as a territory for sporting autonomy and a territory for legal intervention595. 
Even though the ECJ and the Commission have accepted that sport is different to other 
sectors, they have been criticized for being insensitive and adopting a narrow approach 
towards the specific nature of sport than the sporting authorities have desired596. 
However, even though the sporting authorities could not convince the EU institutions 
that sporting activity should not be of any interest to the Union, they succeeded in 
convincing them that certain sporting practices are compatible with the EU Law597. 
After the Mecca Medina case, this has been accepted as the most rational strategy for 
the sporting authorities to convince the EU institutions that sporting practices are not 
necessarily incompatible with the EU law598. As a result, the sporting authorities decided 
to engage and co-operate with the EU to soften the effects of the EU law on the 
autonomy of sport. For the sporting bodies, UEFA in particular, a strategy of co-
operation with the EU has been accepted as the most promising way to promote 
awareness of sporting exceptionalism in the decisional practice of EU institutions599. 
This strategy of restraining the interventionist bite600 of the EU institutions has led to 
the negotiations between the sporting world and the EU Institutions and eventually a 




594 B Garcia and S Weatherill, ‘Engaging with the EU in order to minimise its impact: sport and the negotiation of 
the Treaty of Lisbon’(2012) Journal of  European Public Policy 238 p 238-239. 
595 R Parrish, Sports Law and Policy in the European Union (Manchester University Press 2003). 
596 B Garcia and S Weatherill, ‘Engaging with the EU in order to minimise its impact: sport and the negotiation of 
the Treaty of Lisbon’(2012) Journal of  European Public Policy 238 p 239. 
597 Ibid. 
598 Ibid. 
599 Garcia, B, ‘UEFA and the European Union: From Confrontation to Co-operation and the EU’s involvement in 
Sport’ [2007] Journal of Contemporary European Research 202. 
600 B Garcia and S Weatherill, ‘Engaging with the EU in order to minimise its impact: sport and the negotiation of 
the Treaty of Lisbon’(2012) Journal of  European Public Policy 238 p 242. 
601 Ibid 239. 
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III.I.       Article 6 TFEU 
Before analysing Article 165 TFEU, it is necessary to identify three distinct types of 
competences the Union enjoys. Article 2 TFEU outlines that the Union enjoys an 
exclusive competence, shared competence and supporting competence depending on the 
policy area. These areas are detailed under Article 3 TFEU, Article 4 TFEU and Article 
6 TFEU. In certain areas, the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence where 
only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts while the Member States 
being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the 
implementation of acts of the Union (areas stated under Article 3 TFEU). In certain 
areas the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in 
a specific area, where the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the 
extent that the Union has not exercised its competence (areas stated under Article 4). 
While in certain areas the Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, 
coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States, without thereby superseding 
their competence in these areas. More importantly, legally binding acts of the Union 
adopted on the basis stated under this provision shall not entail harmonisation of 
Member States' laws or regulations (areas stated under Article 6 TFEU). Sport has been 
given a soft competence under the Union and placed under Article 6 TFEU. Article 6 
TFEU states that the Union shall have competence only to carry out actions to support, 
coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States. The areas of such action 
shall, at the EU level, be protection and improvement of human health; industry; culture; 
tourism; education, vocational training, youth, and sport; civil protection; and 
administrative cooperation. 
 
III.II.      Article 165 TFEU 
Article 165(1) TFEU states that the Union shall contribute to the development of quality 
education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by 
supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of 
the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems 
and their cultural and linguistic diversity. The Union shall contribute to the promotion 
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of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its 
structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function602. Article 
165(2) TFEU provides that Union action shall be aimed at developing the European 
dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the 
languages of the Member States; encouraging mobility of students and teachers, by 
encouraging inter alia, the academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study; 
promoting cooperation between educational establishments; developing exchanges of 
information and experience on issues common to the education systems of the Member 
States; encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socio-
educational instructors, and encouraging the participation of young people in 
democratic life in Europe; encouraging the development of distance education; 
developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in 
sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by 
protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially 
the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen603.  
Moreover, Article 165(3) TFEU states that The Union and the Member States shall 
foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in 
the field of education and sport, in particular the Council of Europe604. Finally, Article 
165(4) TFEU stipulates that in order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives 
referred to in this Article: the European Parliament and the Council, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, after consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, 
excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States; the 





602 Article 165 (1) TFEU. 
603 Article 165 (2) TFEU. 
604 Article 165 (3) TFEU. 
605 Article 165 (4) TFEU. 
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III.II.I.   Analysis of Article 165 TFEU 
One can certainly argue that the development of the European sports law has been 
triggered by the involvement and decisions of the European Court of Justice606 and the 
European Commission. It has been accepted that the EU has long been regulating 
sporting activities to enforce Treaty articles governing free movement and competition 
law provisions607. However, the confluence of the EU law and sport has generated 
challenging questions to be answered. First, does sport benefit from an exception in the 
application of the EU law? Second, are there aspects of sport that make it necessary for 
the EU law to treat it in a particular way608. The first two of these questions have found 
their answers in the Lisbon Treaty under Article 165. Firstly, the article does not grant 
any general exception for sporting activity mainly due to the objections of the 
Commission during the discussions for the adoption of a sport competence under the 
EU as well as the Commission decisions and Court judgments adopted in the area as 
explained earlier. Granting a general exemption would challenge the aims and objective 
of the EU. Secondly, under Article 165(1) TFEU the Union shall contribute to the 
promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of 
sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function. 
There are certain aspects of sporting rules which contain the specific nature of sport 
which makes it different than other sector operating within the Union and these 
characteristics of sport should be acknowledged while applying the general EU law to 
sport. However, in case of conflict between the specificity of sport and the EU law, 
judgments and decisions of the EU institutions demonstrated that the EU law prevails.  
Therefore, EU and sport are not mutually exclusive, and sport enjoys a conditional 





606 S Boyes, ‘Sports Law: its history and growth and the development of key sources’ (2012) Legal Information 
Management, 86 p 88. 
607 S Weatherill, ‘Fairness, Openness and the Specific Nature of Sport: Does Lisbon Treaty Change EU Sports Law?’ 
(2010) The International Sports Law Journal 11 p 11. 
608 S Boyes, ‘Sports Law: its history and growth and the development of key sources’ (2012) Legal Information 
Management, 86, 88-89.  
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III.II.II.   Impact of Article 165 TFEU on the Sporting Practices 
Article 165 TFEU achieved a considerable development in sport within the European 
legal framework609. It has mainly legalised the involvement of the EU institutions in the 
area. However, to what extent does the existence of sporting context affect the 
approaches of the EU institutions towards sport has found no definite answers under the 
wording of the Article 165 TFEU. The wording adopted under the Article is not strong 
enough to dictate the European institutions to act in a certain way while challenging 
sporting rules. Article 165(1) declares that the Union shall consider the specific nature 
of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational 
function. However, it does not require the institutions to respect specificity of sport 
blindly. Reading in between the lines, sporting rules will be challenged by the EU 
institutions under the EU law to ensure compliance with the EU legal framework. In 
doing so, the specific nature of sport shall be considered. However, specificity of sport 
shall not prevail over other provisions unconditionally. The article demonstrates that the 
governance of the European model of sport regarding the specificity and autonomy of 
sport is greatly affected by the EU. Sport enjoys conditional autonomy, and the 
specificity of sport does not have a significant effect in assuring mutual exclusivity to 
sport with the EU.  
 
IV. Horizontal Obligation 
Examination by the EU institutions, mainly by the Court, on the horizontal obligation 
of other policy areas in relation to Article 165 TFEU would play a significant role in 
clarifying the extent of the impact of Article 165 TFEU on sport. Horizontal obligation 
determines the strength of each Treaty provision over another in case of conflict and 
identifies which one shall prevail during a legal assessment. The EU is an economic and 
social union with the fundamental aim and objective of establishing the internal market, 
ensuring integration, and protecting the proper functioning of the market610. The EU 
seeks to achieve sustainable development based on balanced economic growth, price 
stability, competitive social market economy, full employment, social progress, and a 
 
609 S Weatherill, European Sports Law: Collected Papers (2nd Edition, Asser Press, 2015) p 530. 
610 Article 3 TEU (3). 
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high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment611. 
Moreover, the EU promotes scientific and technological advancement, combats social 
exclusion and discrimination, and promotes social justice and protection, equality 
between women and men, solidarity between generations and the protection of the rights 
of the child612. While the horizontal obligation is analysed, specific attention must be 
devoted to the identified aims and objective of the Union to assess in case of conflict 
which provision shall prevail over the other provision in the Treaty. The important 
criteria of each provision which needs to be considered are whether the provision is one 
of the fundamental aims and objectives of the Union – such as the establishment of the 
internal market; whether the provision facilitates or ensures the proper functioning of 
the main aims and objectives of the Union; and whether the provision has an economic, 
social or civil intention.  
 
IV.I.    Article 26 TFEU 
It is useful to provide an analysis of the horizontal obligation of the sport provisions 
compared to other provisions under the Treaty. To begin with, the Union has an 
exclusive competence in the areas of customs union, competition rules necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market, monetary policy for the Member States whose 
currency is the euro, the conservation of marine biological resources under the common 
fisheries policy and common commercial policy613.  Article 26 TFEU establishes that 
the Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring the functioning 
of the internal market, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties614; the 
internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaties615; and the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall 
determine the guidelines and conditions necessary to ensure balanced progress in all the 
sectors concerned616. This provisions clearly outlines the fundamental aim and objective 
 
611 Article 3 TEU (3). 
612 Article 3 TEU. 
613 Article 3 TFEU. 
614 Article 26(1) TFEU. 
615 Article 26(2) TFEU. 
616 Article 26(3) TFEU. 
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of the Union. It has an economic intention. Moreover, last section of the Article 
emphasises the need to ensure compliance and progress in other sectors to fulfil the aims 
of Article 26 TFEU with the involvement of the Council and the Commission. This 
gives the power to the Union to adopt harmonising legislation. Therefore, Article 26 
TFEU is a strong provision and has a horizontal obligation. It shall prevail over other 
provisions established under the Treaty which have aims other than establishing or 
ensuring the functioning of the internal market. 
 
IV.II.   Article 151 TFEU 
The Union have shared competence between the Union and the Member States in the 
areas of internal market; social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty; economic, 
social and territorial cohesion; agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of 
marine biological resources; environment; consumer protection; transport; trans-
European networks; energy; area of freedom, security and justice; and common safety 
concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this Treaty617. A horizontal 
obligation analysis will be provided under the competence for internal market social 
policy.  Article 151 TFEU establishes that the Union and the Member States, having in 
mind the fundamental social rights, shall have as their objectives the promotion of 
employment, improved living and working conditions, harmonisation of laws while 
improving and maintaining proper social protection, dialogue between management and 
labour, the development of human resources to achieve lasting high employment and 
the combating of exclusion. They shall implement measures considering diverse forms 
of national practices. Such a development will succeed not only in the functioning of 
the internal market, which favours the harmonisation of social systems, but also in the 
approximation of provisions618. This provision outlines one of the aims and objectives 
of the Union, out of many, in order to achieve proper functioning of the internal market, 
as promotion of employment, improved living standards and social protection during 
labour and ensure proper functioning of it. It has both an economic and social intention. 
Moreover, to ensure proper functioning of the internal market, it has the power to adopt 
 
617 Article 4(2) TFEU. 
618 Article 151 TFEU. 
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harmonising laws within the Union. Therefore, from the horizontal obligation 
perspective, this article reads out as a strong provision which shall prevail over other 
provisions established under the Treaty with aims and objectives other than establishing 
the internal market and ensuring proper functioning of it.  
 
IV.III.   Article 191 TFEU 
To have a better understanding on horizontal obligation, another policy area covered 
under shared competence should be analysed. Article 191 TFEU establishes the 
environmental policy approach of the Union. The Article outlines the Union’s 
objectives on environment as preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the 
environment; protecting human health; prudent and rational utilisation of natural 
resources; and promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or 
worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change619. 
Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection considering the 
diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. Harmonisation measures 
answering environmental protection requirements shall include, where appropriate, a 
safeguard clause allowing Member States to take provisional measures, for non-
economic environmental reasons, subject to a procedure of inspection by the Union620. 
This provision does not outline one of the fundamental aims and objectives of the Union 
and makes no referral to the establishment or the functioning of the internal market. 
Even though the environmental protection Article has no economic desires, it forms a 
social right and Union is intended to be an economic and social union621. Environmental 
protection is considered as an important policy area for the Union and placed under the 
shared competence area and it has the power to adopt harmonising legislation. 






619 Article 191 (1) TFEU. 
620 Article 191 (2) TFEU. 
621Article 3 TEU and Article 26 TFEU. 
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IV.IV.   Article 195 TFEU 
The Union have a supporting, coordinating or supplementing competence to the actions 
of the Member States. The areas are protection and improvement of human health; 
industry; culture; tourism; education, vocational training, youth, and sport; civil 
protection; and administrative cooperation622. Initially, an analysis will be provided for 
the competence of tourism.  Article 195 TFEU establishes that the Union shall 
complement the action of the Member States in the tourism sector by promoting the 
competitiveness of Union undertakings623. The Union shall encourage the creation of a 
favourable environment for the development of undertakings in this sector and promote 
cooperation between the Member States. The European Parliament and the Council, 
excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States, shall 
complement actions within the Member States to achieve the objectives referred624. This 
provision outlines one of the economic aims and objectives of the Union, which is the 
promotion of competition between the undertakings for the proper functioning of the 
market in the tourism sector.  However, unlike social policy provision (Article 151 
TFEU) which declares it necessary to harmonise the laws of Member States, Article 195 
TFEU does not allow harmonisation of tourism laws. The provision of tourism outlines 
one of the requirements, out of many, for the proper functioning of the internal market 
by referring to the necessity of competition between undertakings operating in the 
market. However, it is not a strong provision due to lack of harmonisation powers. 
Therefore, from the horizontal obligation perspective, this article reads out as it might 
prevail over non-economic provisions established under the Treaty which have civil and 
political aims. However, the tourism provision shall not prevail over other provisions 
established under the Treaty with harmonising powers and which have the aims and 






622 Article 6 TFEU. 
623 Article 195(1) TFEU. 
624 Article 195 (2) TFEU. 
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IV.V.   Article 167 TFEU 
Article 167 TFEU provides another example under the competence of culture. The 
union shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while 
respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the 
common cultural heritage625. The Union shall aim to encourage amongst other things 
non-commercial cultural exchange626. The Union shall adopt incentive measures and 
recommendations excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States627. This provision does not outline any of the economic or social aims 
of the Union. Moreover, it does not allow harmonisation of Member States’ domestic 
laws. The culture provision under the Treaty is a civil policy which is secondary to the 
main aims and objectives of the Union. Civil and political rights are not expressed as 
the main aim and objective of the Union but are secondary aims within the Union to 
achieve approximation of the provisions628. It has no intention to develop or ensure the 
proper functioning of the internal market. Therefore, from the horizontality obligation 
perspective, this provision is not a strong provision. Consequently, it shall not prevail 
over other provisions established under the Treaty with economic and social objectives 
aiming to establishing or develop the internal market and ensuring proper functioning 
of it.  
 
IV.VI.   Article 165 TFEU 
Article 165 TFEU acquired a competence of education, vocational training, youth, and 
sport629.  Article 165 TFEU does neither refer to an internal market aim and objective 
nor to an economic or social right. The provision has no powers to adopt harmonising 
legislation within the Union. More importantly, unlike Article 151 TFEU630, it has no 
horizontal obligation requiring it to be considered in the exercise of other EU powers631. 
On the sporting perspective, Article 165 TFEU has limited impact on the Union’s legal 
 
625 Article 167(1) TFEU. 
626 Article 167(2) TFEU. 
627 Article 167(5) TFEU. 
628 Article 151 TFEU. 
629 Article 6 TFEU. 
630 Article 151 TFEU states that “…… so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being 
maintained.”. 
631 Article 165 (4) states that “...excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States”. 
102 
 
framework over sport, particularly in relation to the fundamental internal market 
laws632.  The economic and social aspects of the sporting sector have not been credited 
under the Article. The sport competence has been drafted and worded as merely a civil 
right with no economic or social intention and no main effect on the functioning of 
internal market. Its social function is expressly stated as the Union shall contribute to 
the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature 
of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational 
function633. However, the wording of the Article lacks creating a social aim as it is 
created under Article 191 TFEU for environmental policy. Besides, the importance of 
competitiveness of the sporting market for the internal market has not been referred to 
as it is expressed under Article 195 TFEU for tourism. Moreover, unlike Article 191 
TFEU which is a social right with no economic intention and no effect on internal 
market aim, Article 165 TFEU specifically excludes harmonisation of laws of Member 
States634.  
 
Article 165 TFEU, as set out above, outlines none of the economic aims and objectives 
of the Union, which are necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market. No 
social and economic objectives have been outlined under the article. Therefore, from 
the horizontal obligation perspective, this article reads out as it will not prevail over 
economic and/or social provisions established under the Treaty which have an internal 
market aim. On the other hand, it is important to consider whether Article 165 TFEU 
would prevail over other provisions of similar strength such as Article 167 TFEU.  
Article 167 TFEU on culture has no harmonisation effect, no economic or social aim 
and no effect on internal market aim. Both are simply drafted as a civil provision of the 
Treaty. Both Article 165 TFEU and Article 167 TFEU have a similar power and in case 
of conflict it is difficult to decide which one should prevail over the other. Therefore, 
from the horizontal obligation aspect, it remains within the discretion of the Court of 
 
632 R Parrish, ‘Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department B: Structural And Cohesion Policies 
Culture And Education’ (2010) <https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/bitstream/2134/9388/5/Lisbon%20treaty-
Garcia.pdf,> accessed on 26 June 2018 p 10. 
633 Article 165 (1) TFEU. 
634 Article 165(4) TFEU. 
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Justice to interpret the provisions under the Treaty on a case-by-case analysis to discover 
which one should prevail.  
 
Until now, the ECJ has referred to Article 165 under Bernard, Murphy and Topfit cases. 
Initially in Bernard, the ECJ has referred to the article with an aim to emphasise the 
specific characteristics of sport in general, and football, and of their social and 
educational function. The relevance of those factors was corroborated by their being 
mentioned in the second subparagraph of Article 165(1) TFEU and no analysis towards 
the horizontality of the article was made635. Shortly after, in Murphy, the ECJ took a 
similar stance and noted that, under the second subparagraph of Article 165(1) TFEU, 
the European Union contributes to the promotion of European sporting issues, while 
taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity 
and its social and educational function636. Nevertheless, in its recent judgment of Topfit 
on sport, the ECJ provided a guidance on the horizontality of the article. The ECJ not 
only referred to the specific nature of sporting issue but broaden its analysis on the 
application of Article 165. The court held that with the adoption of Article 165 TFEU, 
EU law does now explicitly refer to sport. Therefore, the right of EU citizens to reside 
in another Member State without discrimination under Articles 18, 20 and 21 TFEU, 
does not only depend on the exercise of an economic activity637. The court stressed the 
social importance of sport in the European Union and interpreted it as an important 
factor for integration in the European society638. Therefore, discrimination provisions, 
should be read in conjunction with Article 165 TFEU639. Article 165 does not have an 
express wording linking sport with other provisions governing the internal market for it 
to be integrated and implemented within the EU policies, such as Articles 11 and 12 
TFEU. Nevertheless, after the TopFit judgment of the ECJ, Article 165 deserves to be 
read in a horizontal manner with other treaty provisions640. It is yet to be seen under the 
 
635 Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP  v Olivier Bernard and  Newcastle United UFC [2010] E.C.R. I-2196.at 
para 40. 
636 Case C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others and Case C-429/08 
Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011 ] E.C.R. I-09083 at para 101. 
637 Case C-22/18 TopFit v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2019:497 at para 19. 
638 Ibid at para 33. 
639 Ibid at para 34. 
640 S Weatherill,  Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 158. 
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future case law whether the ECJ interpretation on the necessity to read discrimination 
clauses in conjunction with Article 165 TFEU will extend to cover internal market rules, 
such as free movement and competition law provisions.  
 
Relying on the emergence of the EU sports law through the spill-over mechanism 
adopted by the EU into a policy area which was not initially predicted or intended by 
the Member States, it is possible for Article 165 TFEU to extend its application to be 
read in conjunction with other treaty provisions. However, currently, the wording of 
Articles 6 and 165 TFEU suggests that in case of conflict with a fundamental treaty 
provision, Article 165 TFEU does not have a strong horizontal effect which would 
necessitate sporting matters to have a priority over other powers, such as free movement 
and competition law. Therefore, from a constitutional perspective the inclusion of the 
Article 165 TFEU does not change the present approach of the organisational structures 
of EU to sport641. Sport and EU are not mutually exclusive, and sport enjoys conditional 
autonomy under the organisational structures of the EU. 
 
V. The Impact of Article 165 TFEU on the European Model of Sport 
The EU enjoys the competence over sport as its members opted for it. The competence 
it enjoys was chosen to be a negative competence with no powers of harmonisation but 
a supporting competence. Supporting competence is the weakest of all the three types 
of competences the EU enjoys, and the EU cannot develop uniforming legislation on 
sport under Article 165 TFEU. Provided that the Member States desired the Union to 
have a stronger power in the area of sport, they could have drafted the provision in 
another way, as it is done for the social policy, environmental policy or tourism. The 
strength of competence the EU enjoys over sport represents current intentions of the 
Member States. Should the intentions change in the future, Member States could give 
more powers to sport by amending the wording of the provision and upgrade it to one 
of the stronger competence areas the EU enjoys.  For the time being, the strength of 





harmonisation is expressly prohibited under the sport article642, harmonising measures 
can always be taken under other policy areas with harmonising powers established under 
the Treaty643. Despite similarly worded prohibitions of harmonisation in the fields of 
social policy, education, vocational training, culture, and public health, the EU has in 
practice achieved convergence in legislation through other legal bases644. Should the 
Union require to adopt sport related uniforming legislation, other policy bases need to 
be consulted for sector specific powers645. The Article 165 TFEU’s impact on the 
organisational structures of the EU towards sport is limited compared to other 
fundamental internal market rules646. However, after Topfit, it is certain that it will be 
read in conjunction with discrimination provisions while it remains possible for it to 
have a similar effect on the fundamental internal market rules. 
 
The Union prohibits sporting activities which are contrary to the fundamental principles 
of the Treaty and impedes cross border economic activity between the Member States 
within the internal market. Therefore, any economic activity which is in breach of 
harmonising, economic and/or social provision with an aim and objective of 
establishing and ensuring proper functioning of the internal market, such as free 
movement provisions, competition law provisions or anti-discriminatory provisions, 
will be caught and declared incompatible under the organisational structures of the EU. 
Consequently, even though Article 165 TFEU does not change the basic pattern of the 
application of the EU law to sport established by the ECJ and the Commission, it 
clarifies the strength of sport under the EU law compared to other Treaty provisions 
based on the horizontal obligation analysis. Sport, like any other market sector, is 
subject to the control rooted in the fundamental provisions of the EU law. Therefore, 
the article re-affirms that sport enjoys conditional autonomy under the organisational 
structures of the EU. 
 
642 Article 165(4) TFEU 
643 S Weatherill, European Sports Law: Collected Papers (2nd Edition, Asser Press, 2015) p 531. 
644 R Parrish, ‘Directorate General For Internal Policies Policy Department B: Structural And Cohesion Policies 
Culture And Education’ (2010) <https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/bitstream/2134/9388/5/Lisbon%20treaty-
Garcia.pdf,> accessed on 26 June 2018 p 13. 
645 S Weatherill, European Sports Law: Collected Papers (2nd Edition, Asser Press, 2015) p 531. 
646 R Parrish, ‘Directorate General For Internal Policies Policy Department B: Structural And Cohesion Policies 
Culture And Education’ (2010) <https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/bitstream/2134/9388/5/Lisbon%20treaty-




Article 165 TFEU does not imply or express any guidance or suggestion on the status 
of autonomy of sport governing bodies but it emphasizes the importance in contributing 
to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature 
of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational 
function647. However, the Court of Justice has often referred to the specificity of sport 
in its judgments before the adoption of Article 165 TFEU and the article did not alter 
the approach of European institutions to sport.  The specificity of sport is recognised by 
the European legal framework and by the European institutions if it complies with the 
EU’s fundamental economic and social aim and objective of establishing and ensuring 
proper functioning of the internal market. The lack of horizontal obligation powers on 
Article 165 TFEU has not altered or had any effect on the EU institutions approach to 
sport while applying EU legal framework to sport. Nevertheless, it will be read in 
conjunction with discrimination provisions while it is possible for it to have a similar 
effect on the fundamental internal market rules648. Therefore, while the Article 165 
TFEU did not alter the status quo of sport thoroughly under the organisational structures 
of the EU, its contribution towards the recognition of the specificity of sport cannot be 
denied. To conclude, as established under the ECJ judgment and Commission decisions, 
sport continues to enjoy a conditional autonomy within the EU based on an assessment 
of compliance of sporting rules with the EU law and during the assessment, specificity 
of sport will be acknowledged. 
 
V.I.        Criticisms on the Article 165 TFEU 
The impact of the Article 165 TFEU on sport was both profound and trivial649. The sport 
article’s effect was trivial because the content of the Article 165 was drafted with 
caution representing Member States’ hesitation in conferring powers to the EU for 
 
647 Article 165(1) TFEU. 
648 Case C-22/18 TopFit v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2019:497 
649 S Weatherill, ‘Fairness, Openness and the Specific Nature of Sport: Does Lisbon Treaty Change EU Sports Law?’ 
(2010) The International Sports Law Journal 11, 11. 
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sport650. However, this was a good start to trigger the spill-over mechanism of the EU651. 
Secondly, the EU has long regulated sport and possessed substantial control on the 
autonomy of sport652. On the other hand, Article 165 has a profound effect because it 
provided a legal base to the EU to involve with sport. Sport acquired a legal base under 
the Treaties and sport is legally subject to the application of the EU law. More 
importantly, it legitimised the EU’s former actions in the field of sport.  With Article 
165, the official involvement of the EU institutions in the field of sport provided the 
possibility to encourage finding an appropriate balance between the wishes of the 
sporting world and the requirements of the EU law through supervision653. The EU 
institutions could support, co-ordinate or compliment sport actions with an 
acknowledgement towards the primary role of the sporting associations. More 
importantly, recently, sport has found a way to be read conjunctively with provisions 
on discrimination, and possibly with other fundamental treaty provisions654. Therefore, 
there is no reason for it not to be welcomed655.  
 
VI. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to establish the impact of European sports policy on sport to 
determine whether EU and European Model of Sport are mutually exclusive.  The 
organisational structures of the EU aim to establish and ensure the proper functioning 
of the internal market in accordance with the Treaties with no exceptions. On the other 
hand, the main features of the European model of sport have the possibility to create 
conflicts with this aim. Therefore, European model of sport is vulnerable to be 
challenged under the organisational structures of the EU and the EU law will regulate 
and supervise the European model of sport to ensure compatibility. Hence, it is 
established that EU and sport is not mutually exclusive. Sport enjoys conditional 
 
650 S Weatherill, European Sports Law: Collected Papers (2nd Edition, Asser Press, 2015) p 507. 
651 Topfit  judgment of the ECJ is an exmaple of the begining of the spill over effect of the Article 165 over other 
policy areas. However, it is too soon to make clear cut conclusion and worth to wait for future judgments to have 
certaninty.  
652 S Weatherill, European Sports Law: Collected Papers (2nd Edition, Asser Press, 2015) p 507. 
653 S Van den Bogaert, et al., ‘Sport and the EC Treaty: A Tale of Uneasy Bedfellows?’ (2006) European Law Review 
821, 839. 




autonomy under the organisational structures of EU and sport is subject to the 
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The research is limited to achieve the impact of the EU law on sport through analysing 
the ECJ judgments and Commission decisions on sport regarding the twin principles of 
the specificity and autonomy of sport underpinning the European Model of Sport. The 
impact of EU law on sport is presented under two chapters, current Chapter IV, and 
following Chapter V.  This chapter aims to establish the impact of EU law on the 
European model of sport in relation to the specificity and autonomy of sport through 
analysing the ECJ judgments.  
 
II. ECJ’s Jurisprudence on Sport  
As outlined in Chapter I, since its founding, the core of the European Union’s 
activities has been the construction of the internal market656. With the aim and 
objective of establishing a common market the EU has been progressively 
approximating the economic policies of the Member States and seeking to unite 
national markets in a single market657. Mainly, the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), and initially the European Economic Community (EEC) 
Treaty, have offered the context for achieving this aim. The EU Treaty provides 
provisions which prohibit Member States from having or creating unjustified 
barriers to the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital to achieve 
negative integration658. Moreover, the Treaty empowers the EU to legislate to 
eliminate obstacles to free movement present in the domestic laws of the Member 
States, to facilitate positive integration659. The Treaty provisions on the freedom of 
movement are centred on the principle of non‐discrimination or equal treatment660. 
The ECJ interprets the principles of the European Union to ensure aim and 
objectives of the EU is properly met without discrimination661.  ECJ, while 
interpreting the fundamental provisions to ensure proper functioning of the internal 
 
656 C Barnard, ‘Competence Review: The Internal Market’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/226863/bis-13-1064-competence-
review-internal-market.pdf > accessed on 22 December 2014 p 3. 
657 Case 207/83 Commission v UK [1985] ECR 1202. 
658 Ibid. 
659 Ibid 3. 
660 Ibid 15. 
661 Ibid 15. 
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market, un-intentionally interfered to regulate sport constituting economic activity 
in the EU. 
 
II.I.  Walrave v Union Cycliste Internationale 
The foundations of EU sports law were established in Walrave and have been 
subsequently developed through the judgments of the ECJ.  
 
II.I.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case 
In Walrave, reference was made to the ECJ from the District Court of Utrecht, to receive 
a preliminary ruling in the action pending before that Court. In the case, the plaintiffs 
Walrave and Koch were Dutch nationals who wanted to offer their services in return for 
remuneration to act as pacemakers on motorcycles in cycle races, but were refused based 
on their nationality since the first defendants had a rule that the pacemaker must be of 
the same nationality as the stayer. The plaintiffs argued that this nationality provision 
was incompatible with the Treaty.  
 
After considering the objectives of the Community, the Court held that the practice of 
sport is subject to Community law only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity 
within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty662. Secondly, the Court ruled that the 
prohibition on discrimination based on nationality does not affect the composition of 
sport teams, in particular national teams, since the formation of them is a question of 
purely sporting interest and has nothing to do with economic activity663. Thirdly, it was 
stated that the prohibition on such discrimination does not only apply to the action of 
public authorities but extends likewise to rules of any other nature aimed at collectively 
regulating gainful employment and services664. Finally, the Court concluded that the 
rule on non-discrimination applies to all legal relationships which by reason either of 
 
662 Case C-63/74 B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405 at para 36. 
663 Ibid at 1421 at para 36. 
664 Ibid  at 1421. 
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the place where they are entered into or of the place where they take effect can be located 
within the territory of the Community665.   
 
II.I.II. Significance: Sporting Exception  
Walrave judgment ruled that 
Having regard to the objectives of the Community, the practice of sport is subject 
to Community law only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity within 
the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty. The prohibition on discrimination based 
on nationality contained in Articles 7, 48 and 59 of the Treaty does not affect 
the composition of sport teams, in particular national teams, the formation of 
which is a question of purely sporting interest and as such has nothing to do with 
economic activity666. 
Walrave established that rules of purely sporting interest which are limited to their 
proper objectives and do not constitute economic activity, such as the composition of 
sport teams, were classified as falling outside the scope of the Treaty667. This rule was 
named as the sporting exception rule under the Community law668. This rule however 
does not affect the composition of sport teams, in particular national teams, the 
formation of which is a question of purely sporting interest and as such has nothing to 
do with economic activity669. This ruling was the landmark establishing that the 
Community law would not be applicable to purely sporting rules with no economic 
interest. Only the sporting rules constituting an economic activity would be tested under 
the application of the Community law to discover compatibility670. A distinction 
between purely sporting rules and economic aspects of sport was made while immunity 
from the application of Community law to purely sporting rules was created under the 
sporting exception rule671. This indicated that sport’s special characteristics should be 
 
665 Case C-63/74 B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405 at para 1421. 
666 Ibid. 
667 Ibid at para 8 and 9. 
668 Ibid at para 4-8. 
669 Ibid at para 8. 
670 B Garcia and S Weatherill, ‘Engaging with the EU in order to minimise its impact: sport and the negotiation of 
the Treaty of Lisbon’(2012) Journal of  European Public Policy 238 p 240.  
671 Case C-63/74 B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405 at para 8. 
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recognised during the application of Community law to sport. This required 
acknowledgement that there is a portion of sporting autonomy which should be free 
from EU intervention such as the composition of sport teams672.   
 
The nationality discrimination is fundamentally against the Community’s aims and 
objectives as well as the Community law. However, the ECJ considered this as a purely 
sporting rule under the nature of sport and exempted it from the application of 
Community law. Nationality discrimination in the composition of national teams has 
been accepted as legitimate and it has formed the core of the interpretative or 
adjudicative strategy for securing sporting autonomy from the application of EU law673. 
The ECJ demonstrated the possibility for sport to explain why it is different or special 
from other industries to be exempted from the application of the Community law674. 
Consequently, in Walrave the ECJ interfered to regulate sport for the first time but it did 
not violate autonomy of sport directly since a potentially broad basis of review to sport 
was provided against the standards required under the Community law675. Even though 
the ECJ refused to grant absolute autonomy from the application of EU law, it 
demonstrated sensitivity to the specificity of sport676. Therefore, sport was granted an 
opportunity to demonstrate its subjection to the application of EU law regarding the 
specificity of sport677.  
 
To conclude, the case demonstrated European Community’s initial impact on the 
organisation of sport. However, this impact was minor. Even though expressly not 
referred to, due to specificity, purely sporting rules were exempt from the application 
of EU law. Only sporting rules with an economic interest were subject to the application 
of EU law.  This demonstrated that, initially, organisation of sport enjoyed two distinct 
forms of autonomy. Purely sporting rules enjoyed autonomy while sporting rules with 
an economic interest were introduced to enjoy conditional autonomy under the 
 
672 Ibid. 
673 S Weatherill,  Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 77-78. 
674 B Garcia and S Weatherill, ‘Engaging with the EU in order to minimise its impact: sport and the negotiation of 
the Treaty of Lisbon’(2012) Journal of  European Public Policy 238 p 240. 
675 Ibid. 




organisational structures of the EU. The ECJ declared conditional autonomy for the 
sporting rules with an economic interest, while specificity of purely sporting rules 
achieved an exemption from the application of EU law.  However, the ECJ failed to 
provide a tool to separate purely sporting rules from economic activity. It was difficult 
to understand the nature of sporting rules let alone to separate economic grounds from 
purely sporting grounds of the activity. As a result, the case introduced an unfortunate 
ambiguity to the juridification of sport. In addition, purely sporting rules definition 
established in the case formed a broad exception of sporting rules and the reasoning 
behind it was very concise and immature678. The ECJ subsequently advanced the scope 
of the sporting exception in its future judgments679. Nonetheless, the Walrave judgment 
has secured its place in the literature as the first source of EU sports law having an 
impact on the autonomy of sport while acknowledging the specificity of purely sporting 
rules. 
 
II.II. Doná v Mantero  
In Doná680, the ECJ reaffirmed that, sport is subject to Community law so far as it 
constitutes an economic activity, and further expanded this approach to the activities 
of professional or semi-professional football players681.  
 
II.II.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case 
In Doná, a reference to the ECJ was made. Mantero had delegated Doná, the 
plaintiff, to inquire in football circles abroad to discover players willing to play in 
the Rovigo team682. Consequently, Doná arranged for the publication of an 
advertisement in a Belgian sporting newspaper in this regard. Mantero refused to 
consider the offers and to pay Doná. Mantero referred to the combined provisions 
of the 'Rules of the Italian Football Federation' according to which only players who 
are affiliated to that federation may take part in matches. Doná argued that the 
 
678 L Freeburn, ‘European Football’s Home-Grown Players Rules and Nationality Discrimination under the European 
Community Treaty’ (2009) Marquette Sports law Review 177 p 200. 
679 Ibid. 
680 Case C-13/76 Doná v Mantero [1976] E.C.R. 1333 at 14-15. 




provisions were discriminatory on nationality and contrary to the Treaty683.  
 
After referring to the related provisions under Community law which seek to abolish 
any nationality discrimination against a person providing a service, the ECJ held 
that the rules or national practices adopted by a sporting organisation which limit 
the right to take part in football matches as professional or semi-professional players 
solely to the nationals of the State in question, are incompatible with the Treaty, 
unless such rules or practice exclude foreign players participation in certain matches 
for reasons which are not of an economic nature and are thus of sporting interest 
only684. Furthermore, the ECJ held that these provisions have a direct effect and 
confer rights on individuals which national Courts must protect685. Besides, the ECJ 
revisited the sporting exception and refined it as a purely sporting rule with no 
economic nature but constituting a restriction should be limited to its proper 
objective in order to be exempted from the application of Community law686.  
Finally, the ECJ expanded the application of nationality-based discrimination to the 
rules of any other nature aimed at collectively regulating gainful employment and 
services including the actions of public authorities687. 
 
II.II.II. Significance 
Two years later Doná ruling has offered no amplification to the ruling in Walrave688. 
The approach of the Community to regulate sport was still centred on the economic 
impact of sport689. Doná limited and altered the sporting exception established 
under Walrave. In its judgment, the Court ruled that  
… those provisions do not prevent the adoption of rules or of a practice 
excluding foreign players from participation in certain matches for reasons 
which are not of an economic nature, which relate to the particular nature 
 
 
684 Case C-13/76 Doná v Mantero [1976] E.C.R. 1333 at 14. 
685 Ibid. 
686 Ibid. 
687 Ibid at para 18. 
688 S Weatherill,  Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 78. 
689 S Weatherill, European Sports Law: Collected Papers(2nd Edition, Asser Press, 2015) p 508. 
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and context of such matches and are thus of sporting interest only, such as, 
for example, matches between national teams from different countries. This 
restriction on the scope of the provisions in question must however remain 
limited to its proper objective690. 
Doná established that purely sporting rules must stay limited to their proper 
objectives to be compatible with the Community law. To conclude, the case 
demonstrated the EU’s minor impact on the organisation of sport.  
 
After Doná, for the following twenty years, there was a break in the ECJ case law 
on sport until the milestone judgment of Bosman. This break was not random but 
indicated the resistance of sporting bodies towards the application of ordinary law 
to sport691. Bringing a case against SGBs at Court has not been easy since a sporting 
career is short, and litigation is lengthy as well as costly. Moreover, SGBs have 
been powerful and they have global reach. An unsuccessful challenge would easily 
end a sportsmen’s career.  Bosman’s referral to the EU’s Court of First Instance 
(CFI), and the ECJ judgment on the case has changed the perception of everyone 
involved in the activity of sport692. Unlike an unpopular sport of cycling, Bosman 
has involved a Belgian football player, and it has energised the development of EU 
sports law693. 
 
II.III. Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v 
Bosman 
The Bosman case was the second milestone decision of the ECJ in regulating 
sporting practices under EU law. In Bosman, the Court re-addressed the difficulty 
of separating the economic grounds of a sporting activity from its purely sporting 
context. In addition, the Court demonstrated willingness to discover the special 
aspects of sport which would be considered legitimate. The Court acknowledged 
the importance of maintaining a degree of equality and uncertainty as well as 
 
690 Case C-13/76 Doná v Mantero [1976] E.C.R. 1333 at 14-15. 
691 S Weatherill,  Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 78. 




encouraging the recruitment and training of young players in sport694. Nevertheless, 
the sporting exception rule of Walrave was narrowed down to interpret and limit 
the specificity of sport695. However, the Court could not offer a clear definition of 
what constitutes the specificity of sport696. Consequently, the hopes of SGBs for a 
generous view of Walrave exception were drained697 and the ruling in Bosman has 
been widely accepted as turning point in the EU’s approach to sport698. Bosman 
changed the path of EU sports law initially established under Walrave.  
 
II.III.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case 
In Bosman, reference was made to the ECJ by the Cour d'Appel, Belgium, for a 
preliminary ruling. In the case, Bosman, a professional footballer of Belgian 
nationality, was employed in 1988 by RC Liege, a Belgian club, under a contract 
expiring on 30 June 1990, which assured him an average monthly salary of BFR 
120 000, including bonuses699. On 21 April 1990, RC Liege offered Bosman a new 
contract for one season, reducing his pay to BFR 30 000, the minimum permitted 
by the URBSFA federal rules. Bosman refused to sign and was put on the transfer 
list. The compensation fee for training was set, in accordance with the said rules, at 
BFR 11 743 000700. Since no club showed an interest in a compulsory transfer, 
Bosman made contract with US Dunkerque, a club in the French second division, 
which led to his being engaged for a monthly salary in the region of BFR 100 000 
plus a signing-on bonus of some BFR 900 000701. On 27 July 1990, a contract was 
also concluded between RC Liege and US Dunkerque for the temporary transfer of 
Bosman for one year, against payment by US Dunkerque to RC Liege of a 
compensation fee of BFR 1 200 000 payable on receipt by the Federation Française 
 
694 Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club 
liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-
Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 at para 106. 
695 Ibid at  para 32. 
696 S Weatherill, European Sports Law: Collected Papers (2nd Edition, Asser Press, 2015) p 4. 
697 L Freeburn, ‘European Football’s Home-Grown Players Rules and Nationality Discrimination under the European 
Community Treaty’ (2009) Marquette Sports law Review 177 p 200. 
698 E Szyszczak, ‘Competition and Sport’ (2007) European Law Review 95 p 97. 
699 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 
at para 28. 
700 Ibid at para 29. 
701 Ibid at para 30. 
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de Football ('FFF') of the transfer certificate issued by URBSFA. The contract also 
gave US Dunkerque an irrevocable option for full transfer of the player for BFR 4 
800 000702. Both contracts, between US Dunkerque and RC Liege and between US 
Dunkerque and Bosman, were however subject to the suspensive condition that the 
transfer certificate must be sent by URBSFA to FFF in time for the first match of 
the season, which was to be held on 2 August 1990703. RC Liege had doubts as to 
US Dunkerque's solvency and did not ask URBSFA to send the said certificate to 
FFF. As a result, neither contract took effect. On 31 July 1990, RC Liege also 
suspended Bosman, thereby preventing him from playing for the entire season704. 
On 8 August 1990, Bosman brought an action against RC Liege before the Tribunal 
de Premiere Instance (Court of First Instance), Liege.  
The ECJ reaffirmed its previous judgment in Walrave and after considering the 
objectives of the Community, reaffirmed that sport is subject to Community law 
only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of the 
Treaty705. This principle applies to the activities of professional or semi-
professional footballers, where they are in gainful employment or provide a 
remunerated service706. The Court further explained that it is not necessary, for the 
purposes of the application of the Community provisions on freedom of movement, 
for the employer to be an undertaking and all that is necessary is the existence of, 
or the intention to create, an employment relationship707. The Court reaffirmed that 
this principle not only applies to the action of public authorities but also to rules of 
any other nature aimed at regulating gainful employment in a collective manner708.  
II.III.II. Restriction and Objective Justification 
Moreover, the ECJ established the importance of considering whether the 
restriction, which were the transfer rules, form an obstacle to freedom of movement 
 
702 Ibid at para 31. 
703 Ibid at para 32. 
704 Ibid at para 33. 
705 Ibid at para 73. 
706 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 
at para 73. 
707 Ibid at para 74. 
708 Ibid at para 82. 
119 
 
for workers and could they be justified709. The freedom of movement for workers 
is one of the fundamental principles of the Community and has a direct effect710. 
The ECJ held that the transfer rules constituted an obstacle to freedom of movement 
for workers because they obstruct workers’ activity to play as professional 
footballers711. The rules would still amount to a restriction, but such a restriction 
may be justified in the pursuit of legitimate objective. But even if that were so, the 
application of those rules must not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose712. 
The transfer rules could only be otherwise if those rules pursued a legitimate aim 
compatible with the Treaty and were justified by pressing reasons of public 
interest713. But even if that were so, application of those rules would still have to be 
such as to ensure achievement of the aim in question and not go beyond what is 
necessary for that purpose714. The Court examined the considerable social 
importance of sporting activities, in particular football, and accepted the aim of 
maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of equality and 
uncertainty and encouraging the recruitment and training of young players as 
legitimate715. However, the prospect of receiving transfer fees cannot be either a 
decisive factor in encouraging recruitment and training of young players or an 
adequate means of financing such activities, particularly in the case of smaller 
clubs716. The Advocate General expressed in his Opinion that the similar aims can 
be attained as efficiently by other means which do not impede freedom of movement 
for workers717. Firstly, by a collective wage agreement certain limits for the salaries 
to be paid to the players by the clubs could be set718. Secondly, it would be possible 
to allocate the clubs' earnings between the clubs719. This would mean that part of 
the income earned from the sale of tickets for its home matches by a club is to be 
 
709 Ibid at para 92. 
710 Ibid at para 93 
711 Ibid at para 100 
712 Ibid at para 104. 
713 Ibid at para 104. 
714 Ibid at para 104. 
715 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 
at para 106. 
716 Ibid at para 109. 
717 Ibid at para 110. 
718 AG Opinion in Bosman, para 226. 
719 AG Opinion in Bosman, para 226. 
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shared with the other clubs. Likewise, the earnings received for awarding the 
broadcasting rights of the matches on television, could be shared between all the 
clubs720. 
 
The Court ruled that Article 54 TFEU (ex-Article 48 TEC) prohibits the application 
of rules laid down by sporting associations where a professional footballer who is a 
national of one Member State may not, on the expiry of his contract with a club, be 
employed by a club of another Member State unless the latter club has paid to the 
former club a transfer, training or development fee721. The Court emphasised that 
the freedom of movement for workers entails the abolition of any discrimination 
based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, 
remuneration and conditions of work and employment722. After establishing the 
existence of an obstacle, the Court considered whether that obstacle may be 
justified723. The Court ruled that the restriction on the scope of the provisions in 
question must remain limited to its proper objective724.  None of the arguments put 
forward were accepted as legitimate by the Court725. 
Moreover, the Court further established that Article 48 prohibits the application of 
rules laid down by sporting associations under which, in competitions they organise, 
football clubs may field only a limited number of professional players who are 
nationals of other Member States726. The sporting rule of UEFA which restricted 
the number of foreign players who could be fielded by clubs in competitions 
infringe the freedom of movement provisions of the Treaty727. This reasoning of the 
 
720 AG Opinion in Bosman, para 226. 
721 Ibid at para 114. 
722 Ibid at para 117. 
723 Ibid at para 121, 123, 124, 125, 126. First, they argued, those clauses serve to maintain the traditional link 
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countries (para123). Secondly, those clauses are necessary to create a sufficient pool of national players to 
provide the national teams with top players to field in all team positions (para124). Thirdly, they help to maintain 
a competitive balance between clubs by preventing the richest clubs from appropriating the services of the best 
players (125). Finally, UEFA points out that the '3 +2' rule was drawn up in collaboration with the Commission 
and must be revised regularly to remain in line with the development of Community policy (para126). 
724 Ibid at para 127. 
725 Ibid at para 130. 
726 Ibid at para 137 
727 Ibid at 137. 
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Court established that free movement of workers principle prevails over nationality 




Bosman has destroyed the widespread opinion of the sporting authorities that they 
were immune from legal interference in their affairs. The Court ruled that  
 It is sufficient to note that, although the rules in issue in the main proceedings 
apply also to transfers between clubs belonging to different national 
associations within the same Member State and are similar to those 
governing transfers between clubs belonging to the same national 
association, they still directly affect players' access to the employment 
market in other Member States and are thus capable of impeding freedom of 
movement for workers. Consequently, the transfer rules constitute an 
obstacle to freedom of movement for workers prohibited in principle by 
Article 48 of the Treaty. It could only be otherwise if those rules pursued a 
legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and were justified by pressing 
reasons of public interest. But even if that were so, application of those rules 
would still have to be such as to ensure achievement of the aim in question 
and not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose729. 
This had a gigantic effect on the autonomy of sport730. Long standing sporting 
practices of requiring a payment for players after completion of their contract as a 
training compensation; rules restricting professional footballers from moving freely 
between clubs once their contracts ended; limits imposed on the number of foreign 
players permitted to represent club teams all declared illegal under EU law731. On 
the other hand, the ECJ limited the scope of restrictions only to catch rules affecting 
players' access to the employment market in other Member States and are thus 
 
728 R Parrish  and S Miettinen, The Sporting Exception in European Union Law (TMC Asser Press, 2008) 49 p 88.  
729 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 
at para 103. 
730 SVD Bogaert, ‘The ECJ on the Tatami: Ippon, Waza-Ari or Koka?’ (2000) European Law Review 554 p 554. 
731 S Boyes, ‘Sports Law: its history and growth and the development of key sources’ (2012) Legal Information 
Management, 88 p 88. 
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capable of impeding freedom of movement for workers 732. Sporting rules in its 
entirety, including purely sporting rules, were granted a conditional autonomy under 
the organisational structures of EU733. Nevertheless, the ECJ demonstrated 
reluctance in applying competition law principles to sporting rules, realising that 
their potential impact on sport would be much heavier than free movement 
provisions734.  
 
The judgment became one of the most well-known European Court cases, not only 
for shaping specifically transfer matters in European football but also for European 
sports law in general. Bosman introduced the necessity of considering whether 
sporting rules form an obstacle to freedom of movement within the internal market 
and whether they could be justified. Bosman established that main practices of the 
sporting industry could be declared incompatible under the EU law.  Whereas the 
specificity of sport was not assessed or expressly referred to under the ECJ’s 
reasoning, special characteristic of sport was emphasised to consider whether this 
would grant sport specific treatment under the application of the EU law. However, 
the specific nature of sport could not grant an immunity to sport under the 
application of the EU law. The restriction on freedom of movement of the workers 
which affected cross border trade was declared incompatible because it did not 
remain limited to its proper objective.  Bosman can be identified as the first case 
demonstrating evidence of conditional autonomy of the organisation of sport under 
the organisational structures of EU. Bosman demonstrated that the EU had a 
considerable impact on the organisation of sport restricting freedom of movement 
between the Member States within the internal market735. The organisation of sport 
was not immune from the application of EU law and the organisational structures 
of sport in Europe should comply with EU law. Therefore, while the specificity of 
sport was considered under the organisational structures of the EU during regulating 
 
732 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 
at para 103. 
733 S Weatherill,  Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 85. 
734 Ibid at 557. 
735 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 
at para 104.  
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sport, SGBs autonomy was declared conditional upon compliance with EU law 736. 
To conclude, in Bosman, the ECJ rather than insisting for a restrictive sporting rule 
to be considered valid under EU law should fall under a Treaty exemption, applied 
a market access analysis. After the analysis, the Court held that restrictive rules are 
valid if they are objectively justified by pursuing a legitimate aim compatible with 
the Treaty and justified by pressing reasons of public interest 737. The ECJ, while 
outlawing transfer and foreign player limitation rules, accepted that there are novel 
categories of objective justification relevant to sport rules even when they have 
direct discrimination738. For example, the Court accepted the aim of maintaining a 
balance between the clubs to preserve equality and uncertainty towards the 
competition results as well as encouraging to recruit and train young players as 
legitimate739. However, other grounds of maintaining the traditional link between 
each club and its country740 and maintaining sufficient pool of players to be selected 
to the national teams741 were rejected by the Court based on the facts of the case742. 
Nevertheless, these grounds could possibly be justified if supported by the facts of 
another appropriate case in the future743. After Bosman, sportspersons sought to 
ascertain their rights under EU law. The two example cases for this approach are 
Deliège and Lehtonen.  
 
II.IV. Christelle Deliège V Ligue Francophone De Judo Et Disciplines 
Associées ASBL 
II.IV.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case  
In Deliège, reference was made to the ECJ by the Tribunal of Belgium, for a 
preliminary ruling744. Deliège was a judoka who had been declared Belgian 
 
736 S Weatherill, Leading Cases in Sports Law (Asser Press, 2013) p 98. 
737 S Weatherill, Leading Cases in Sports Law (Asser Press, 2013) p 93. 
738 Ibid at para 89. 
739 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 
at para 104. 
740 Ibid at para 123. 
741 Ibid at para 124. 
742 Ibid at para 131-132, 134. 
743 L Freeburn, ‘European Football’s Home-Grown Players Rules and Nationality Discrimination under the European 
Community Treaty’ (2009) Marquette Sports law Review 177 p 203. 
744 Case C-51/96 Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo 
ASBL, Union européenne de judo [2000] E.C.R. I-2549. 
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champion on several occasions. The parties had a disagreement on Deliège 's 
status. Deliège claimed she practiced judo professionally or semi-professionally 
whilst the LBJ and the LFJ claimed that judo is a sport which is practiced by 
amateurs745. Deliège c la imed that the LFJ and the LBJ improperly frustrated 
her career development by preventing her from participating in certain tournaments 
while the LFJ claimed that Deliège  lacked discipline746.  
 
Initially the Court ruled that amateur sport is not subject to Community law747. 
Furthermore, the information supplied by the referring national Court did not enable 
the ECJ to give an informed ruling as to the existence and extent of trade between 
Member States or as to the possibility of such trade being affected by the rules for 
the selection of judokas748. The referring Court did not provide sufficient 
information to enable the ECJ to give an informed ruling on the interpretation of the 
competition rules applicable to undertakings749. Nevertheless, based on the freedom 
of movement provisions, a sports association or federation unilaterally classifying 
its members as amateur athletes did not in itself mean that those members do not 
engage in economic activities within the meaning of the Treaty750. Deliège was 
sponsored and pursued an activity as an employed person or provider of services 
for remuneration. This was considered as an economic activity within the meaning 
of Article 2 TEC751. The selection system in the case could prove more favourable 
to one category of athletes than another and inevitably could have the effect of 
limiting the number of participants in a tournament. However, this fact alone did 
not constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services752. Sporting activities 
were of considerable social importance in the Community and special consideration 
to the characteristics of sport should be afforded.753 such limitation is inherent in the 
 
745 Case C-51/96 Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo 
ASBL, Union européenne de judo [2000] E.C.R. I-2549 at para 6. 
746 Ibid at para 8. 
747 Ibid at para 25. 
748 Ibid at para 36. 
749 Ibid at para 37, 38. 
750 Ibid at para 46. 
751 Ibid at para 53. 
752 Ibid at para 66 
753 Ibid at para 41. 
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conduct of an international high-level sports event and requires certain selection 
rules to be adopted754. Nevertheless, sporting rules must remain limited to their 
proper objective755. 
 
II.IV.II. Significance: Inherency Exception 
In Deliège the Court did not follow the classic example of an objective justification 
approach. Instead, a new form of exclusion for sporting rules under inherency was 
introduced. The selection rules in the case had the effect of limiting the number of 
applicants in a tournament. The Court stated that 
[…] the Treaty provisions concerning freedom of movement for persons do 
not prevent the adoption of rules or practices excluding foreign players from 
certain matches for reasons which are not of an economic nature, which 
relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus of 
sporting interest only, such as, for example, matches between national teams 
from different countries. […] however, that that restriction on the scope of 
the provisions in question must remain limited to its proper objective and 
cannot be relied upon to exclude the whole of a sporting activity756. 
In the case, the selection rules were declared inherent in the conduct of international 
high-level sports event. Therefore, it was not classified as a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services under the EU law757. The information provided to the 
ECJ by the referring national Court was not enough for the ECJ to give a judgment 
on the competition law provisions. To conclude, the case demonstrated that EU had 
a general impact on the organisation of sport through regulating freedom of 
movement to provide services. Sporting rules did not enjoy a general exception 
under the application of EU law and each sporting rule should be tested under the 
market access analysis.  However, sporting rules which were inherent in the sporting 
activity and limited to their proper objective may not be regarded as constituting a 
 
754 Ibid at para 64. 
755 Case C-51/96 Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo 
ASBL, Union européenne de judo [2000] E.C.R. I-2549 at para 43. 
756 Ibid. 
757 Ibid at 64. 
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restriction on the freedom to provide services prohibited by the Treaty.  
 
Even from a different angle compared to the above demonstrated objective 
justification analysis, Deliège re-affirmed that sport  is subject to control under the 
organisational structures of EU and does not have exclusive autonomy. On the other 
hand, introduced inherency exception demonstrated the acknowledgement of the 
specificity of sport which makes it different from other sectors.  
 
II.V. Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL 
II.V.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case 
In Lehtonen, reference was made to the ECJ by the Tribunal of Brussels, for a 
preliminary ruling. Lehtonen was a basketball player of Finnish nationality. During 
the 1995/1996 season he played in a team which took part in the Finnish 
championship, and after that was over he was engaged by Castors Braine, a club 
affiliated to the FRBSB (Belgian Federation), to take part in the final stage of the 
1995/1996 Belgian championship. The parties concluded a contract of employment 
for a remunerated sportsman. That engagement was registered with the FRBSB who 
informed Castors Braine that if FIBA (the International Basketball Federation) did 
not issue the license the club might be penalised and that if it fielded Lehtonen it 
would do so at its own risk758. For the European zone, the deadline for the 
registration of non-EU players was 28 February, whereas for a player from a 
federation in the European zone was 31 March. The deadline for registration had 
passed and Lehtonen was not registered. Lehtonen had taken part in breach of the 
FIBA rules on transfers of players within the European zone. As a result, Castors 
Braine dispensed with the services of Lehtonen for the play-off matches759. 
 
In the case, the ECJ initially noted that the information supplied by the national 
Court referring did not enable the ECJ to give an informed ruling as to the existence 
and extent of trade between Member States or as to the possibility of such trade 
 
758 Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v Fédération royale belge des 
sociétés de basketball ASBL (FRBSB) 2000 E.C.R. I-2681 para 12. 
759 Ibid at para 13. 
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being affected by the rules for the selection of judokas760. The referring Court did 
not provide sufficient information to enable the ECJ to give an informed ruling on 
the interpretation of the competition rules applicable to undertakings761. 
Accordingly, the Court answered the question referred to by interpreting the Treaty 
rules on the principle of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
and on freedom of movement for workers762. The ECJ reaffirmed that sport is 
subject to Community law in so far as it constitutes an economic activity763 and 
sport has social importance which deserves to be granted a special consideration764. 
Yet, EU law prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality765. Therefore, the 
existence of an obstacle to freedom of movement for workers and possible 
justification needed to be analysed. The Court held that participation in matches is 
essential for players and a rule restricting participation restricts the chances of 
employment for the player766. Therefore, the rule under scrutiny formed an obstacle 
to freedom of movement of workers. Unlike the inherency principle adopted under 
Deliège, the Court adopted the classic objective justification test and ruled that to 
justify such a rule measures taken by sports federations with an intention to secure 
the proper functioning of competitions must not go beyond what is necessary for 
achieving the aim pursued767. The difference of application on the transfer period 
rules between the players from a federation outside and inside of the European zone 
at the detriment of the former did not have an objective justification768. Therefore, 
the rule in the case was declared as going beyond what it was necessary to achieve 





760 Ibid at para 36. 
761 Ibid at para 28. 
762 Ibid at para 30. 
763 Ibid at para 32. 
764 Ibid at para 33, the Court referred to the case law which is supported by Declaration No 29 on sport annexed to 
the Final Act of the conference which adopted the text of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
765 Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v Fédération royale belge des sociétés 
de basketball ASBL (FRBSB) 2000 E.C.R. I-2681 at para 37. 
766 Ibid at para 50. 
767 Ibid at para 56. 




Lehtonen judgment demonstrates that sport governing authorities could limit the 
time of movement of players between clubs as part of their legitimate aim to ensure 
the regularity of sporting competitions769.  Therefore, a transfer window is not in 
breach of EU law. However, as outlined in Bosman770, measures taken by sports 
federations with a view to ensure the proper functioning of competitions may not 
go beyond what is necessary for achieving the aim pursued771. This period should 
not be contaminated by arbitrary or discriminatory features772. Therefore, even 
though the Court has accepted the need to restrict the mobility of players at the end 
of a season, the discriminatory transfer window rules have been found contrary to 
EU law.  The ECJ followed the analytical market access approach adopted under 
Bosman, and examined the existence of an obstacle to trade, objective justification, 
and the proportionality of the rule. After establishing the existence of an obstacle to 
freedom of movement of workers, the Court considered whether that obstacle may 
be objectively justified773 and ruled that the rule went beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the aim pursued. Therefore, it was not compatible under the EU law. 
 
To conclude, the case demonstrated that EU had an impact on the organisation of 
sport. The case re-affirmed that sport enjoys conditional autonomy under the 
organisational structures of EU. On the other hand, the ECJ expressed the need to 
give special consideration to the characteristics of amateur sport774. Therefore, ECJ 
acknowledged the specificity of sport by expressly referring to the existence of 






769 Ibid at para 53. 
770 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 
at para 104.  
771 Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v Fédération royale belge des 
sociétés de basketball ASBL (FRBSB) 2000 E.C.R. I-2681 at para 56. 
772 S Weatherill,  Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 240. 
773 Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v Fédération royale belge des sociétés 
de basketball ASBL (FRBSB) 2000 E.C.R. I-2681 at para 51. 
774 Ibid at para 33. 
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II.VI. Expanding the Application of European Law 
 
II.VI.I. Kolpak and Simutenkov 
In Kolpak775, on the interpretation of Article 38(1) of the Europe Agreement 
establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member 
States, and in Simutenkov776 on the interpretation of Article 23(1) of the Agreement 
on partnership and cooperation establishing a partnership between the European 
Communities and their Member States, the ECJ expanded the application of 
European law in sport to non-European Union citizens. The Court established that 
workers who are not citizens of Member States but who are lawfully employed in 
the territory of a Member State have a right to equal treatment  in working 
conditions of the same scope as that which, in similar terms, nationals of Member 
States are recognised as having under the EC Treaty777. 
 
II.VI.I.I Deutscher Handballbund eV v Maros Kolpak 
II.VI.I.I.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case 
In the case of Kolpak, reference was made to the Court by the German Court for a 
preliminary ruling. Kolpak was a Slovak national who entered a fixed-term 
employment contract for the post of goalkeeper with the German handball team 
TSV Ostringen eV Handball, receiving a monthly salary. He was a resident in 
Germany and held a valid residence permit778. The DHB, which organised league 
and cup matches at federal level, issued to him, under Rule 15 of the SpO, a player's 
licence marked with the letter A on the ground of his Slovak nationality779. Kolpak, 
who had requested that he be issued with a player's licence which did not feature 
the specific reference to nationals of non-member countries, brought an action.  
 
The ECJ, initially referred to the Article 1 (2) of the Association Agreement with 
Slovakia and stated that the aims of the Agreement were, to provide an appropriate 
 
775 C-438/2000 Deutscher Handballbund eV v Maros Kolpak 2003 ECR I-4135 
776 Case C-265/03 Igor Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol 
(2005) ECR I-2579. 
777 Ibid.  
778 C-438/2000 Deutscher Handballbund eV v Maros Kolpak (2003) ECR I-4135 at para 9. 
779 Ibid at para 10. 
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framework for political dialogue between the Parties, allowing the development of 
close political relations between them, to promote the expansion of trade and 
harmonious economic relations between the Parties in order to foster dynamic 
economic development and prosperity in the Slovak Republic, and to provide an 
appropriate framework for the Slovak Republic's gradual integration into the 
Communities780. After establishing the direct effect of the association agreement, 
the Court established that the football regulation under scrutiny forms an obstacle 
to trade under the EU law. After this finding, the ECJ examined whether there is an 
objective justification to the rule and referred to the previous case law781. The Court 
concluded that the discrimination arising in the present case from the particular rule 
of the SpO cannot be regarded as justified on exclusively sporting grounds in as 
much as it follows from those rules that, during matches organised by the DHB, 
clubs are free to field an unlimited number of nationals of EEA Member States782.  
II.VI.I.I.II. Significance 
In Bosman, the Court held that rules restricting free movement of workers between 
Member States are contrary to EU law. This decision has removed discriminatory 
practices protecting nationals and facilitated competition in the common market by 
enabling workers in one-Member State to find employment in another Member 
State783. Similar arguments were raised in Kolpak based on the Association 
Agreement. The case concerned a Slovak national and the Association Agreement 
with Slovakia which was not a Member State at the time. The restrictive rules in the 
case were discriminatory at club level but were held inadmissible under EU law 
because they restricted freedom of movement of workers. The Court indicated that 
the employment market of all Member States should be open for access and must 
encourage competition based on ability and not nationality784. This approach 
adopted by the Court has neglected to recognise the specificity of sport compared 
 
780 Ibid at para 3. 
781 See Bosman and Doná. 
782 C-438/2000 Deutscher Handballbund eV v Maros Kolpak (2003) ECR I-4135 at para 56. 
783 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 
at para 134. 
784 S Weatherill,  Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 184. 
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to other market sectors785. Instead, the Court contributed to ensure the main aim and 
objective of the Union to achieve and ensure proper functioning of the internal 
market and cross border trade is protected786. The ECJ demonstrated that under the 
application of the freedom of movement for workers, the employment markets in 
all Member States will be open with no reservations to competition within the 
internal market based on ability and not nationality787. 
 
The other important significance of Kolpak is that it is one of the first cases decided 
on nationals of a state outside the EU/EEA who sought equal treatment as national 
players under an Association Agreement between the EU and Slovakia. With the 
Kolpak case, the aim and objective of the EU to abolish discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality including workers of Member States regarding employment 
conditions788 has for the first time spilled over to regulate equal treatment to workers 
of States which are a party to an Association Agreement which contains non-
discrimination clauses with the EU States and are legitimately employed in a 
Member State789. Consequently, for the first time, the conditional autonomy of sport 
in the EU spread outside the borders of the Union and demonstrated the possible 
impact of the EU on the lex sportiva. 
To conclude, the case demonstrated that the EU had a considerable impact on the 
organisation of sport by regulating freedom of movement to provide services 
between a Member and non-Member State who are party to an association 
agreement. Sporting rules did not enjoy a general exception under the EU law and 
each sporting rule must be tested under the market access analysis.  Thus, the case 
re-affirmed that sport enjoys conditional autonomy under the organisational 
structures of EU. On the other hand, under the case, the specificity of sport was not 
acknowledged. Instead, the Court expressed the importance of the employment 
market of all Member States to be open for access and encouraged competition 
 
785 Ibid. 
786 For detailed discussion, visit Chapter I. 
787 S Weatherill,  Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 184. 
788 Article 45(2) TFEU. 
789 Commission of the European Communities, ‘White Paper on Sport’ COM (2007) 391 final p 14-15 section 4.2. 
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based on the ability and not the nationality of the workers790. The Court contributed 
to ensure the main aim and objective of the Union to achieve and ensure proper 
functioning of the internal market and cross border trade791. The Court demonstrated 
eagerness to ensure cross border trade is not affected between the Member States 
and to protect the proper functioning of the internal market. Therefore, apart from 
confirming the conditional autonomy of sport, the ECJ acknowledged the 
importance of market access over the specificity of sport.  
 
II.VI.I.II. Igor Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real 
Federación  
        Española de Fútbol 
II.VI.I.II.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case 
In Simutenkov792, reference was made by the Spanish Court to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling. In the case, Simutenkov, a Russian national living in Spain, had 
a residence and a work permit. Simutenkov was employed as a professional football 
player under an employment contract with Club Deportivo Tenerife and he held a 
federation licence as a non-Community player793. In January 2001, Simutenkov 
submitted, through that club, an application to the Real Federación Española de 
Fútbol (Royal Spanish Football Federation) (RFEF) for it to replace the federation 
licence which he held with a licence that was identical to that held by Community 
players. In support of that application, he relied on the Communities Russia 
Partnership Agreement which ensured that the treatment accorded to Russian 
nationals legally employed in the territory of a Member State shall be free from any 
discrimination based on nationality, as regards working conditions, remuneration or 
dismissal, as compared to its own nationals794. RFEF turned down that 
application795. Simutenkov argued that this was incompatible with Article 23(1) of 
 
790 S Weatherill,  Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 184. 
791 For detailed discussion, visit Chapter I. 
792 Case C-265/03 Igor Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol 
(2005) ECR I-2579. 
793 Case C-265/03 Igor Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol 
(2005) ECR I-2579 at para 6. 
794 Ibid at para 3 and 7. 
795 Ibid at para 8. 
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the Communities-Russia Partnership Agreement796.  
The ECJ established the direct effect of the particular provision since an agreement 
concluded by the Communities with a non-member State must be regarded as being 
directly applicable797. The Court cited Article 1 of the Agreement and emphasised 
that the purpose of the Agreement was to establish a partnership between the parties 
with a view to promoting, inter alia, the development between them of close 
political relations, trade and harmonious economic relations, political and economic 
freedoms, and the achievement of gradual integration between the Russian 
Federation and a wider area of cooperation in Europe798. After referencing Bosman 
and Kolpak, the Court ruled that nationality discrimination provisions of EU law 
applies to rules laid down by sporting associations which determine the conditions 
of which professional sportsmen can engage in gainful employment799.  They also 
preclude any limitation, based on nationality, on the number of players who may be 
fielded at the same time800. In the case, the limitation based on nationality did not 
relate to specific matches between teams representing their respective countries but 
applied to official matches between clubs and thus to the essence of the activity 
performed by professional players. The Court ruled that such a rule which limits the 
number of professional players from non-member countries who may take part in 
national competitions cannot be justified on purely sporting grounds801.  
II.VI.I.II.II. Significance 
The approach of the ECJ adopted in Kolpak was approved in Simutenkov. Generally, 
the two cases are accepted as demonstrating that Bosman has implications beyond 
the borders of the EU802. To conclude, Simutenkov demonstrated that the EU had a 
considerable impact on the organisation of sport by regulating freedom of 
movement to provide services between a Member and non-Member State who are 
 
796 Ibid at para 13. 
797 Ibid at para 21. 
798 Ibid at para 27. 
799 Ibid at para 33. 
800 Case C-265/03 Igor Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol 
(2005) ECR I-2579 at para 33. 
801 Ibid at para 38. 
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party to an association agreement. Sporting rules did not enjoy a general exception 
under EU law and each sporting rule must be tested under the market access 
analysis.  Thus, the case re-affirmed that sport enjoys conditional autonomy under 
the organisational structures of the EU. On the other hand, the specificity of sport 
was affected under the application of EU law and it was not acknowledged in the 
judgment. Instead, the Court expressed the importance of promoting the 
development of close political relations, trade and harmonious economic relations, 
political and economic freedoms, and the achievement of gradual integration 
between the non-Member State and a wider area of cooperation in Europe. The 
Court contributed to ensure the main aim and objective of the Union to achieve and 
ensure the proper functioning of the internal market and cross border trade803. The 
Court ensured that cross border trade was not affected between the Member States 
and protected proper functioning of the internal market between Member and non-
Member States. Therefore, apart from confirming the conditional autonomy of 
sport, the ECJ acknowledged the importance of market access over the specificity 
of sport. More importantly, the autonomy of sport was limited to a conditional 
autonomy under the organisational structures of the EU not only within the borders 
of the Union with 27 Member States territories but also to other non-Member States 
which has entered into an Association Agreement with a Member State to facilitate 
competition within the internal market. 
 
II.VII. Introduction of Competition Provisions to Sporting Practices  
Above demonstrated rulings of ECJ demonstrated the application of free movement 
law in sport.  Since Bosman and Deliège most of the sport related cases are decided 
under the application of competition law rather than free movement804. Competition 
law does not operate under the same lines as free movement law since competition 
law relies on finding concerted practices and free movement law relies on the 
adoption of measures. Market analysis is more heavily relied on under the 
competition law then it is under the free movement law805. For example, de minimis 
 
803 For detailed discussion, visit Chapter I. 




principle for the application of EU law applies to competition law but not to the free 
movement law. On the other hand, even though there are there are difference in their 
application, they are practically aligned for the purpose of shaping EU sports law 
while establishing and maintaining the internal market806. Free movement law is 
devoted to achieving the internal market without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaties807. Whereas competition law is devoted to ensuring 
maintenance of effective competition within the internal market808. Therefore, both 
are part of a broader scheme and their similarities out weights their differences809.  
 
II.VII.I. David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission 
Unlike the European Commission810, it was not until Meca- Medina811 judgment 
that the ECJ examined the application of competition law to sport. ECJ has set the 
scene for the future judgments in the area812. 
 
II.VII.I.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case 
In the case, the applicants were two professional athletes who compete in long-
distance swimming813. In an anti-doping test carried out during the World Cup the 
applicants tested positive for Nandrolone814. Consequently, FINA's Doping Panel 
suspended the applicants for a period of four years815, later reduced to two816. 
Initially, Meca Medina appealed to CAS and by an arbitration award dated 23 May 
2001, CAS reduced to two years the suspension of the swimmers. The applicants 
did not appeal against that award to the Swiss Federal Court but filed a complaint 
with the Commission, alleging a breach of then Article 81 EC and/or Article 82 EC, 
now Article 101 and 102 TFEU. After analysing the particular anti-doping rules 
 
806 Ibid p 105. 
807 Article 26 TFEU. 
808 Article s101 and 102 TFEU. 
809 S Weatherill,  Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 105. 
810 COMP 37.806. ENIC/UEFA, IP/02/942, 27 June 2002. 
811 Case C- 519/04 Meca-Medina v Commission of the European Communities [2006] E.C.R.I-6991. 
812 S Weatherill, Leading Cases in Sports Law (Asser Press, 2013) p 99. 
813 Case C-519/04 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991 at para 3. 
814 Ibid at para 3. 
815 Ibid at para 3. 
816 Ibid at para 3. 
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according to the assessment criteria of competition law, the Commission, concluded 
that those rules did not form a prohibition under the then Articles 81 EC and 82 EC, 
now Article 101 and 102 TFEU, since they were solely inherent in the objectives of 
safeguarding the integrity of competitive sport and athletes’ health and rejected the 
applicants’ complaint817. The applicants appealed the Commission decision to the 
Court of First Instance. After analysing the previous case law of the ECJ, the Court 
of First Instance held that the prohibitions laid down by Articles 39 EC and 49 EC 
apply to the rules adopted in the field of sport if they constitute an economic activity. 
On the other hand, the Court of First Instance held that those prohibitions do not 
affect purely sporting rules which have nothing to do with economic activity818. 
Therefore, the Court reasoned that purely sporting rules have nothing to do with the 
economic relationships of competition. The Court ruled that the anti-doping rules at 
issue, which have no discriminatory aim, are intimately linked to sport, and does 
not constitute an economic activity. Consequently, the rules to combat doping do 
not fall within the scope of Articles 81EC and 82 EC819. The Court of First Instance 
dismissed the action applicants. 
 
Meca Medina filed another appeal to ask the European Court of Justice to set aside 
the judgment of the Court of First Instance. The ECJ first of all visited the objectives 
of the EU law and reaffirmed that sport is subject to EU law in so far as it constitutes 
an economic activity; that where a sporting activity takes the form of gainful 
employment or the provision of services for remuneration, which is true of the 
activities of semi-professional or professional sportsmen, it falls, more specifically, 
within the scope of EU law820; that EU provisions on freedom of movement for 
persons and freedom to provide services not only apply to the action of public 
authorities but extend also to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating gainful 
employment821.  More importantly, the Court established that the mere fact that a 
rule is purely sporting in nature does not provide an immunity from the application 
 
817 Ibid at para 20. 
818 Ibid at para 7. 
819 Case C-519/04 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991 at para 8 - 10. 
820 Ibid at para 23. 
821 Ibid at para 24. 
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of general EU law. The Court established that the sporting rules under scrutiny must 
satisfy the requirements of fundamental freedom of movement provisions as well 
as competition law provisions822. Consequently, even though certain rules do not 
constitute restrictions on freedom of movement based on the fact that they concern 
questions of purely sporting interest and have nothing to do with economic activity, 
they do not have an immunity from the application of competition law provisions823.  
After applying competition law provisions to sporting rules, it is established that the 
anti-doping rules which have a legitimate objective do not necessarily constitute a 
restriction on competition and should not be regarded as incompatible with the 
common market objectives. Such a limitation is inherent in the organisation and 
proper conduct of competitive sport and its very purpose is to ensure healthy rivalry 
between athletes824. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the penal 
nature of the anti-doping rules at issue and the magnitude of the penalties applicable, 
are capable of producing adverse effects on competition by unwarranted exclusion 
of athletes from sporting events825. Consequently, the restrictions imposed by those 
rules must be limited to what is necessary to ensure the proper conduct of 
competitive sport826. Under the case, the threshold did not appear to go beyond what 
is necessary to ensure that sporting events take place and function properly827.  
II.VII.I.II. Significance  
In this landmark decision, the Court ruled that  
[…] even if those rules do not constitute restrictions on freedom of 
movement because they concern questions of purely sporting interest and, 
as such, have nothing to do with economic activity (Walrave and Koch and 
Donà), that fact means neither that the sporting activity in question 
necessarily falls outside the scope of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC nor that the 
rules do not satisfy the specific requirements of those articles828. 
 
822 Ibid at para 28. 
823 Ibid at para 31. 
824 Ibid at para 45. 
825 Case C-519/04 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991 at para 46. 
826 Ibid at para 47. 
827 Ibid at para 54. 
828 Ibid at para 31. 
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In this decision, the ECJ not only scrutinized sport under the EU competition law 
but also rebutted the presumption of the sporting exception established in Walrave, 
and ruled that even if a rule does not constitute a restriction on the freedom of 
movement because it concern questions of purely sporting interest and, has nothing 
to do with economic activity, it does not mean that the sporting activity in question 
necessarily falls outside or within the scope of EU competition law829. There is a 
possibility that a purely sporting rule might have an economic aspect in its purpose 
and effect. Consequently, each sporting rule should be analysed on a case-by-case 
approach to establish whether it is compatible with competition law provisions to 
ensure cross border trade between Member States in the internal market is not 
affected830.  
 
Meca Medina established the legal framework of interpretation of the EU 
competition law provisions to the organisational features of the European model of 
sport.  The case matters greatly because the ECJ firmly established that sporting 
rules have an economic effect, and they fall under the scope of the EU law. 
However, they are not declared incompatible if they have a real effect on securing 
sport’s effective organisation831. Sporting rules with direct or indirect economic 
effects on the internal market should be assessed under the EU competition law 
provisions to discover whether they can be justified and proportionate under the 
market access analysis832. The Court ruled that 
[…] even if the anti-doping rules at issue are to be regarded as a decision of 
an association of undertakings limiting the appellants’ freedom of action, 
they do not, for all that, necessarily constitute a restriction of competition 
incompatible with the common market, within the meaning of Article 81 EC, 
since they are justified by a legitimate objective. Such a limitation is inherent 
in the organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport and its very 
purpose is to ensure healthy rivalry between athletes833. 
 
829 Ibid at para 31. 
830 Ibid  at para 32, 33. 
831 S Weatherill,  Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 110. 
832 S Weatherill,  Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 110. 
833 Case C- 519/04 Meca-Medina v Commission of the European Communities [2006] E.C.R.I-6991 para 45. 
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The sporting rule with an economic effect will not form a restriction on condition 
that the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit 
of the legitimate objectives and are proportionate to them834. A restrictive sporting 
rule might not necessarily constitute a restriction of competition incompatible with 
the common market, within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, if they are justified 
by a legitimate objective. Such a limitation would be inherent in the organisation 
and proper conduct of competitive sport and its very purpose is to ensure healthy 
rivalry between athletes835. At this point, EU law provided a room, a conditional 
autonomy, to the sporting authorities to demonstrate why and how sporting rules 
are necessary for the proper functioning of sport836. With a deeper look, the Court 
indicated that a restrictive sporting rule would not be declared incompatible under 
the organisational structures of the EU if it facilitates competition within the sport 
sector operating under the internal market. Such a sporting rule would not impede 
cross border trade between the Member States but indirectly contribute towards the 
further integration and proper functioning of the internal market while protecting 
integrity of sport and ensuring conduct of sport. The specificity of sport is 
acknowledged to understand different circumstances of competition in sport and to 
help maintain it.  
 
Meca Medina demonstrated that the EU has a gigantic impact on the organisation 
of sport during the application of competition law provisions to it. The main aim 
and objective of the EU to ensure further integration and proper functioning of the 
internal market surfaced and competition law provisions provided the tool for it to 
regulate sport. The case showed that the autonomy of sport under the EU law 
depends on the condition to demonstrate sufficient reason for the existing pattern of 
sport governance to the ECJ837. The shape of EU sports law is developed during the 
interpretation of competition law provisions of the Treaty under the case. Moreover, 
the preference of the ECJ for a case-by-case examination of sporting rules under the 
 
834 Case C- 519/04 Meca-Medina v Commission of the European Communities [2006] E.C.R.I-6991 para 42. 
835 Ibid at para 45. 
836 S Weatherill, Leading Cases in Sports Law (Asser Press, 2013) p 146. 
837 S Weatherill,  Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 110. 
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competition law provisions instead of the purely sporting rule notion deserves an 
attention. In the future for the interpretation of the free movement provisions the 
ECJ might prefer to adopt the same approach to achieve a consistent application of 
the EU law to sport838.   
 
II.VII.I.III.  After the Meca Medina Judgment 
The Meca Medina judgment is one of the most important sport related cases 
together with Bosman and Walrave since they formed the boundaries of EU sports 
law. The case has effectively eliminated the Walrave judgment’s purely sporting 
interest rule839. In addition, the case has demonstrated the approach of the EU to 
sport. This is a reflection visualised on a case-by-case analysis while requiring 
compliance with the EU law and paying attention to the competitive sport. 
However, the case has not provided a legal framework formulating the EU’s 
approach to sport and created uncertainty840. This has raised the concerns of 
SGBs841.  Prior to Meca-Medina, the application of EU law in the sporting activities 
had a distinction between the purely sporting rules, which are required for the proper 
functioning of the sporting activity, and the economic activities emerging as a result 
of sporting practice. The European Commission in its Meca-Medina made a finding 
that the disputed sporting rule was inherent in the objectives of safeguarding the 
integrity of competitive sport and athletes’ health842. On the other hand, the CFI 
preferred the purely sporting rule approach and held that the disputed sporting rule 
was a purely sporting rule and has nothing to do with economic activity. CFI 
wrongfully ruled that competition law provisions did not apply to the purely 
sporting rules843.  The ECJ in Meca-Medina rebutted this view and expressed that a 
rule which is of purely sporting interest will not be exempted from the application 
of the EU law844. The sporting rule of purely sporting interest which is found 
 
838 S Weatherill,  Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 123. 
839 S Weatherill, Leading Cases in Sports Law (Asser Press, 2013) p 59. 
840 Commission of the European Communities, ‘White Paper on Sport’ COM (2007) 391 final at [4.1]; R Parrish and 
S Miettinen, The Sporting Exception in European Union Law (TMC Asser Press, 2008) p 44. 
841 Infantino, Director of Legal Affairs at UEFA 2006 and Zylberstein 2007. 
842 Case C- 519/04 Meca-Medina v Commission of the European Communities [2006] E.C.R.I-6991 para 40. 
843 K Lefever, ‘New Media and Sport’ (eds), Specificity of Sport: The Important Role of Sport in Society, ASSER 
International Sports Law Series, (T.C.M. Asser Press, 2012) p 33.  
844 Case C-519/04 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991 at para [27]. 
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compatible with the free movement provisions would not be automatically 
exempted from the application of competition law845. Therefore, a case-by-case 
application of the provisions is necessary under the proportionality test to discover 
if the requirements of the competition provisions are met since every case is 
different846.  
While the uncertainty of the case-by-case approach to deal with compatibility of a 
sporting rule has been criticised as unsatisfactory by the European Parliament847, it 
is considered necessary by the Commission and required by the Court in Meca-
Medina. The judgment inflamed both the long-standing serious concerns of the 
sporting authorities on the autonomy of sport due to the EU institution’s interference 
and practical difficulties of uncertainty and unpredictability aroused as a result of 
case-by-case applied proportionality test848. The judgment has overturned the 
presumption of sporting autonomy for the purely sporting rules while causing 
practical difficulties849. The specificity of a purely sporting rule would not provide 
a protection to it from the application of the EU competition law. Therefore, 
specificity of sport would not fall outside the coverage of the EU and each sporting 
rule would be evaluated under EU law to determine compatibility and standing in 
sport. The organisational structures of EU law demonstrated that they have 
significant impact on both the autonomy and the specificity of sport. Consequently, 
the judgment has attracted serious criticism from the sport governing 
organisations850. Infantino851, criticised the ECJ for failing to clarify the scope and 
nature of the specific sporting rules that fall outside the scope of EU law. Moreover, 
he declared that the Court has taken a major step backwards by applying an open-
ended legal test which would create legal challenges to rules and practices in the 
world of sport. He concluded that Meca Medina created considerable difficulty in 
 
845 Case C-519/04 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991at para [31]. 
846 K Lefever, ‘New Media and Sport’ (eds), Specificity of Sport: The Important Role of Sport in Society, ASSER 
International Sports Law Series, (T.C.M. Asser Press, 2012), p 33. 
847 European Parliament (INI/2007/2261), ‘Parliament Resolution of 8 May 2008 on the White Paper on Sport’ [2007] 
at [F.4]. 
848 S Weatherill, Leading Cases in Sports Law (Asser Press, 2013) p 146. 
849 Ibid. 
850 Infantino, Director of Legal Affairs at UEFA 2006 and Zylberstein 2007. 
851 Director of Legal Affairs at UEFA in 2006. 
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identifying specific sporting rules which will not be challenged under EU law852. 
Soon after, the European Parliament called on the European Commission to provide 
more legal certainty by creating clear guidelines on the applicability of the EU law 
to sport in Europe and by implementing a range of other administrative 
initiatives853. The implication of Meca Medina is initially felt in the Arnaut Report 
published in 2006854. The report was published nearly two months after the ECJ 
judgment in Meca Medina which overruled the CFI decision.  However, the report 
underestimated the impact of the Meca Medina by referring to the CFI finding only. 
Nevertheless, the report emphasized the significance of the case by stressing that 
before Meca Medina, Courts undertook more individual assessment and considered 
whether a rule in question had an economic character to bring it within the scope of 
EU law855. However, in Meca Medina, the Court directly examined whether the 
anti-doping rules under scrutiny were based on purely sporting considerations and 
held that such rules were subject to the EU law if they did not remain limited to 
their proper scope or objective and if they impeded cross border trade between the 
Member States within the internal market856.  However, the Report failed to reflect 
the ECJ’s judgment in favour of conditional sporting autonomy on demonstrating 
compliance with EU law and supported the status quo in sport and centred its 
analysis on the Court of First Instance’s judgment which was set aside before the 
publication of the Report857. Therefore, the Report was possibly a motivated 
propaganda to promote the ambitions of sporting federations to ease the 
involvement of the European institutions with sporting activity858.  
The European Commission’s White Paper published in July 2007, ignored the 
Arnaut Report, and placed a heavy reliance on the ECJ judgment of Meca-Medina 
and identified the case as a landmark decision. The Commission placed heavy 
 
852 INF, 02.10.2006 Meca Medina; a step backwards for the European Sports Model and the Specificity of Sport? P 
2 
853 Ibid. 
854 José Luis Arnout, ‘The Independent European Sport Review’, (2006) <http://eose.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/independant_european_sports_review1.pdf> accessed on 06 March 2018 at para 6.30 p 106. 
855 Ibid. 
856 Ibid. 
857 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 120. 
858 Ibid at 121. 
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reliance on the ECJ’s reasoning in Meca Medina859 and adopted the case as the focal 
point of the legal analysis in the White Paper860.  The paper acknowledged the ECJ 
judgment and re-affirmed by confirming that compatibility of a certain sporting rule 
with the EU competition law could only be decided after a case by case analysis861. 
Conditional autonomy is provided to sporting rules and practices under the 
organisational structures of the EU. This judgment invalidated the presumption of 
specificity of purely sporting rules providing immunity from the application of the 
EU law862. The judgment inflamed the disputes863 and the White Paper on Sport 
paved the sport competence’s way into the Lisbon Treaty. The sport competence 
adopted under Article 165 TFEU provided the legal grounds for the organisations 
of the union which has modestly transformed the shape of the European sports law 
and legalised the interventions of the EU in the decisions of the sporting 
authorities864.   
 
II.VIII. Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko 
Dimosio 
The next decision of the ECJ in sport was MOTOE865. The case received a great 
interest given its proximity to the landmark judgment of Meca Medina866.  
 
II.VIII.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case 
In the case, a reference for a preliminary ruling was made by the Greek Court. 
MOTOE was a non-profit-making body which organised motorcycling 
competitions in Greece. ELPA requested MOTOE, first, to communicate to it 
specific rules for each of the planned events two months before the date upon which 
it would take place and second, it asked the clubs organising the events to lodge a 
 
859 Commission of the European Communities, ‘White Paper on Sport’ COM (2007) 391 final p 15. 
860 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 139. 
861 Commission of the European Communities, ‘White Paper on Sport’ COM (2007) 391 final p 15. 
862 Ibid. 
863 Commission of the European Communities, ‘White Paper on Sport’ COM (2007) 391 final p 20. A mandate was 
given by the European Council of June 2007 for the Intergovernmental Conference, which foresaw a Treaty provision 
on sport. 
864 S Weatherill, Leading Cases in Sports Law (Asser Press, 2013) p 148; S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU 
Sports law (OUP 2017) p 140 
865 Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio [2008] E.C.R. I-04863. 
866 S Weatherill, Leading Cases in Sports Law (Asser Press, 2013) p 146; S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in 
EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 140. 
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copy of their statutes with Ethniki Epitropi Agonon Motosykletas. MOTOE 
completed what was requested and send them to ELPA867. In reply to MOTOE’s 
request, the competent ministry communicated to MOTOE that it had not received 
a document from ELPA with its consent under Article 49 of the Greek Road Traffic 
Code868. Pleading the unlawfulness of that implicit rejection, MOTOE brought an 
action seeking compensation869.  
 
In the case, the Court engaged with sport governance which incurred economic 
effects. The ECJ initially stated that EU competition law refers to the activities of 
undertakings and more specifically, to undertakings holding a dominant position870. 
Any entity engaged in an economic activity must be categorised as an 
undertaking871. In addition, any activity offering goods or services on a given 
market is an economic activity and the fact that an activity has connection with sport 
does not impede the application of the EU competition law872. The Court ruled that 
activities of a legal person consisting not only taking part in administrative decisions 
but also in organising sport events including sponsorship, advertising and insurance 
contracts, fall within the scope of the competition law provisions of the EU873. 
II.VIII.II. Significance of the Case 
The judgment was given by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice, 
thereby constituting high level of authority. The system of undistorted competition, 
as provided under the Treaty, can only be guaranteed if equality of opportunity is 
secured between various economic operators874. The ECJ advocated a power of 
review of the institutional structures of the EU over sport governance875. The main 
problem in MOTOE was the conflict of interest where a SGB used its regulatory 
power to achieve a commercial advantage at the expense of another sport 
 
867 Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio [2008] E.C.R. I-04863 
at para 8. 
868Ibid at para 10. 
869 Ibid at para 11. 
870 Ibid at para 20. 
871 Ibid at para 21. 
872 Ibid at para 22. 
873 Ibid at para 54. 
874 Ibid at para 51. 
875 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 254. 
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stakeholder lying lower down in the pyramid. While EU law provides a conditional 
autonomy to the European model of sport, sport can maintain its preferred model of 
governance, such as having a single federation for a single territory and having a 
single global authority at the top of the pyramid of governance. However, when 
challenged, it needs to demonstrate the necessity in having such a model for 
governance in sport. Therefore, EU does provide a room for the legitimate and 
distinctive concerns of sport while being a force for reform in sports governance876. 
While Article 165TFEU declares that specificity of sport should be acknowledged, 
specific nature of sport falls under the competition law provisions of the Treaty. 
MOTOE required an adaptation of the disputed sporting rule in the case. However, 
it did not invalidate the long-standing model of sport governance. A close 
examination of each aspect of the system is specifically necessary rather than a 
generalised assessment of compatibility of a sporting rule. This is in line with the 
Meca Medina judgment on a case-by-case examination. In Meca Medina entire 
doping control rules were not declared incompatible with the EU law but were found 
excessive. Similarly, in Bosman, transfer rules were not treated as incompatible but 
the system which victimised Bosman was condemned877.  MOTOE demonstrated 
that if SGBs enjoy a dual role and undertake commercial activity as well as a 
regulatory activity they will be regulated by the internal market rules of the EU 
without exception. As Weatherill suggests, surrendering commercial activity is the 
best way for the SGBs to enjoy autonomy of sport878.  
Therefore, interpreting the case, any entity undertaking economic activity within 
the internal market, irrespective of its nature, is subject to the application of EU law 
to have a standing within the organisational structures of the EU. The specificity of 
sport, including those rules which could be identified as purely sporting rules, due 
to the possibility of having an economic effect, will not be protected from the 
application of the EU competition law.  Therefore, sport, irrespective of its 
specificity, does not enjoy different treatment from the application of EU law from 
 
876 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 254. 




which other market sectors enjoy. The specificity of sport does not grant sport 
autonomy if it has an economic effect impeding cross border activity of the Member 
States within the internal market. Therefore, the autonomy of sport governance is 
conditional on compliance with the application of the EU law. Whereas sport 
governance with no economic effect on the cross-border trade will not relate with 
the internal market regulations.  
To conclude, the case demonstrated that the EU had an important impact on the 
organisation of sport during the application of competition law provisions to it. The 
main aim and objective of the EU is to ensure further integration and proper functioning 
of the internal market surfaced and competition law provisions provided the tool for it 
to regulate sport. To ensure competition within the internal market, access of Member 
States to cross border trade must not be affected. Thus, the case re-affirmed that sport 
enjoys conditional autonomy under the organisational structures of the EU. On the other 
hand, the specificity of sport was not expressly acknowledged in the judgment as a 
factor of determination under the application of EU competition law provisions to sport. 
 
II.IX. Case Law after the adoption of Article 165 TFEU 
One of the most significant cases decided after the adoption of Article 165 TFEU is 
Bernard879.  
II.IX.I. Olympic Lyonnais SASP v Bernard 
II.IX.I.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case 
In Bernard, reference was made during proceedings brought by Olympic Lyonnais 
SASP against Bernard who was a professional football player, and Newcastle 
United FC which was a club incorporated under English law. The case concerned 
the payment of damages for unilateral breach of his obligations under Article 23 of 
the Charte du football professionnel. Olivier Bernard signed a ‘joueur espoir’ 
contract with Olympic Lyonnais for three seasons880. Before that contract was due 
to expire, Olympic Lyonnais offered him a professional contract for one year881. 
 
879 Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP  v Olivier Bernard and  Newcastle United UFC [2010] E.C.R. I-2196. 
880 Ibid at para 7. 
881 Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP  v Olivier Bernard and  Newcastle United UFC [2010] E.C.R. I-2196 
at para 8. 
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Bernard refused to sign that contract and signed a professional contract with 
Newcastle United FC882. On learning of that contract, Olympic Lyonnais sued 
Bernard before the Conseil de prud’hommes (Employment Tribunal) in Lyon, 
seeking an award of damages jointly against him and Newcastle United FC883. The 
Conseil de prud’hommes in Lyon ordered him and Newcastle United FC jointly to 
pay Olympic Lyonnais damages884. The Cour d’appel, Lyon, quashed that 
judgment885.  
 
The ECJ found that national provisions precluding or deterring a national of a Member 
State from leaving his country of origin to exercise his right to freedom of movement 
constitutes a restriction on that freedom even if they apply without regard to the 
nationality of the workers concerned886. Rules such as those requiring an individual to 
sign a professional contract with the club which trained him to not to be sued for 
damages at the end of training period are likely to discourage players from exercising 
their right of free movement887. Consequently, those rules form a restriction on freedom 
of movement for workers and they are incompatible with the EU law888. It is re-affirmed 
that whether there are any justifications to the restriction established can only be 
accepted if it pursues a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and is justified in the 
public interest. Furthermore, the measure should not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve that purpose889. In considering whether a system which restricts the freedom of 
movement of such players is suitable to ensure that the said objective is attained and 
does not go beyond what is necessary to attain it, account must be taken to the specific 
characteristics of sport in general, and football in particular, and of their social and 
educational function890. Here, the Court cited the new sport competence and stated that 
the relevance of those factors is also corroborated by their being mentioned in the second 
 
882 Ibid at para 9. 
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subparagraph of Article 165(1) TFEU891. The scheme providing for the payment of 
compensation for training is in principle identified as justifiable by the objective of 
encouraging the recruitment and training of young players. However, such a scheme 
must be capable of attaining that objective and be proportionate892. Yet in the case, 
damages were not calculated in relation to the training costs but were calculated in 
relation to the total loss suffered by the club893. Consequently, the possibility of 
obtaining such damages went beyond what was necessary to encourage recruitment and 
training of young players894. 
 
II.IX.I.II. Significance 
Bernard is the first case decided after the adoption of the Article 165 TFEU. The 
case analysis provided the standard of application of the proportionality principle 
in the sport sector and this provides guidance to the future cases filed to the ECJ895. 
When considering the standing of a sporting rule under the free movement 
principles, account must be taken to the specific characteristics of sport and its 
social and educational function. The social importance of sport played an important 
role in legitimising the objective of the sporting rule which would not be considered 
as legitimate in other employment sectors apart from sport896. Even though the rule 
formed a restriction on the freedom of movement of workers, considering the 
specific nature of traineeship and the importance to promote football clubs to 
continue seeking new talent and training, the Court ruled that football clubs should 
reasonably be compensated for the training fees if trainee players end up signing 
their first professional contract with a club from another EU country. The rule is 
justified under the need to encourage investment in young players897.  
The application of the proportionality test in this judgment deserves serious 
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attention. The Court accepted the social and educational function of sport and 
referred to sport as area which requires specific feature to be considered during the 
scrutiny of possible justifications898. On the other hand, unlike under competition 
law related sport cases, it is obvious that the ECJ has not departed from applying 
free movement provisions on case-by-case basis and expressly referring to the 
specificity of sport during this application. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
approach of the organisational structures of EU towards sport and granting it a 
conditional autonomy only has not lost its standing and remained unaffected after 
the implementation of Article 165 TFEU899.  
To conclude, the case demonstrated that the EU had a considerable impact on the 
organisation of sport by regulating freedom of movement to provide services 
between the Member States. Sporting rules did not enjoy a general exception under 
the EU law and each sporting rule must be tested under the market access analysis.  
Thus, the case re-affirmed that sport enjoys conditional autonomy under the 
organisational structures of the EU. On the other hand, the specificity of sport was 
not affected. 
 
II.X. Football Association Premier League Ltd and others v QC Leisure and 
Others and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd 
After the adoption of the sport competence under Article 165 TFEU, the case-by-
case inquiry adopted by the ECJ under Meca Medina did not change900. Article 165 
TFEU states that while deciding on a sport related case, sports special character 
should be considered. This guidance has been re-adopted by the ECJ again under 
the application of freedom of movement provisions in Murphy after Bernard.  
 
II.X.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case 
In Murphy901, a reference to receive a preliminary ruling was made to the ECJ.  The 
 
898 K Pijetlovic, ‘Another Classic of EU Sports Jurisprudence: Legal Implications of Olympique Lyonnais v Oliver 
Bernard and Newcastle UFC (C-325/2008)’ (2010) European Law Review 857 p 861. 
899 S Weatherill, Leading Cases in Sports Law (Asser Press, 2013) p 149. 
900 Ibid. 
901 Case C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others and Case C-
429/08 Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011 ] E.C.R. I-09083. 
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reference was concerning the marketing and use in the United Kingdom of decoding 
devices which give access to the satellite broadcasting services of a broadcaster, are 
manufactured and marketed with that broadcaster’s authorization, but are used, in 
disregard of its will, outside the geographical area for which they have been issued 
(‘foreign decoding devices’).  
 
In the case, the ECJ stated that based on the previous case law, where a national 
measure relates to both the free movement of goods and the freedom to provide 
services, the Court will in principle examine it in the light of one only of those two 
fundamental freedoms. Therefore, the Court found that it is appropriate to examine 
that activity in the light of the freedom to provide services alone902. The Court 
sought to discover whether the particular provision forms a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services and if it does could it be justified903. The Court found 
that the legislation concerned constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide 
services under the EU law unless it is objectively justified904. The Court referred to 
the Article 165(1) TFEU and stated that the EU shall contribute to the promotion of 
European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its 
structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function905. The 
Court held that even if the objective of encouraging attendance of public to stadiums 
could justify a restriction on the fundamental freedoms, the means taken were not 
proportionate to meet the aim906. Therefore, the Court ruled that the restriction on 
freedom to provide services which consists in the prohibition on using foreign de-
coding devices cannot be justified by the objective of encouraging the public to 
attend football stadiums907. 
For the first time, even though incompatibility was established under free movement 
provisions, the Court moved on to assess the compatibility of the same rule under 
competition law provisions. The Court reaffirmed that an agreement falls within the 
 
902 Ibid at para 80. 
903 Ibid at para 83. 
904 Ibid at para 89. 
905 Ibid at para 101. 
906 Ibid at para 123. 
907 Ibid at para 124. 
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prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU when it has as its object or effect the 
prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the internal market. In 
order to assess whether the object of an agreement is anti-competitive, the content 
of its provisions, the objectives it seeks to attain and the economic and legal context 
of which it forms a part needed to be analysed908. Under this analysis, neither Article 
165 TFEU nor specificity of sport was expressed by the ECJ. Instead, market 
restriction analysis was undertaken. After the analysis, the Court ruled that clauses 
of exclusive licence agreements had an anti-competitive object, and they constituted 
a restriction on competition under Article 101(1) TFEU909.  
II.X.II. Significance 
It is the first case under the competition law provisions to be decided after the 
adoption of Article 165 TFEU. The ECJ analysed the case through the obstacle to 
trade, objective justification and proportionality under the competition law 
provisions while there was a possibility of analysis under the freedom of movement 
provisions. Even though the ECJ did not reference Meca-Medina, the case 
demonstrated that Meca-Medina guidance prevails as an authoritative judgment as 
how and why EU law applies to sporting practices. For the first time the ECJ 
analysed a case regarding sport under both freedom of movement and competition 
law principles. In the case, Advocate General Kokott referred to Article 165 TFEU 
and emphasized that while EU law respects the specificity of sport, sport does not 
fall outside the scope of the EU law910. This has reaffirmed standing of the 
organisation of the EU on the autonomy of sport that it is conditional on compliance 
with EU law and the specificity of sport does not provide a shield to sport from the 
application of the EU law. The approach taken under Meca Medina towards the 
organisation of sport and the legal framework of the EU on how and why it applies 
to sport did not change after the adoption of the Article 165 TFEU911. The case 
clarified that the effect of Article 165 TFEU on acknowledging the specificity of 
 
908 Case C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others and Case C-429/08 
Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011 ] E.C.R. I-09083 at para 136. 
909 Ibid at para 144. 
910 Ibid at para 165. 
911 S Weatherill, Leading Cases in Sports Law (Asser Press, 2013) p 150. 
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sport played a minor role and could not provide a shield to sport from the application 
of the EU law. Initially, while the Court analysed compliance of the rule under the 
free movement provisions it expressly referred to Article 165 TFEU and the 
specificity of sport. However, while the Court analysed compliance of the rule under 
the competition law provisions no consideration was made to the specificity of 
sport. Instead, the functioning of the internal market and ensuring cross border trade 
between the Member States is not affected played a vital role. The ECJ aimed to 
protect market access. Therefore, the difference of application by the ECJ to sport 
under the free movement and competition law provisions regarding the specificity 
of sport has not been altered. The effects of this judgment are likely to be felt not 
only under the broadcasting of sporting events but also under other sectors912.  
 
To conclude, the case demonstrated that the EU had a considerable impact on the 
organisation of sport. Sporting rules did not enjoy a general exception under the EU 
law and each sporting rule must be tested under the market access analysis.  While 
the specificity of sport was considered under the freedom of movement provisions, 
it did not influence the application of the competition law provisions. Thus, the case 
re-affirmed that sport enjoys conditional autonomy under the organisational 
structures of the EU. The EU would not tolerate sport to impede cross border trade 
between the Member States within the internal market. 
II.XI. Sky Österreich GmbH v. Österreichischer Rundfunk 
In Sky Osterrich, the ECJ considered the compliance of an EU Member State with 
an EU regulation concerning the audio-visual media services.  
 
II.XI.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case 
In Sky Osterrich913, a request for a preliminary ruling on the validity of Article 15(6) 
of Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions in Member States 
concerning the provision of audio-visual media services was made by the Austrian 
 
912 M Hayland, The football association premier league (2010)  p 10. 
913 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2013:28. 
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Court914. The Court ruled that, the article is perfectly valid, and the EU is lawfully 
entitled to impose limitations on the freedom to conduct a business. The 
disadvantages resulting from that provision are not disproportionate in the light of 
the aims which it pursues and are such as to ensure a fair balance between the 
various rights and fundamental freedoms at issue in the case915.  
 
II.XI.II. Significance 
Although the domestic Court case had relevance to sport channels, compliance of a 
sporting rule under EU law was not analysed by the ECJ. Therefore, the contribution 
of the case towards the impact of EU law on the specificity or autonomy of sport 
cannot be interpreted. 
 
II.XII. UEFA v European Commission 
II.XII.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case 
In the case, by appeal, UEFA requested the ECJ to set aside the judgment of the 
General Court of the European Union in Case T-55/08 UEFA v Commission [2011] 
ECR II-271 by which the General Court dismissed its application for annulment in 
part of Commission Decision 2007/730/EC of 16 October 2007 on the compatibility 
with Community law of measures taken by the United Kingdom pursuant to Article 
3a(1) of Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning 
the pursuit of television broadcasting activities916. 
 
The Court stated that EU law authorises the Member States to designate certain 
events which they consider to be of major importance to the society in a Member 
State and expressly authorises obstacles to the freedom to provide services, the 
freedom of establishment, the freedom of competition and the right to property, 
which are an unavoidable consequence of such a designation917. Pursuing such an 
objective has been recognised as legitimate even though the marketing on an 
 
914 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk at para 2. 
915 Ibid at para 67. 
916 Case C-201/11 P Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v European Commission. 
917 Case C-201/11 P Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v European Commission at para 10. 
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exclusive basis of events of high interest to the public is liable to restrict 
considerably the access of the general public to information relating to those events. 
However, the Court emphasised that in a democratic and pluralistic society, the right 
to receive information is of importance918. Pursuant to Article 3a (2) of Directive 
89/552, it is for the Member States alone to determine the events which are of major 
importance and they have a broad discretion in that respect919. Instead of 
harmonising the list of such events, the EU Directive is based on the premise that 
considerable social and cultural differences exist within the European Union in so 
far as it concerns their importance to the public. Consequently, the Court ruled that 
the EU Directive allows each Member State to draw up a list of designated events 
‘which it considers to be of major importance’ to the society in that State920. On the 
other hand, the Commission has the power to examine the legality of national 
measures designating events of major importance, which would enable it to reject 
any measures which are incompatible with the European Union law921. The ECJ 
dismissed the appeal and order the UEFA to pay the costs922.  
II.XII.II. Significance 
The case was analysed under the EU competition law. Competition law provisions 
were opted to apply to broadcasting rights related to sport cases. This is no surprise 
considering that broadcasting has been the major element in converting sport into 
an important economic activity within the Europe923. The advancement and 
privatization of the broadcasting industry sector played an important role in the 
development of EU sports law. The case demonstrated that market access analysis 
is applied to sporting rules while discovering compatibility with the competition 
law provisions. Agreements between a broadcasting company and a SGB should 
comply with the competition law provisions of the EU law. Therefore, it has been 
reaffirmed that sport enjoys conditional autonomy under the organisational 
 
918 Ibid at para 11. 
919 Ibid at para 12. 
920 Ibid at para 13. 
921 Ibid at para 16. 
922 Ibid at para 117. 
923 S Stewart, ‘The Development of Sports Law in the European Union, Its Globalisation, and the Competition Law 
Aspects of European Sports Broadcasting Rights’ (2009) Vol.16 Sports Lawyers Journal 183 p 202. 
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structure of EU. No express reference was made to the specificity of sport. 
However, allowing each Member State to list events of major importance to society 
underlines the specificity of sport. The ECJ allowed a broad discretion to Member 
States to choose what to place on their list and respected considerable social and 
cultural differences which existed in the EU924. It can also be assumed that the EU 
did not prefer to harmonise the practice. Even so, it could be concluded that both 
the freedom of movement provisions and competition law provisions of the EU law 
have a considerable effect on the autonomy of sport. They both limit the autonomy 
of sport to conditional autonomy. Whereas specificity of sport is only recognised 
under the application of the freedom of movement provisions of the EU.  
 
II.XIII TopFit v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband 
II.XIII.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case 
In the case, request for a preliminary ruling was made for the interpretation of Articles 
18, 21 and 165 TFEU on the conditions governing participation in the national amateur 
sports championships of another Member State in the senior category925. Biffi was an 
Italian national who lived in Germany for 15 years and was a member of TopFit sports 
association established in Berlin. Deutscher Leichtathletikverband (DLV) was an 
umbrella association at federal state which organised national athletics championships 
consisting of rules prohibiting other Member States nationals from participating in 
national championships926. Biffi’s participation in the finals was rejected and he filed 
legal action. The referring Court was uncertain whether nationality requirement 
constitutes unlawful discrimination contrary to the EU law. 
 
The ECJ held that Articles 18, 21 and 165 TFEU prohibits rules of a national sports 
association precluding an EU citizen who resided for many years in another Member 
State to participate in the national championships in the same way as nationals unless it 
 
924 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 351. 
925 Case C-22/18 TopFit v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2019:497. 
926 Ibid  at para 9, 10. 
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has a legitimate aim which can be objectively justified, and it is proportionate927. The 
Court ruled that  
Articles 18, 21 and 165 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding rules of a 
national sports association, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, under 
which an EU citizen, who is a national of another Member State and who has 
resided for a number of years in the territory of the Member State where that 
association, in which he runs in the senior category and in an amateur capacity, 
is established, cannot participate in the national championships in those 
disciplines in the same way as nationals can, or can participate in them only 
‘outside classification’ or ‘without classification’, without being able to progress 
to the final and without being eligible to be awarded the title of national 
champion, unless those rules are justified by objective considerations which are 
proportionate to the legitimate objective pursued, this being a matter for the 
referring court to verify928. 
The ECJ firstly referred to the previous case law and established that rules of the 
national sports association which govern the access of EU citizens to sports 
competitions, are subject to the EU law under Articles 18 and 21 TFEU929. Biffi was 
treated differently from nationals and this difference of treatment restricted his freedom 
of movement as an EU citizen930. Such a restriction on the freedom of movement of EU 
citizens can be justified only where it is based on objective justification and is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued931.  The free movement of persons and 
services do not preclude rules or practices justified on grounds of certain sports matches 
between national teams from different countries. However, such a restriction must 
remain limited to its proper objective and cannot be relied upon as a general 
exemption932. Referring to Meca-Medina, the ECJ re-affirmed that purely sporting rules 
 
927 Case C-22/18 TopFit v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband at para 67, 68. 
928 Case C-22/18 TopFit v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband at para 68. 
929 Ibid at para 40. These cases were cited: Walrave and Koch, 36/74, EU:C:1974:140, paragraph 17; of 15 December 
1995, Bosman, C-415/93, EU:C:1995:463, paragraph 82; of 18 December 2007, Laval un Partneri, C-341/05, 
EU:C:2007:809, paragraph 98; and of 16 March 2010, Olympique Lyonnais, C-325/08, EU:C:2010:143, 
paragraph 30. 
930 Case C-22/18 TopFit v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2019:497 at para 44. 
931 Ibid at para 48. To that effect, judgment of 13 November 2018, Raugevicius, C-247/17, EU:C:2018:898, 
paragraph 31). 
932 Ibid at para 49. To that effect, see judgment of 15 December 1995, Bosman, C-415/93, EU:C:1995:463, 
paragraphs 76 and 127. 
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are not exempted from the application of EU law, but specific justifications needed to 
be examined933. Neither of the two justifications put forward by the DLV were founded 
on objective justification and the ECJ held that it is up to the referring Court to verify 
whether there are other justifications934.  
 
II.XIII.II. Significance 
The case has been analysed under the non-discrimination and citizenship provisions of 
the EU to discover whether EU citizens could participate under national championships. 
Previously in Walrave, the ECJ analysed the issues of nationality discrimination in sport 
under the application of the free movement provisions to ensure that certain sporting 
practices do not interfere with the operation of internal market. However, under the 
TopFit case, freedom of movement rights was practiced by Biffi without a restriction 
since they were not dependant on economic activity being carried out. Instead, the case 
was based on the prohibition on the non-discrimination of nationality emerging from 
the EU citizenship rights. These rights were triggered under sport for the first time where 
other more specific rights, such as free movement rights, were not relevant935.  
 
Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EU law explicitly refers to sport in Article 165 TFEU. 
Therefore, the right of an EU citizen to reside in another Member State without 
discrimination under Articles 18, 20 and 21 TFEU does not dependent on the exercise 
of an economic activity936. In the sporting context, this could be interpreted as non-
economic sporting activity, such as amateur level sports with zero economic benefits 
derived from it, falls under the scope of EU law and Article 21 TFEU may be invoked 
by EU citizens against the private associations which are more often than not ruling 
sports at a local, regional and national level in the Member States. Therefore, economic, 
and non-economic sports activity from now on will be subjected to the control of EU 
 
933 Ibid at para 53, 55. 
934 Ibid at para 58, 59. 
935 T Terraz,  ‘ISLJ International Sports Law Conference 2019 - Conference Report’  (Asser International Sports Law 
Blog, 26/04/2019) <https://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/can-european-citizens-participate-in-national-
championships-an-analysis-of-ag-tanchev-s-opinion-in-topfit-e-v-daniele-biffi-v-deutscher-leichtathletikverband-e-
v-by-thomas-terraz> accessed on 11 March 2020. 
936Case C-22/18 TopFit v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2019:497  at para 19. 
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law under the discrimination provisions of the Treaty937. This issue was discussed by 
the AG Mr Tanchev in his opinion. He has made a finding that should ECJ choose to 
expand its case-law on Article 21 TFEU and the component elements of European 
citizenship to the horizontal context of a dispute between private parties than non-State 
actors would be obliged to comply with them938.  
 
The case demonstrated that during the compatibility analysis of the sporting rules 
with the EU citizenship provisions, the objective of the gradual integration of the 
EU citizens played a vital role. Therefore, market access analysis adopted under 
Meca Medina was applied. The autonomy of the market restrictive sporting rule is 
on condition of the objective justification and the proportionality. Once again, 
conditional autonomy of sport under the organisational structures of the EU is 
confirmed. On the other hand, even though specificity of sport was not expressed 
separately in the judgment, the Court outlined Article 165 TFEU initially during its 
analysis. The case established that the EU citizenship is there to promote integration 
of the internal market and sporting rules should comply with it. To conclude, the 
case created the possibility of horizontal application of the discrimination 
provisions to sport. This demonstrated that EU had a considerable impact on the 
organisation of sport.  The EU would not tolerate sport to impede cross border trade 
between the Member States within the internal market. 
 
III. Chapter Evaluation  
To date, EU sports law which discovers the approach of the organisational 
structures of the EU to sport is shaped under four turning points939. Three of these 
have been established under the judgments of the ECJ, in the Walrave, Bosman and 
Meca Medina. The fourth one is Article 165 TFEU which has introduced a legal 
competence for sport for the first time under the EU law and legitimise the EU 
institutions’ involvement in sport. The contribution of Article 165 TFEU will be 
 
937 T Terraz, ‘A New Chapter for EU Sports Law and European Citizenship Rights? The TopFit Decision’   (Asser 
International Sports Law Blog, 29/06/2019) https://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/a-new-chapter-for-eu-sports-
law-and-european-citizenship-rights-the-topfit-decision-by-thomas-terraz accessed on 29 June 2020. 
938 Opinion of Mr Tanchev — Case C-22/18 TopFit v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband at para 56. 
939 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017). 
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discussed under Chapter VI.  However, the role of the ECJ judgments in 
establishing and developing EU sports law as well as shaping the significance and 
autonomy of sport is analysed under this chapter. In Walrave940, the Court 
established that sport is subject to EU law if it constitutes an economic activity941. 
20 years later the ECJ in Bosman942 established that sporting rules in general do not 
have absolute or unconditional autonomy but only conditional autonomy under the 
EU law943. The autonomy of sporting rules and the specificity of sport was declared 
conditional on compliance with the fundamental free movement provisions of EU 
law. However, the EU law was not insensitive to sport and provided a room for 
purely sporting rules to prove its case for special treatment under the specificity of 
sport944. Prior to the Meca-Medina judgment, the Court was reluctant to analyse 
sporting practices under the competition law provisions. In Meca Medina the Court 
did not follow the route to pursue the fictional concept of purely sporting rules but 
found an intellectually more credible basis to express special character of sport 
under the application of the EU law945. The case formed a rejection of the purely 
sporting rule perception and appreciated that a purely sporting rule should be tested 
against the demands of EU law where it has economic effects on the internal 
market946. Sport enjoyed no difference of application under the EU law, but it did 
have a room to show specificity and necessity.  
 
Recent judgments of the ECJ demonstrate slight difference in impact of 
organisational structures of the EU between the specificity of sport and on the 
autonomy of sport. Under the application of the free movement provisions, it is 
established that specificity of sport is acknowledged but it does not provide a 
general exemption to the sporting rules. The specificity of sport is conditional on 
compliance with the fundamental free movement provisions of the EU law. On the 
other hand, the specificity of sport is mainly impliedly recognised under the market 
 
940 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405. 
941 Ibid at  para 8. 
942 Case C-415/93Union Royale Belge Societes de Football Association v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
943 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 85. 
944 Ibid. 




access analysis of competition law and citizenship provisions. Either way, if a 
sporting rule is tested under the application of EU law and declared compatible 
under the organisational structures of EU it could be interpreted as this compatibility 
is due to the specificity of sport. Therefore, it could be concluded that the specificity 
of sport is conditional upon compliance with EU law.  Under the EU competition 
law and citizenship provisions, the fundamental aim is to promote gradual 
integration and ensure proper functioning of the internal market and no difference 
of application is granted to sport due to its specificity. Therefore, currently, the 
specificity of sport is affected under the organisational structures of the EU and 
could not play any role contributing to the autonomy of sport under the competition 
law and the citizenship provisions.  
The ECJ demonstrated a similar impact of organisational structures of the EU on 
the autonomy of sport. Both the freedom of movement provisions and the 
competition law provisions of the EU have a considerable effect on the autonomy 
of sport. They both limit the autonomy of sport to conditional autonomy. To 
conclude, currently, sport enjoys autonomy on condition that it complies with EU 
law. Should there be a variation of analysis in the future is yet to be seen in the 
upcoming judgments of the ECJ. To have more certainty, there seems to be a need 
for more judgments in the area.  
IV. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to establish the ECJ jurisprudence on sport to develop 
an understanding of the EU’s approach towards sport with an intention to prepare 
the ground of answering the second research question collectively with Chapter V. 
This chapter demonstrated that ECJ judgments had a gigantic impact on the 
organisation of sport, especially during the application of competition law 
provisions to it. The main aim and objective of the EU, which is ensuring further 
integration and proper functioning of the internal market, demonstrated and 
competition law provisions provided the tool for the EU to regulate sport. To ensure 
competition within the internal market, access of Member States to cross border 
trade must not be affected. Under the organisational structures of the EU, the 
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European model of sport enjoys a conditional autonomy947 where each rule needs 
to be tested under a case-by-case examination to determine compatibility within the 
EU and its validity. Sporting rules do not enjoy a general exception under EU law 
and each sporting rule must be tested under the market access analysis. The 
specificity of sport is expressly or impliedly acknowledged. However, specificity 
of each sporting rule needs to be evaluated within the organisational structures of 
EU to determine compatibility and standing. The specificity of sport does not 
provide an autonomic shield of protection to the sport related rule restricting 
practice within the internal market. Therefore, it could be concluded that specificity 
of sport, like autonomy of sport, is conditional upon compliance with the EU 
internal market provisions.    
 
947 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law (OUP 2017) p 116. 
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CHAPTER V: IMPACT OF EU ON THE GOVERNANCE OF SPORT 
 
I. Introduction; II. Impact of EU on the Organisation of European Model of Sport; 
II.I. The Impact of EU Commission on the Organisation of European Model of Sport 
II.II. Assessing the Impact of EU Law on the Governance of the European Model of 
Sport; II.II.I. Unsanctioned and Rival Events; II.II.I.I. Formula One (FIA) Decision; 
II.II.I.I.I. Facts and Decision of the Application ; II.II.I.I.II. Significance of the 
Decision; II.II.I.II. MOTOE Case; II.II.I.II.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case; 
II.II.I.II.II. Significance of the Case; II.II.I.III. ISU Decision; II.II.I.III.I. Facts of the 
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Complaint; II.II.I.IV.II. Possible Judgment on the Complaint; II.II.I.IV.III. Possible 
Significance of the Complaint; II.II.II. Home and Away Rule and Club Location; 
II.II.II.I. Mouscron Decision; II.II.II.I.I. Facts and Decision of the Application ; 
II.II.II.I.II. Significance of the Decision ; II.II.III. Breakaway Leagues; II.II.III.I. 
Compliance Analysis of the Breakaway Leagues with the EU; II.II.III.II. Possible 
Impact of EU on the Breakaway Leagues ; II.II.IV. Club Ownership; II.II.IV.I. 
ENIC/UEFA Decision; II.II.IV.I.I. Facts and Decision of the Application; II.II.IV.I.II. 
Significance of the Decision; II.II.V. Mandatory Player Release Rules; II.II.V.I. 
Compliance Analysis of the Mandatory Player Release Rules with the EU; II.II.V.II. 
Charleroi/Oulmers Case; II.II.V.III. Possible Impact of EU on the Mandatory Player 
Release Rules; II.II.VI. Licensing Requirements; II.II.VI.I. Compliance Analysis of the 
Licensing Requirements with the EU; II.II.VI.II. Possible Impact of EU on the Club 
Licensing Rules; II.II.VII. Third Party Ownership; II.II.VII.I. Compliance Analysis and 




Under the previous chapter, the impact of the EU on the specificity and autonomy of 
sport is established. The objective of this chapter is to establish the impact of the EU 
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law on the organisation of sport with reference to the European model of sport.  This is 
intended to prepare the ground of answering the second research question of what is the 
impact of EU law and policy on the governance of the European Model of Sport 
regarding the specificity and autonomy of sport together with Chapter IV.  This chapter 
analyses the application of EU law to individual sporting rules on unsanctioned and rival 
events, home and away rule, club location, breakaway leagues, club ownership, 
mandatory player release rules, licensing requirements, and third party ownership under 
the organisation of the European model of sport. 
 
II. Impact of EU on the Organisation of European Model of Sport 
Many sport governing bodies, such as the IOC, FIFA, and UEFA, are in Switzerland 
which is not a member of the European Union. Even so, EU law influenced the 
functioning of sport in Europe948. Since the birth of the ancient Olympic Games until 
the present, Europe has always been a major centre for sports development949. 
Organizational innovations initially developed and implemented in Europe later 
distributed around the world. This historical leadership of Europe in sports development 
provided the European Union (EU) with a great opportunity to set the trend in the 
formulation and articulation of the rules and management system within its territory950. 
The size of the European sports market ensured the EU’s leading role in shaping the 
regulatory basis of sport951. With the commercialisation of sport in Europe, the 
organisational structures of the EU have taken an interest in regulating European sport 
operating within the EU territory952. Currently, any form of sporting activity generating 
gainful employment or not953, falls under the coverage of EU954. Consequently, the 
organisational structures of EU have a considerable impact on the autonomy and 
 
948 Since Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405. 
949 V. Zuev, I. Popova, The European model of sport: Values, Rules, and Interests¸ International Organisations 
Research Journal, Vol. 13. No 1 (2018), p. 52. 
950 Ibid. 
951 Ibid. 
952 See ECJ judgments in C-438/2000 Deutscher Handballbund eV v Maros Kolpak (2003) ECR I-4135 and Case C-
265/03 Igor Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol (2005) ECR 
I-2579 Cases.   
953 See Case C-22/18 TopFit v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2019:497 case. 
954 Case C-519/04 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991 at para 23. (see, to this 
effect, Walrave and Koch, paragraph 5, Donà, paragraph 12, and Bosman, paragraph 73). 
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specificity of sport955. Meanwhile, to maintain the organisation of the European model 
of sport, International Federations have adopted sporting rules aimed at discouraging 
participants from disturbing the model and limiting the role of the EU.  
 
II.I. The Impact of EU Commission on the Organisation of European Model of 
Sport 
Some aspects of sport governance have raised concerns under the EU competition law. 
The Commission has acquired significant experience in applying competition rules to 
sporting practices. However, the Commission’s methods in applying competition rules 
to sport has not been thoroughly reviewed by the ECJ956. Within the governance 
standards of European model of sport, SGBs pursue certain legitimate objectives such 
as establishing the rules of the game, ensuring proper organisation and conduct of sport, 
protecting competitive balance and uncertainty of results, maintaining the integrity of 
sport, ensuring the health and safety of the athletes and promoting youth 
development957.  While these are examples of the features of European model of sport, 
not every restriction to protect these features would be regarded as pursuing a legitimate 
aim under the application of EU law. To have a protection from the application of EU 
law, these rules should have a legitimate aim and must be objectively justified958. The 
European model of sport enjoys conditional autonomy under the organisational 
structures of EU and the border is patrolled with vigilance959.  
 
The pyramid structure of the European model of sport represents the organisation of 
sport in Europe, while the notion of governance covers the whole range of practices 
conducted by SGBs for the sake of proper regulation of ‘their’ sport960. This is the 
fundamental area where claims to sporting autonomy are commonly made961.The 
 
955 Established under Chapter IV. 
956 R Parrish and S Mittinen, ‘Legal Issues in the Governance of Sport’, in Richard Parrish and Samuli Mittinen (eds), 
Sporting Exception in European Union Law, (Asser Press, 2008) p 205. 
957 Ibid. 
958 Ibid. 
959 S Weatherill, ‘Is the Pyramid Compatible with EC law?’ in Stephen Weatherill (eds), European Sports Law 
Collected Papers, (Asser Press, 2007), p 264. 




pyramid structure does operate as a base for shaping the basic pattern of sport962. 
However, number of matters covered under the pyramid structure of sport organisation 
forms less obviously necessary elements of sport governance but more noticeable 
commercial elements963. This raises the doubt on whether the role of SGBs in decision-
making of sporting organisations is justifiable under the law entitling only a conditional 
autonomy in sport.  
 
II.II. Assessing the Impact of EU Law on the Governance of the European Model 
of Sport  
II.II.I. Unsanctioned and Rival Events 
The EU provides conditional autonomy to sport which includes the matters of 
governance. This type of conditional autonomy enjoyed by the governance of sport is 
under the shadow of the EU law and depends on the case-by-case examination of each 
rule specifically964. Sport governing bodies often have a dual role which result in a 
conflict of interest965. They attempt to preserve exclusivity in regulating sport and 
organising events966. To avoid the development of rival organisations they attempt to 
tie players in by prohibiting them participating in other events as well as preventing 
rival event organisers from setting up thereby challenging the regulatory power of the 
SGB. Failure to comply with these restrictions on taking part in other competitions 
results in exclusion from official events organised by the SGBs. These restrictive rules 
could be more indirect than an express ban967. Nevertheless, they have been the subject 
of challenge and required to demonstrate an adequate reason for choice of governance 






962 S Weatherill, ‘Is the Pyramid Compatible with EC law?’ in Stephen Weatherill (eds), European Sports Law 
Collected Papers, (Asser Press, 2007), p 266. 
963 Ibid. 
964 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law, (OUP, 2017), page 246. 
965 for example, see MOTOE case. 
966 A Lewis QC and J Taylor, Sport: Law and Practice (3rd eds, Bloomsbury Professional, 2014)  p 762. 
967 Ibid  p 764. 
166 
 
II.II.I.I. Formula One (FIA) Decision  
II.II.I.I.I. Facts and Decision of the Application  
The FIA968 decision is one of the first decisions concerning a key issue of conflict of 
interest between a regulatory and a commercial role of SGBs. In the decision, the FIA 
was the organiser and promoter of motor sport championships including Formula One.  
It issued pre-requisite licenses to parties wishing to compete in international motor sport 
organisations or organise motor sport events. Participants in unauthorised events by FIA 
would lose their license and would not be able to take part in any commercial activity 
in motor sport. The preliminary conclusion of the Commission found these rules of the 
FIA contrary to EU competition law, Article 101 (1) and 102 TFEU for not allowing or 
having the possibility of blocking competing motor sport events with the ones organised 
or promoted by FIA.  
The European Commission concluded an investigation on how international motor 
sports is organised and commercially exploited. The Commission found that the FIA 
was abusing its dominant position and restricting competition. Consequently, the 
Commission sent the same statement of objections to both Formula One Administration 
Ltd (FOA), which sold the television rights to the Formula One championship, and 
International Sports world Communicators (ISC), which marketed the broadcasting 
rights to a number of major international motor sport events. Many of the contracts 
concerning the commercial exploitation of international motor sports, particularly those 
involving broadcasters, found unlawful under EU competition law. The Commission 
identified four competition problems; (a) FIA used its power to block series which 
compete with its own events, (b) FIA used this power to force a competing series out of 
the market, (c) FIA used its power abusively to acquire all the television rights to 
international motor sports events, and (d) FOA and the FIA protected the Formula One 
championship from competition by tying up everything that was needed to stage a rival 
championship969. After reaching a settlement with FIA to remove certain conflicts of 
interest and limit its role as a motor sport regulator without influence over the 
 
968 FIA IP/01/1523, 30 October 2001. 
969 FIA IP/99/434, 30 June 1999. 
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commercial exploitation and generally removing anti-competitive clauses from its 
agreements, the Commission closed the decision without a final verdict 970.  
 
II.II.I.I.II. Significance of the Decision 
The decision generally demonstrated that the main objective of the Commission in 
tackling competition law provisions in sport related disputes is to ensure a healthy 
competitive environment in economic activities, specifically related to motor sport, and 
to minimise the risk of possible future abuses of dominant position. Rules introducing 
separation of commercial and regulatory activities in sport was identified as adequate 
structural remedy to avoid abuses within the market971. This separation was proposed 
as a solution rather than a requirement. Under EU competition law, it is not tolerated 
that SBGs abuse their regulatory powers and distort competition to achieve commercial 
gains. However, based on the market access analysis, a sporting rule would not prevent 
or impede competition if it could have been justified on the substantive grounds of safe, 
fair, and orderly conduct of motor sport972. To conclude, the decision demonstrated that 
EU had a considerable impact on the organisation of sport regarding restrictions on 
taking part in other competitions. This fact demonstrated that the organisation of sport 
enjoys conditional autonomy under the organisational structures of EU. The specificity 
of the sport was not assessed or referred to under the Commission’s reasoning to grant 
sport specific treatment under the application of EU law. Apart from confirming the 
conditional autonomy of sport, the Commission provided supervision to the sport 
governing body to revise and amend their rules having restrictive effect to comply with 
the EU law. This decision can be identified as one of the first decisions demonstrating 
evidence for the supervised conditional autonomy of the organisation of sport under the 





970 Commission of the European Communities, ‘White Paper on Sport’ COM (2007) 391 final at para 2.2.2.1. 
971 FIA IP/99/434, 30 June 1999, para 6. 
972 FIA IP/99/434, 30 June 1999, para 5; S Weatherill, ‘Fair Play Please!’, in Stephen Weatherill (eds), European 
Sports Law Collected Papers, (Asser Press, 2007), p 185. 
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II.II.I.II. MOTOE Case 
II.II.I.II.I. Facts and Judgment of the Case 
MOTOE973 is one of those cases which has enabled ECJ to closely analyse organisation 
of sport in unsanctioned and rival events with a direct commercial consequence. In the 
case, MOTOE argued abuse of dominant position by ELPA violating EU law. ELPA 
engaged in the organisation and commercial exploitation of motorcycling event, it was 
an undertaking, it did have a dominant position in the market for supply and the 
commercial exploitation of motorcycling events and it did abuse its dominant position 
under Article 102 TFEU.  
In the case, the ECJ stated that Article 86(2) EC (now Article 106(2)TFEU) enables 
Member States to confer exclusive rights which may hinder competition in so far as 
restrictions on competition are necessary to ensure the performance of the sporting 
activity974. However, an undertaking whose activities consist of both administrative 
decisions authorising the organisation of events, and entering into sponsorship, 
advertising and insurance contracts, falls within the scope of Articles 82 EC and 86 
EC975 (now Article 102 and 106TFEU). Therefore, ELPA was not afforded a protection 
from the application of EU law. The ECJ did not rule that the whole system of regulated 
access to the market for staging sport events are incompatible under EU law. But the 
system under the case was declared unlawful due to the presence of intermingling of 
regulatory and commercial powers which is found as an abusive conduct under the EU 
competition law.  
II.II.I.II.II. Significance of the Case 
MOTOE demonstrates the impact of the EU over sport governance arrangements976. The 
Court held that  
[…] a legal person whose activities consist not only in taking part in 
administrative decisions authorising the organisation of motorcycling events, 
 
973 Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) V Elliniko Dimosio [2008] ECR I – 4906. 
974 Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) V Elliniko Dimosio [2008] ECR I – 4906 
at para 44. 
975 Ibid at para 54. 
976 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law, (OUP, 2017), page 254. 
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but also in organising such events itself and in entering, in that connection, into 
sponsorship, advertising and insurance contracts, falls within the scope of 
Articles 82 EC and 86 EC. Those articles preclude a national rule which confers 
on a legal person, which organises motorcycling events and enters, in that 
connection, into sponsorship, advertising and insurance contracts, the power to 
give consent to applications for authorisation to organise such competitions, 
without that power being made subject to restrictions, obligations and review977. 
The main problem identified was the conflict of interest over the dual role of the 
organisation where the regulatory powers were used to achieve commercial advantage.  
Measures giving rise to a risk of an abuse of a dominant position are not permitted under 
the EU law978. Un-distortion of competition could only be guaranteed where equal 
opportunity is ensured between various economic operators. The Court identified that 
where a legal person’s activities consist of both taking part in administrative decisions 
authorising the organisation of motorcycling events and organising such events itself 
falls within the scope of EU law. Such powers must be subject to restrictions, 
obligations, and review979. Otherwise, this forms an example of intermingling of powers 
by the sporting authority which distorts competition within the internal market and 
would not be tolerated under EU law.  
Sport does not operate in vacuum it is subjected to the application of EU law. However, 
EU law does not prohibit SBGs to adopt a model of governance favoured by them. The 
single federation for a single territory with a single global authority at the top of the 
pyramid structure of the European model of sport can be sustained under EU law 
provided that it can be justified that such a model is necessary for the proper functioning 
of sport with a legitimate aim 980. The pyramid structure under the European model of 
sport governance is essential to deliver uniform rules and timetable for sport and sport 
 
977 Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) V Elliniko Dimosio [2008] ECR I – 4906 
at para 53. 
978 Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) V Elliniko Dimosio [2008] ECR I – 4906 at 
para 50. 
979 Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) V Elliniko Dimosio [2008] ECR I – 4906 
at para 53. 
980 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law, (OUP, 2017), page 254. 
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should be regulated981. However, EU law will not tolerate SGBs to use their power to 
promote their own economic interest at the detriment of other potential service provider 
where the possibility of objective justification disappears, and abuse of sport 
governance arises982. At this point individual analysis of each aspect of the system is 
required and a generalised analysis would not be suitable983. Therefore, the case 
demonstrated that EU law does have a significant impact on sport governance, but it is 
not insensitive to the legitimate and significant concerns of sport which does not distort 
competition within the market984. Again, the ECJ demonstrated its objective of ensuring 
the functioning of the internal market.  
To conclude, the case demonstrated that the EU had a considerable impact on the 
governance of European model of sport regarding unsanctioned and rival events with a 
direct commercial consequence of distorting competition within the internal market. 
This demonstrated that organisation of sport enjoys conditional autonomy under the 
organisational structures of EU. This autonomy is conditioned on compliance with the 
EU law, especially non-distortion of the proper functioning of the internal market. 
Whereas the specificity of the sport was not assessed or referred to under the 
Commission’s reasoning to grant sport specific treatment under the application of EU 
law.   
 
II.II.I.III. ISU Decision 
II.II.I.III.I. Facts of the Application 
ISU is the first decision in which the EU institutions have analysed restrictions on 
participation in rival sport events. In the decision, the Commission analysed the 
International Skating Union's Eligibility rules relating to the proceedings under Article 
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the Treaty) and Article 53 
of the EEA Agreement985. The infringement consisted of the adoption and enforcement 
 
981 Advocate General Kokott in Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) V Elliniko 
Dimosio [2008] ECR I – 4906 at para 91-96. 
982 Ibid at para 91-96. 
983 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law, (OUP, 2017), page 256. 
984 Ibid p 254. 




of rules that constitute a prohibited restriction of competition within the meaning of 
Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. According to the ISU's 
Eligibility rules, a speed skater became ineligible for a period up to a lifetime to 
participate in the ISU's international speed skating events if he or she participated in any 
speed skating events not authorised by the ISU or one of its Members986. Under the 
ISU's Eligibility rules adopted in 2016, a speed skater participating in events that are 
not authorised by the ISU or one of its Members is subject to sanctions ranging from a 
warning to periods of ineligibility from an unspecified minimum to a maximum of a 
lifetime ban. Until 2015, there were no pre-established criteria on the basis of which the 
ISU authorised third party events, and, although the ISU introduced authorisation 
criteria afterwards, those criteria were not objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory, and went further than necessary to protect legitimate aims987. The ISU's 
Eligibility rules created significant barriers to finding skaters for third parties wishing 
to start organising and commercially exploiting international speed skating events in 
competition with the ISU and its Members because professional skaters could not risk 
becoming ineligible and foregoing the possibility of competing in important 
international speed skating events such as the Olympic Games, the ISU World Cup and 
the ISU Championships988. The Eligibility rules thus not only limited the skaters' 
commercial freedom to participate in events that were not authorised by the ISU, but 
they also prevented potential competitors from organising and commercially exploiting 
international speed skating events. 
 
The ISU's Appeals Arbitration rules provided that all decisions of the CAS shall be final 
and binding989. Judicial recourse against CAS arbitral awards was possible, but only 
before the Swiss Federal Tribunal on a limited number of grounds, which did not include 
a violation of the Union or EEA competition rules. Furthermore, athletes had no choice 
 
986 See in particular Rules 102(1) a) (ii), 102(2) c), 102(7) and 103(2) of the General Regulations adopted 
by the 55th Ordinary Congress, June 2014 ("ISU General Regulations 2014"). 
987 See, Case AT.40208 – International Skating Union's Eligibility rules, Commission Decision, C (2017) 8240 final 
8.12.2017, Section 8.5.2. 
988 Case AT.40208 – International Skating Union's Eligibility rules, Commission Decision, C (2017) 8240 final 
8.12.2017, Section 8.5.2. para 4, p 6. 
989 ISU 2014 Constitution and General Regulations, Article 25(2); ISU 2016 Constitution and General 
Regulations, Article 26(2). 
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but to accept the Appeals Arbitration rules and the exclusive competence of the CAS990. 
The hurdles that the Appeals Arbitration rules imposed on athletes, in obtaining 
effective judicial protection against potentially anti-competitive ineligibility decisions 
of the ISU, reinforced the restriction of their commercial freedom and the foreclosure 
of third-party organisers of speed skating events. Those rules protect potentially anti-
competitive decisions issued under the Eligibility rules by curtailing the reach of Union 
and EEA competition law to those decisions991. 
II.II.I.III.II. Decision of the Application 
The commission initially analysed the regulatory framework in sport and referred to 
Article 165 of the Treaty. It expressed the need for the specificity of sport to be 
recognised and considered for its characteristics making it special, such as the 
interdependence between competing adversaries or the pyramid structure of open 
competitions992. Moreover, the Commission emphasised the ECJ caselaw993,  the 2007 
White Paper on Sport994 and the 2011 Communication of the Commission "Developing 
the European Dimension in Sport"995 and made it clear that, while respecting the specific 
nature of sport, sporting rules are subject to the application of the EU law, including 
competition law996. The sporting rules normally concern the organisation and proper 
conduct of competitive sport and they are under the responsibility of sport organisations 
to ensure compatible with the EU law. To assess their compatibility with EU law, in line 
with the judgment of the Court of Justice in Meca-Medina, the Commission considered 
the legitimacy of the objectives pursued, whether any restrictive effects of those rules 
 
990 Case AT.40208 – International Skating Union's Eligibility rules, Commission Decision, C (2017) 8240 final 
8.12.2017, para 5, p 6. 
991 Ibid  para 1, p 5 and para 8.7, p 67. 
992 Referring to the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Developing the European Dimension in Sport", 
Brussels, 18.1.2011, COM (2011) 12 final, pages 10-11. 
993 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch ECLI:EU:C:1974:140, paragraph 4, case 13/76 Donà, ECLI:EU:C:1976:115, 
paragraph 12.; Case C-415/93 Bosman, supra, paragraph 73; Case C-176/96 Lehtonen, supra, paragraph 32, Joined 
Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège, supra, paragraph 41, Case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492, 
paragraph 22, Case C-49/07 MOTOE ECLI:EU:C:2008:376, paragraph 22; Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais 
SASP  v Olivier Bernard and  Newcastle United UFC [2010] E.C.R. I-2196 paragraph 27. 
994 "White Paper on Sport" of 11 November 2007, COM (2007) 391 final, {SEC (2007) 932} {SEC (2007) 934} 
{SEC (2007) 935} {SEC (2007) 936}.Dimension in Sport", Brussels, 18.1.2011, COM (2011) 12 final. 
995 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Developing the European Dimension in Sport", Brussels, 
18.1.2011, COM (2011) 12 final. 
996 Case AT.40208 – International Skating Union's Eligibility rules, Commission Decision, C (2017) 8240 final 
8.12.2017, para 5.1, p 9. 
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were inherent in the pursuit of the objectives and whether those rules were proportionate 
to such objectives997. The Commission expressly referred to the specificity of the sport 
structure and stated that the specificity of European sport could be approached through 
two prisms: one being the specificity of the structure of sport and the other the 
specificity of sporting activities and of sporting rules. The specificity of the structure of 
sport, including notably the autonomy and diversity of sport organisations, can be 
described as a pyramid of competitions from grassroots to elite level, with organised 
solidarity mechanisms between the different levels and operators. In addition, it includes 
the organisation of sport on a national basis, and the principle of having a single 
federation per sport998. There are differences in the scope and importance of the sporting 
pyramid depending on the sport. In particular, the system of open competitions is 
generally limited to team sports, while in motor sports and cycling, professional 
competitions are totally or partially closed999. The Commission concluded that speed 
skating is one of the individual sports where there is a pyramid structure regarding 
national championships and the selection of national athletes. The ISU was the exclusive 
international sport federation acknowledged by the International Olympic Committee 
administrating Figure Skating and Speed Skating Sports throughout the world and 
administered speed skating at the international level, whereas its Members administered 
speed skating at the national level. In that function, the ISU set specific rules for the 
speed skating competitions of the Winter Olympic Games and all other international 
skating competitions organised within the pyramid structure1000.  
 
After examining the eligibility and arbitration rules of the ISU, the Commission 
identified the relevant product market and relevant geographic market and analysed the 
position and the significance of the ISU in these markets under Article 101 TFEU and 
Article 53 EEA Agreement in the field of sport1001. The Commission reaffirmed that 
 
997 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Developing the European Dimension in Sport", Brussels, 
18.1.2011, COM (2011) 12 final, page 11. 
998 " Commission of the European Communities, ‘White Paper on Sport’ COM (2007) 391 final  p 13. 
999 The Commission, "Commission staff working document – The EU and sport: Background and context", 
SEC (2007) 935, page 41. 
1000 Case AT.40208 – International Skating Union's Eligibility rules, Commission Decision, C (2017) 8240 final 
8.12.2017, para 5.2, p 11. 
1001 Ibid at  para 8, p 35. 
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sport fulfils particularly important educational, public health, social, cultural, and 
recreational functions and has some distinctive features. However, restrictions relating 
to the area of sport are not generally excluded from the application of EU competition 
law1002. To assess whether sporting rules adopted by an international sport association 
come within the scope of Article 101(1) of the Treaty, account must first of all be taken 
to the overall context of its objectives and whether the consequential effects restricting 
competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives and are proportionate to 
them1003. 
 
The ISU argued for the necessity to have ex ante control over all international speed 
skating competition events and the pre-authorisation system. The ISU claimed that the 
Eligibility rules are part of the ISU's pre-authorisation system and this is central to the 
functioning of the pyramid model of sport which allows the ISU to regulate sport 
pursuant to uniform rules throughout the world. Whilst the ISU argued that this 
exclusive ex-ante control system is the norm for regulating organised sport, the 
Commission noted that alternative systems exist1004. Nevertheless, while a governing 
body could adopt stricter rules for its sport than other governing bodies, this should be 
justified on the specific facts and the features of the sport to be inherent in the pursuit 
of legitimate objectives and proportionate to them1005. The ISU provided certain 
possibilities for justification based on the health and safety of skaters deriving from the 
characteristics of speed skating. However, this was not enough to justify why the risks 
to integrity, such as match-fixing or doping failures, or to the proper running of 




1002 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140, paragraph 4; Case 13/76 Donà, ECLI:EU:C: 1976:115, 
paragraph 12; Case C-415/93 Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, paragraph 73. Joined Cases C-51/96 and C191/97 
Deliège, ECLI:EU:C:2000:199, paragraph 41; Case C-176/96 Lehtonen and Castors Braine, ECLI:EU:C:2000:201, 
paragraph 32 and Case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina ECLI:EU:C: 2006:492, paragraph 22. 
1003 Case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492, paragraph 42. 
1004 Case AT.40208 – International Skating Union's Eligibility rules, Commission Decision, C (2017) 8240 final 
8.12.2017, para 8.3.2, p 63. 
1005 Ibid at  para 8.3.2, p 64. 
1006 Ibid  at para 8.3.2, p 65. 
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The Commission made a finding the eligibility rules, inter alia having regard to their 
content, objectives and the legal and economic context, have the object of restricting 
potential competition on the relevant market  within the meaning of Article 101(1) of 
the Treaty1007. They imposed severe sanctions, including a lifetime ban, on athletes who 
participate in un-authorised speed skating events, and, they inherently aimed at 
preventing athletes from participating in events not authorised by the ISU which resulted 
in the foreclosure of competing event organisers1008. To conclude, the Commission 
made a finding that the consequential effects of the eligibility rules, especially the 
restriction of the athletes' commercial freedom to participate in international speed 
skating events organised by third parties and the foreclosure of potential competitors in 
the market for organisation and commercial exploitation of international speed skating 
events, were not inherent in the pursuit of legitimate objectives, and, in any event, not 
proportionate to1009.  Therefore, the eligibility rules were not compatible with the Article 
101 of the Treaty and had an effect of restricting of competition within the meaning of 
Article 101(1) of the Treaty1010. 
 
II.II.I.III.II. Significance of the Decision 
The Commission decided that the ISU’s rules imposing severe penalties on athletes 
participating in speed skating competitions not authorised by the ISU were contrary to 
EU law. The ISU had to change those rules1011. The decision required the ISU to stop 
its illegal conduct within 90 days and to refrain from any measure that has the same or 
an equivalent object or effect. To comply, the ISU could abolish or modify its eligibility 
rules to have legitimate objectives with no economic interest which are inherent and 
proportionate to achieve those objectives1012. While the Commission did not consider it 
necessary or appropriate to impose a fine in this decision, if the ISU failed to comply 
 
1007 Ibid  at para 8.3.2, p 42. 
1008 Ibid  at para 8.3.2.2., p 44.  
1009 Ibid at para 8.5.2., p 67. 
1010 Ibid  at para 8.6., p 67. 
1011 IP/17/5184 European Commission, Press Release, Antitrust: International Skating Union's restrictive penalties 




with the Commission's decision, it would be liable for non-compliance payments of up 
to 5% of its average daily worldwide turnover1013.  
 
Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, in charge of competition policy, acknowledged 
that International sports federations play an important role in athletes' careers by 
protecting their health and safety as well as the integrity of competitions they participate 
in1014. However, they adopt severe penalties, as it was imposed on skaters by the ISU to 
protect its own commercial interests and prevent others from setting up their own events. 
She made a finding that this decision directed ISU to modify its rules and open new 
opportunities for sport stakeholders which would benefit all ice-skating fans1015. The 
European Commissions’ ruling defends the freedom of athletes to participate in the 
speed skating competition of their choice, even if such a competition is not organised 
by the international federation (ISU). This freedom of choice would be supported by 
sport clubs and individual athletes while the integrity of the European model of sport, 
the pyramid structure, would be facing a challenge. The decision is likely to modify the 
classic structure of the European model of sport1016. Whether the decision of the 
European Commission will be a precedent to ensure freedom of choice for athletes 
across all sports, as well as clubs and competition organisers, to stop its illegal conduct 
and not to impose or threaten to impose unjustified penalties on athletes will be 
confirmed in the FIBA/Euro League complaint pending in front of the Commission. 
However, it is a possibility that the impact of this decision will extend beyond skating 
and the general structure of organisational markets in all other sports in Europe, such as 
emergence of alternative cross border European football leagues and the status of 
UEFA, will be affected1017. 
 
The decision demonstrated the considerable impact of EU law on the organisational 





1016 K Pijetlovic, ‘European Model of Sport: alternative structures’, in Jack Anderson (eds), Research Handbook on 
EU Sports Law, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), p 350. 
1017 K Pijetlovic, ‘European Model of Sport: alternative structures’, in Jack Anderson (eds), Research Handbook on 
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specificity of sport thoroughly and has not been insensitive to the legitimate and 
significant concerns of sport which do not distort competition within the market. 
However, it has defended the main aim and objective of the organisational structures of 
EU and ensured proper functioning of the internal market through competition law 
principles. The Commission found the rules of ISU incompatible with the EU 
competition law and supervised the ISU to modify its rules according to the EU law.  
This is a direct interference with the governance of sport and the ISU had no authority 
to reject. It is also a demonstration of supervised conditional autonomy of European 
model of sport within the EU. Sport enjoys autonomy on condition of compliance with 
the EU law and sporting rules are supervised by the EU institutions to ensure 
compliance.  
To conclude, the decision demonstrated that EU had a direct impact on the governance 
of European model of sport regarding restrictions on taking part in other un-sanctioned 
competitions. This is considered as a direct commercial interference which distorts 
competition within the internal market. To avoid this, the commission supervised the 
ISU to modify its rules in line with the EU law. This demonstrated that organisation of 
sport enjoys conditional autonomy under the organisational structures of EU. This 
autonomy is conditioned on compliance with the EU law, especially non-distortion of 
the proper functioning of the internal market. Even though, the specificity of the sport 
was acknowledged and assessed thoroughly under the Commission’s reasoning, it did 
not grant sport a specific treatment under the application of EU competition law.   Once 
again it is confirmed that every sporting rule is subject to the application of EU law with 
no exception and distortion of the internal market will not be negotiated. 
 
II.II.I.IV. Pending FIBA/Euro League Complaint 
II.II.I.IV.I. Facts of the Complaint 
Like the ISU decision, FIBA/Euro League Complaint demonstrates the EU Law 
challenge on the governance of the European Model of Sport. Under the complaint, 
Euroleague Basketball has filed a complaint to the Commission against FIBA and FIBA 
Europe as a consequence of the repeated pressures that European basketball clubs are 
178 
 
suffering at the hands of the international federation and its affiliated national 
federations with the objective of forcing them to renounce their participation in 
European competitions1018. The complaint concerns the threats and pressures that FIBA 
and its member federations are making against clubs, players, and referees to force them 
to abandon the Euroleague and the Eurocup and only participate in FIBA 
competitions1019. The objective of the complaint is to ensure that clubs, players, and 
referees can freely make the choice to participate in the competitions that they consider 
appropriate without being subject to threats or pressures. It is argued that FIBA is 
violating EU law by enforcing restrictive rules and sanctions against those who are 
involved in competitions not approved by FIBA1020. The decision is pending before the 
Commission. However, there are the FIA, MOTOE and ISU decisions and case 
precedents demonstrating that, under the application of EU law to the organisation of 
sport, the rule will highly likely be classified as contrary to EU law. It is worth 
mentioning here that FIBA has filed a counter complaint against Euroleague arguing 
abuse of dominant position1021.  
 
II.II.I.IV.II. Possible Judgment on the Complaint 
Based on the established previous judgments and decisions, the Commission would be 
considering the legitimacy of the objectives pursued, whether any restrictive effects of 
those rules were inherent in the pursuit of the objectives and whether those rules were 
proportionate to such objectives1022. The Commission may or may not refer to the 
specificity of the sport. However, it will not tolerate any sporting rule which has the 
potential of distorting competition within the internal market to gain commercial 
advantage. The consequential effects of the rules have the potential to restrict the 
athletes' commercial freedom to participate in other national or international events 
organised by third parties and the foreclosure of potential competitors in the market 
 
1018 Euroleague Basketball, <https://www.euroleaguebasketball.net/euroleague-
basketball/news/i/6p8c54yjk66qsitp/euroleague-basketball-presents-a-complaint-before-the-european-commission-
against-fiba-and-fiba-europe> accessed on 01/05/2019. 
1019 Ibid. 
1020 Ibid. 
1021 FIBA Basketball, ‘FIBA files a complaint against Euroleague’  (Press release on 05 April 2016) 
<https://www.fiba.basketball/news/fiba-files-complaint-against-euroleague> accessed on 02 August 2020. 
1022 European Commission, ‘Developing the European Dimension in Sport’ [2011] COM (2011) 12 final, page 11. 
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which probably will not be classified as inherent in the pursuit of legitimate objectives, 
and, in any event, proportionate1023.  Therefore, the rules probably will not be 
compatible with the Article 101 of the Treaty and will have an effect of restricting of 
competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) of the Treaty1024. More importantly, 
after this finding, it is highly likely for the Commission to supervise FIBA to modify its 
rules to separate commercial and regulatory activities of sport to ensure compliance with 
the EU law.  
 
II.II.I.IV.III. Possible Significance of the Complaint 
Unless the EU changes its approach towards the organisational structures of the 
European model of sport, the Commission will, very likely, reaffirm the incompatibility 
of the restrictions on taking part in other competitions and supervise FIBA to modify its 
rules accordingly. While the contribution of the specificity of sport principle towards 
achieving protection under EU law in case of distortion of competition is minor if any,  
the complaint will be demonstrating again that the EU has a direct impact on the 
governance of the European model of sport regarding restrictions on taking part in other 
un-sanctioned competitions. This would confirm once more that organisation of sport 
enjoys supervised conditional autonomy under the organisational structures of EU. This 
autonomy is conditioned on compliance with the EU law, especially non-distortion of 
the proper functioning of the internal market. Every sporting rule is subject to the 
application of EU law with no exception and distortion of the internal market will not 
be negotiated. 
 
II.II.II. Home and Away Rule and Club Location 
Within Europe, generally sport is organised on national basis where teams from one 
country compete each other in domestic leagues. Only successful teams are qualified to 
enter cross border competitions which are indirectly representing their country of 
origins1025. The Commission has previously acknowledged that competition rules 
 
1023 Case AT.40208 – International Skating Union's Eligibility rules, Commission Decision, C (2017) 8240 final 
8.12.2017, para 8.5.2., p 67. 
1024 Ibid  at para 8.6., p 67. 
1025 A Lewis QC and Jonathan Taylor, Sport: Law and Practice, (3rd eds, Bloomsbury Professional, 2014) p 1155. 
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should not be applied to create a single market for sport in EU since there was no 
economic need for such unification and it is crucial for sport to maintain national 
identity for the sake of competition in sport1026. This geographical restriction could be 
identified as an aspect of the specificity of sport with no economic interest but necessary 
for the proper conduct of sport1027. The below stated case is the unpublished precedent 
in this area took place two decades ago. 
 
II.II.II.I. Mouscron Decision 
II.II.II.I.I. Facts and Decision of the Application  
In Mouscron1028, the Commission rejected the complaint lodged by the Communauté 
Urbaine de Lille against UEFA stating that the UEFA Cup rule that each club must play 
its home match at its own ground is a rule which is contrary to the scope of EU 
competition law. The Commission concluded that there is no Community interest that 
would justify looking more closely into whether UEFA has abused any dominant 
position it might have by applying exceptions to that rule without taking account of the 
integration that exists between certain frontier regions1029.  
II.II.II.I.II. Significance of the Decision  
The Commission published a press release in 1999 relating to the Mouscron decision 
concerning the temporary relocation of a club, and home and away rule stating that there 
are limits to the application of the EU competition rules to sport. The three key aspects 
of the Commission's approach to sport was first, the regulatory powers of sport 
organisations on the non-economic aspects linked to the specific nature of the sport did 
not fall under the application of EU law. Secondly, the rules of sport organisations that 
are necessary to ensure equality between clubs, uncertainty to results, and the integrity 
and proper functioning of competitions were not, in principle, incompatible with the EU 




1028 Case 3651, C.U. de Lille/UEFA (Mouscron) Unpublished Commission Decision of 9 December 1999. 
1029 European Commission Press Release, ‘Limits to application of Treaty competition rules to sport: Commission 
gives clear signal’, IP/99/965. 
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had a Community dimension and would significantly affect trade between Member 
States1030. 
Under the application, the Commission considered that the contested matter had a 
limited effect on cross border trade, that it was de minimis and consequently there was 
no considerable Community interest in intervening1031. Secondly, even though there was 
a minor Community interest, if the rule pursues a legitimate objective, such as to ensure 
competitive balance, the restriction would be considered as inherent in the organisation 
of club competitions so long as it remained proportionate1032. Thirdly, even in the 
absence of inherency, based on the fact that the rule contributes to the production of 
sporting contest by allowing consumers to benefit from the locality of the club where 
its supporters lived would fall under the exemption laid down in article 101(3)1033. 
Mouscron was brought to the attention of the Commission two decades ago and EU 
integration  has since developed. Nevertheless, the legal grounds of the competition 
provisions remain the same. In the future, the club relocation and the home and away 
rules might be challenged under the organisational structures of EU to discover whether 
they could be objectively justified as an inherent rule and are proportionate. Depending 
on the facts of the application, it is highly likely that similar conclusion would be made. 
II.II.III. Breakaway Leagues 
The formation of a breakaway league, which is an alternative private league, is a 
structural threat to the classic pyramidal model of sport1034. A breakaway league is set 
up without the authorisation of the official national or international governing body for 
the sport and it generally lacks the recognition of the governing body1035. Such a league 
has no organisational control. It can be a closed, or a partly open, private league created 
by a group of clubs sharing common commercial interests1036.  A closed breakaway 
league is not integrated into the system of promotion and relegation with other 
 
1030 Ibid. 
1031 R Parrish and Si Mittinen, ‘Legal Issues in the Governance of Sport’, in Richard Parrish and Samuli Mittinen 
(eds), Sporting Exception in European Union Law, (Asser Press, 2008), p 210. 
1032 Ibid. 
1033 Ibid. 
1034 K Pijetlovic, EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, (Asser Press, 2014), p 53. 
1035 Ibid. 
1036 Ibid  p 48. 
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leagues1037. Clubs in closed leagues tend to have a comparable financial and competitive 
standing with high market values for their broadcasting rights and general merchandise. 
Due to their solidarity, their sport governing bodies do not want to lose control over 
them and consequently, elite clubs receive great bargaining powers over their sport 
governing bodies1038.  
II.II.III.I. Compliance Analysis of the Breakaway Leagues with the EU 
The main objective of the EU is to enhance the integration process and ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market. Based on the previous precedents, the EU has not 
granted an exception to sport due to specificity and sports autonomy is on condition of 
compliance with the EU law as well as not distorting trade between Member States.  
Under the Media Partners proposal regarding the formation of G-14 alliance consisting 
of 14 elite European football clubs, then stood up at 18, a breakaway league was 
presented for the good of the game to promote the cooperation, amicable relations and 
unity of the member clubs; to promote and improve professional football in all its 
aspects and safeguard the general interests of the member clubs; to promote cooperation 
and good relations between G-14 and sport governing bodies1039. However, the reality 
behind the G-14 alliance was to maximize commercial gain and obtain regulatory 
independence1040. 
 
The complaint resulted in UEFA Champions' League reform revealing the role of 
increasingly active stakeholders in sport1041. On the other hand, the Commission did not 
formed a judgment on the complaint.  The possible approach of the EU under the 
complaint could be predicted through the analysis of the previous judgment and 
decisions. To begin with, under the Meca-Medina case, the EU would not grant any 
exception to sport due to its specificity and examine compatibility of each sporting rule 




1039 K Pijetlovic, EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, (Asser Press, 2014) p 61. 
1040 Ibid p 62. 
1041 Independent, Football: UEFA winning `super league' war (24 October 1998) 




and/or movement, is affected between Member States1042.  The EU would not interfere 
with domestic commercial matters1043. Once the complaint falls within the jurisdiction 
of EU, the sporting rule, in this case breakaway league prohibition, would be challenged 
to find out whether it forms a restriction on the internal market, whether it could be 
justified due to inherence and/or legitimate aim, and whether it is proportionate. The 
specificity of sport may or may not be expressly relied on. However, the specificity of 
sport will not change the rule from being classified as a restriction should it likely to 
distorts competition within the internal market and affect cross-border trade between 
the Member States. 
A breakaway league is against the pyramid of the European model of sport requiring 
one federation in each layer of the pyramid for each sport. The political consensus on 
the necessity to preserve the structures of sport in Europe was emphasized in EU policy 
documents to protect social significance sport1044. The Nice Declaration noted the 
unprecedented developments of sport while acknowledging the necessity for the 
federations to continue to be the key feature of a form of organisation protecting and 
preserving sporting cohesion, participatory democracy, and solidarity at every level1045. 
These policy statements demonstrate the willingness of the EU to preserve the 
fundamental values of sport such as solidarity, self-regulation,  societal role of sport for 
all and its beneficial effects on  youth, health, and social inclusion1046. The 2007 
Parliament Report on the future of professional football emphasised that sport is an 
inalienable part of the European identity characterised by open competitions within a 
pyramid structure where countless amateur clubs and volunteers form the base for top 
professional clubs.  The attachment of European sport with the relationship between 
amateur and professional sport was emphasised1047. The Commission Communication 
on Developing European Dimension in Sport identified specificity of sport as all the 
 
1042 Case 3651, C.U. de Lille/UEFA (Mouscron) Unpublished Commission Decision of 9 December 1999. 
1043 See competences of EU. 
1044 Helsinki Report, Amsterdam Declaration on Sport and Nice Declaration.  
1045 European Council, Nice Declaration (2000). 
1046 K Pijetlovic, EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football, (Asser Press, 2014), p 49. 
1047 Motion for the Parliament Resolution in the European Parliament Report on the Future of European Professional 
Football in Europe (2006/2130(INI)), Committee on Culture and Education, final A6-0036/2007. 
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characteristics which makes sport special including the interdependence between 
competing adversaries of the pyramid structure of open competitions1048. 
Sanctioning breakaway leagues do find a firm support under the EU law1049. However, 
each rule should be considered within its own merits against the requirements of the EU 
law. The policy documents above provide a guidance that the pyramid structure of sport 
with open leagues falls under the specificity of sport and therefore should be 
acknowledged under the EU law. However, it is for the ECJ to interpret the law.   
II.II.III.II. Possible Impact of EU on the Breakaway Leagues  
Currently, the European model of sport sanction breakaway leagues.  The impact of EU 
on the breakaway leagues is yet to be seen. Even though closed breakaway leagues 
might not be compatible with the EU law, an open break away league would contribute 
towards cross border competition and trade between Member States within the internal 
market. On the other hand, like club location rules, the presence of an open breakaway 
league might affect cross boarder competition and trade between Member States within 
the internal market. Nevertheless, the impact of the breakaway league on the internal 
market will be assessed through the market access analysis on a case by case 
examination by the organisational structures of EU. This challenge would demonstrate 
that EU has a direct impact on the governance of European model of sport where the 
cross-border trade between Member States is affected. This would confirm once more 
that the organisation of sport enjoys conditional autonomy, supervised through the 
Commission decisions, under the organisational structures of the EU. This autonomy is 
again conditioned on compliance with the EU law, especially under non-distortion of 
the proper functioning of the internal market. Once again it would be confirmed that 
every sporting rule is subject to the application of EU law and distortion of the internal 




1048 COM (2011) 12 final, 18.1.2011 at para 4.2 




II.II.IV. Club Ownership 
SGBs recognised that common ownership of competing clubs undermines the 
prerequisite features of successful sport. Uncertainty of results is necessary for the 
public confidence towards the integrity of sport and authenticity of the competition1050. 
Both sides of the competition should be perceived as competing with best of their 
abilities to win free from any external constraints. Therefore, it is legitimate for the sake 
of competition for the SGBs to have proportionate rules to prevent conflict of interest 
which may lead to the manipulation of sporting results. This ensures the public’s 
perception that the results are not influenced by any factor apart from the sporting skills 
of the sides competing1051. Organisational structures of the European model of sport 
adopted rules and regulations to prevent such conflicts occurring1052. Such rules have 
the potential to restrict competition by prohibiting the same entity or person from 
investing in more than one participating team in the same competition. These rules have 
been challenged under the organisational structures of the EU to discover whether club 
ownership rules are motivated by legitimate sporting interests or tainted by conflict of 
interest of the SGBs to achieve commercial gain. 
 
II.II.IV.I. ENIC/UEFA Decision 
UEFA has adopted the rule on the Integrity of the EUFA Club competitions: 
Independence of clubs’ in 1998 which became effective in 2000/1 season. The rule 
prohibited two clubs or more directly or indirectly controlled by the same entity or 
managed by the same person participating in a UEFA club competition 1053. To ensure 
the integrity of the competition, only one club is admitted to a UEFA Club 
competition1054. The main aim behind this rule is to avoid any suspicion of match fixing 
and protect the integrity of competition.  
 
 
1050 A Lewis QC and Jonathan Taylor, Sport: Law and Practice, (3rd eds, Bloomsbury Professional, 2014) p 1170. 
1051 Ibid  p 1171. 
1052 For example, see UEFA article 5 on the integrity of the competition prohibiting possibility of simultaneously be 
involved, either directly or indirectly, in any capacity whatsoever in the management, administration and/or sporting 
performance of more than one club participating in a UEFA club competition. 
1053 Currently Regulations of the UEFA Champions League 2018-21 Cycle, 2018/19 Season, Article 5 regulates 
Integrity of Competition. 
1054 UEFA Champions League 2018-21 Cycle, 2018/19 Season, Article 5.02. 
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II.II.IV.I.I. Facts and Decision of the Application 
The club ownership rule was challenged by ENIC1055, which was an investment 
company with shares in six different football clubs. ENIC filed a complaint to the 
Commission. The Commission rejected ENIC’s complaint and concluded that even 
though the rule was capable of being caught under the application of EU competition 
law provisions, the object of the particular rule was not to distort competition but to 
protect competition in sport1056. The rule might have influenced the freedom of action 
of clubs and investors. However, it is found inherent to the very existence of credible 
UEFA competitions. Furthermore, the rule did not lead to a limitation on the freedom 
of action of clubs and investors that goes beyond what is necessary to ensure its 
legitimate aim of protecting the uncertainty of the results and giving the public the right 
perception as to the integrity of the UEFA competitions with a view to ensure their 
proper functioning1057. Therefore, the rule did not qualify as a restriction of competition 
and therefore fell outside the scope of Article 101(1) (Ex81(1) of the EC) of the Treaty. 
Furthermore, the rule did lead to the application of Article 102 (Ex81(1) of the EC)1058.  
 
II.II.IV.I.II. Significance of the Decision 
The Commission assessed whether the effect of the rule is restrictive and, if it is, is it 
inherent in the pursuit of the objective to ensure the very existence of credible pan 
European football1059. This  reasoning of the Commission is remarkably like the one 
previously adopted by the ECJ in Deliège1060 regarding freedom of movement. 
Nevertheless, the Commission relied on Wouters1061  in connection with competition 
law while it had no connection with sport. Since ENIC decision, Wouters case has 
established itself as mainly important in the development of European sports law1062. 
By applying the Wouters test, the Commission considered whether the consequential 
 
1055 COMP 37.806. ENIC/UEFA, IP/02/942, 27 June 2002. 
1056 Ibid. 
1057 Ibid at para 47. 
1058 Ibid. 
1059 COMP 37.806. ENIC/UEFA, IP/02/942, 27 June 2002 at para 30. 
1060 Case C-51/96 Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo 
ASBL, Union européenne de judo [2000] E.C.R. I-2549 at para 64. 
1061 Cases C- 180/98 Pavlov etc. [2000] ECR I- 6451, [2001] 4 CMLR 30, para 75. 
1061 Case C- 309/99 Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandsche Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR I- 1577, 
[2002] 4 CMLR 913, at para 97 and 110 
1062 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law, (OUP, 2017), p 106. 
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effect of the rule was inherent in the pursuit of the credible sport. The Commission 
agreed that the aim of the rule was to achieve clean competition necessary for the 
credible competition.1063 The decision significantly demonstrates that rules forbidding 
multiple ownership of clubs are indispensable to the maintenance of a credible 
competition requiring uncertainty of results in all games1064. Moreover, the decision 
hinted that sport is socially special, but it is economically special as well. To ensure 
credible competition there is a need to limit the power of investors in sport leagues 
which may not be necessary in other market sectors unless there is abuse of dominant 
position1065. While Wouters demonstrates the sensitivity of EU competition law 
generally to specificities of each sector, ENIC demonstrated EU competition law’s sport 
specific application1066.   
 
II.II.V. Mandatory Player Release Rules 
Player release rules are central to the European model of sport. They provide a clear 
example on the difference of sport compared to other market sectors. SGBs have rules 
to release players from their clubs to play in their national teams for international 
competitions. These sporting rules regulate the mandatory release of players by clubs to 
allow them play in international representative competitions. These rules are mandatory 
on the players as well who are required to reply affirmatively when called up by the 
association subject to exceptional cases of injury or illness. Sanctions may be imposed 
in case of non-compliance. Moreover, clubs releasing a player are not entitled to receive 
a renumeration or financial compensation. In addition, it is the responsibility of the 
releasing club to insure the player against possible injuries during the entire release 
period1067. This is a demonstration that sport is different compared to other market 
sectors1068 where the requirement for an employer to release a highly trained employee 
is often very highly paid. This can be interpreted as SGBs are using their regulatory 
power in sport governance to force other competing undertakings, clubs, to achieve 
 
1063 COMP 37.806. ENIC/UEFA, IP/02/942, 27 June 2002 at para 29, 38. 
1064 Stephen Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law, (OUP, 2017) p 107. 
1065 Ibid  p 108. 
1066 Ibid . 
1067 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, Annex 2 on the Release of Players to Association Teams. 
1068 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law, (OUP, 2017) p 259. 
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vitality towards its business model at the expense of clubs1069. This problem was visible 
in MOTOE, where a conflict of interest arose between the governance choices and direct 
commercial interests.  
 
II.II.V.I. Compliance Analysis of the Mandatory Player Release Rules with 
the EU 
In light of the ENIC decision , the overall effect of the release rule is open for a challenge 
under the EU law to determine whether sport is so special to withstand the of abuse of 
dominant position under the Article 102 TFEU.  To begin with, the EU acts when 
commercial cross border activity, trade and/or movement, is affected between Member 
States1070.  The EU would not interfere with domestic commercial matters1071. Once the 
complaint falls within the jurisdiction of EU, the sporting rule, in this case mandatory 
players release, would be challenged to find out whether it forms a restriction on the 
internal market, whether it could be justified due to inherence and/or legitimate aim, 
and whether it is proportionate.  
Mandatory release of players rule enforced by FIFA is capable of being considered as 
an abuse of dominant position. However, it might not distort competition within the 
internal market. A player release system is inherent in sporting activity due to the need 
to underpin the international game’s viability and supra-national competition in Europe. 
This is one of the differences of sport compared to other sectors. Quite like the club 
ownership rule analysed above, it can be objectively justified if interpreted as 
facilitating proper functioning of supra-national sport competition and integrity of sport 
in Europe. The object of the rule could be considered as not an abuse of dominant 
position restricting competition but facilitating competition within the internal market. 
Therefore, the mandatory release of players rule might not form a restriction of 
competition if it is considered inherent and necessary for the integrity and proper 
competition in sport. On the other hand, the rule might go too far in protecting one sides 
commercial interests, the regulators, at the expense of others, the clubs. Under the case 
 
1069 Ibid  p 261. 
1070 Case 3651, C.U. de Lille/UEFA (Mouscron) Unpublished Commission Decision of 9 December 1999. 
1071 See competences of EU. 
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scenario, like the Formula One (FIA) decision the Commission could directly involve 
with modifying or altering the rule through supervision. This type of supervision 
establishes a direct impact of EU on the governance of the European model of sport. 
 
II.II.V.II. Charleroi/Oulmers Case 
This rule so far has not been tested by the organisational structures of EU to discover 
whether it would be classified as an abuse of dominant position or unjustifiable 
restriction. However, under the discontinued litigation of Charleroi/Oulmers1072, a 
referral was made to the ECJ to consider whether mandatory player release rules of 
FIFA without compensation constituted an unlawful restriction of competition or an 
abuse of dominant position or obstacle to fundamental freedoms under the application 
of EU law1073. The ECJ did not answer these questions and decided to wait for the 
pending resolution of the Belgian appeal. However, the case was settled out of Court 
and the case was removed from the ECJ’s registrar. The club Charleroi has received 
support from G-14 alliance for solid commercial reasons. G-14 had a much greater long-
term interest in challenging FIFA rules favouring its own commercial interest over the 
clubs.  The of court settlement prevented the ECJ from taking a stance1074. The threat 
led the governing bodies in football to allocate funds to establish a compensation 
scheme for player release. In addition, governing bodies established a new institution 
called European Club Association (ECA)1075 which allowed clubs to have a say in 
governance matters at international level1076. Even though the case was discontinued at 
the Court, the clubs won concessions associated with governance by using litigation 
through the application of EU law to put pressure on governing bodies. The ECA has 






1072 Case-C-243/06 Charleroi/Oulmers, OJ C 212, 2 September 2006. 
1073 Ibid  p 11. 
1074 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law, (OUP, 2017) p 263. 
1075 Further details can be found on www.ecaeurope.com Accessed on 17/05/2019. 
1076 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law, (OUP, 2017) p 263. 
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II.II.V.III. Possible Impact of EU on the Mandatory Player Release Rules 
Mandatory player release rules’ impact on the internal market would be assessed 
through the market access analysis by the organisational structures of EU. The rule 
might have been declared as inherent and necessary for the proper conduct and 
international competition in sport with no adverse effect on the cross-border trade and 
competition between Member States. However, it had a weakness of unjust enrichment 
of the regulator at the expense of clubs. Therefore, this weakness would be required to 
be remedied for the rule to comply with the EU law.  Nevertheless, the rule demonstrates 
the specificity of sport compared to other market sectors. The Charleroi settlement has 
altered the governance structures of sport in Europe to a less aggressive point in seeking 
the commercial interests of the governing bodies1077. EU law has facilitated the means 
to achieve a change in the governance of sport without forming a threat to the pyramid 
structure of the European model of sport but securing an adaptation in the application 
of sporting rules1078. The stand of the governing bodies to alter sporting rules in 
accordance with the EU law meets the demands of conditional autonomy while 
sustaining the pyramid structure under the European model of sport.1079  
 
II.II.VI. Licensing Requirements 
Licensing systems aims to ensure that all clubs respect the same basic rules on financial 
management and transparency. Typically, such systems include provisions regarding 
discrimination, violence, protection of minors and training1080. However, licensing 
systems must comply with competition and Internal Market provisions of the EU and 
should not go beyond what is necessary for the pursuit of a legitimate objective relating 
to the proper organisation and conduct of sport1081. The European Commission 
acknowledged that robust licensing systems for professional clubs at European and 
national level are a useful tool to promote good governance in sport1082. Currently, the 
UEFA club licensing and financial fair play regulations 2018 outlines minimum 
 
1077 Ibid  p 268. 
1078 Ibid  p 263. 
1079 Ibid  p 268. 





licensing requirements under the headings of sporting criteria, infrastructure criteria, 
personnel and administrative criteria, legal criteria, and financial criteria1083.  
 
II.II.VI.I. Compliance Analysis of the Licensing Requirements with the EU 
Bearing in  mind the Commission’s previous approaches stated previously, the overall 
effect of the licensing requirement rule is open for challenge under the competition law 
provisions of the EU to determine whether it distorts competition and/or constitutes 
abuse dominant position by the SGBs is prohibited under the EU law. Mandatory club 
licensing rules enforced by SGBs are capable of being considered as an abuse of 
dominant position since they form a barrier to entry into the market. However, they 
might not necessarily distort competition within the internal market since these criteria 
have a sporting objectives to promote and improve the standards of football in Europe 
while promoting training of young players, to ensure adequate level of management and 
organisation within clubs, to adapt clubs’ sporting infrastructure in accordance with 
health and safety requirements, to protect integrity of competition and to allow 
development of benchmarking for clubs  in financial sporting, legal, personnel, 
administrative, and infra-structure related  criteria throughout  Europe1084. Quite like the 
club ownership rule and the mandatory player release rule analysed above, club 
licensing rules could be inherent to facilitate proper functioning of sport competition 
and integrity of sport in Europe. These rules do have a legitimate aim under the 
specificity of sport which is not found under other market sectors1085. The object of the 
rule could be considered as not an abuse of dominant position restricting competition 
but facilitating competition within the internal market by protecting integrity of sport. 
Therefore, the licensing rule might not form a restriction of competition if it is 
considered inherent and necessary for the integrity and proper competition in sport. On 
the other hand, the rule might go too far in protecting one sides commercial interests 
and could not be considered as proportionate and compatible with the EU law. The 
means used under the rule might not be proportionate since these rules place heavy 
 
1083 UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations 2018 edition. 
1084 Ibid Article 2. 
1085 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law, (OUP, 2017) p 273. 
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burdens on clubs1086. If declared incompatible with the EU law, like the Formula One 
(FIA) Case, the Commission could directly involve with modifying or altering the rule 
through supervision. This type of supervision certainly establishes a direct impact of EU 
on the governance of the European model of sport.  
II.II.VI.II. Possible Impact of EU on the Club Licensing Rules 
Currently, the legal status of the licensing rules is uncertain1087. However, it is open for 
challenge under the EU law. Even though the rule might have a legitimate aim to address 
the problems which do not arise in other sectors, it does place a burden on the 
employees1088. The suspicion behind the rule is that it might be used as a shield for anti-
competitive agreement aiming to limit employer’s expenditure to maximise profit1089. 
Therefore, the means used might not be justifiable.  
 
II.II.VII. Third Party Ownership 
Third party ownership (TPO) of a player is describing the situation where the economic 
value of a player’s registration belongs to one or more third party as well as, if not at 
all, to the club. Under the TPO, a player is registered under a club but the club has an 
obligation to a third party who has provided funding for the acquisition of the player in 
return for a right to a share in the player’s future transfer of registration. TPO provides 
the possibility of investment in sport labour. The third party invests in talent hoping that 
he will improve and increase in value. On the  other hand, the club wins by acquiring a 
 
1086 Ibid. 
1087 See, taking the view the arrangements are lawful, C Davies, ‘Labour Market Controls and Sport in the Light of 
UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations’  [2012] ECLR 435; A Mestre, There Striani Case: UEFA’s Break-Even 
Rule and EU Law’ July 2013 World Sports Law Report 3; that they are probably lawful, C Flanagan, ‘A Tricky 
European Fixture: An Assessment of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations and their Compatibility with EU Law’ 
(2013) 13 Intl Sports LJ 148; that they may be unlawful, S Bastianon, ‘The Striani Challenge to UEFA Financial Fair 
Play. A new Era after Bosman or Just a Washout?’ (2015)11 Competition Law Review 7; that they are unlawful, T 
Peeters and S Szymanski, ‘Vertical Restraints in Soccer: Financial Fair Play in the English Premier League’, 
Department of Economics, University of Antwerp (2012) <http://ideas.repec,org/p/ant/wpaper/2012028.html> 
accessed 29 November 2016; N Petit, ‘Fair Play Financier ou Oligopoleague de clubs rentiers?: Elements d’analyse 
en droit European de la concurrence’  (2014) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2438399> 
accessed 29 November 2016; V Kaplan, ‘UEFA Financial Fair play Regulations and European Union Antitrust 
Complications’ (2015) 29 Emory International Law Review 799. 
1088 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law, (OUP, 2017) p 273. 
1089 See the revenue distribution outlined on the UEFA web page for 2019/2020 < 
https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/stakeholders/news/0253-0f8e6d83afa2-0904576faee6-1000--2019-20-uefa-club-
competitions-revenue-distribution-system/> accessed on 05 August 2020; S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in 
EU Sports law, (OUP, 2017) p 273. 
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better player which would have been not affordable otherwise and the player wins by 
acquiring to play for a higher profile. TPO is applied in Europe. The problem lies in the 
risk that the third party might pursue to influence the club’s decision making on sporting 
matters with an intention to make greater profit1090.  As a result, economic incentives 
might suppress the integrity of the sporting competition1091. Nevertheless, SGBs adopt 
rules to preclude the third-party influence over the club’s decisions. As an example, 
FIFA regulates TPO under the players economic rights on the status and transfer of 
players1092 and prohibits any third-party influence on clubs imposes disciplinary 
measures on clubs that do not observe the obligations set out1093. Moreover, any club or 
player who enters an TPO agreement may be imposed disciplinary measures1094. These 
rules do not prohibit TPO. However, they do limit the role of a third-party owner. 
 
II.II.VII.I. Compliance Analysis and Possible Impact of EU on the Third-Party 
Ownership  
The approach of the organisational structures of EU towards TPO rules shall be 
determined based on the fact whether they are genuinely necessary to achieve the 
legitimate aim they are pursuing and if the means taken are proportionate. The EU 
would provide a room for the sporting rules to preserve the integrity of sport from the 
commercial and damaging influence of the third-party owners. Therefore, even though 
TPO rules could have a restrictive effect on the competition  for players market, they 
might be constituting a genuine need for sport governance1095. Should TPO rules be 






1090 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law, (OUP, 2017) p 280. 
1091 Ibid. 
1092 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, < https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/regulations-
on-the-status-and-transfer-of-players-2018-2925437.pdf?cloudid=c83ynehmkp62h5vgwg9g> accessed on 
21/05/2019. 
1093 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, Article 18bis. 
1094 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, Article 18ter. 
1095 S Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports law, (OUP, 2017) p 281. 
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III. Chapter Evaluation  
 
In this chapter the impact of the EU law on the organisation of sport with reference to 
the European model of sport is attempted to be established.  The chapter analysed the 
application of EU law to individual sporting rules on unsanctioned and rival events, 
home and away rule, club location, breakaway leagues, club ownership, mandatory 
player release rules, licensing requirements, and third party ownership under the 
organisation of the European model of sport to determine the role of the Commission 
decisions in establishing and developing EU sports law as well as shaping the 
significance and autonomy of sport. It is established that the Commission approaches 
each individual complaint with an objective of enhancing the integration process and 
ensuring proper functioning of the internal market. Similar to the ECJ’s approach 
established in the previous chapter, the Commission does not grant any exception to 
sport due to its specificity and instead it examines compatibility of each sporting rule 
on a case by case analysis as guided under the Meca Medina judgment. The Commission 
acts when commercial cross border activity, trade and/or movement, is affected between 
Member States1096 and it would not interfere with domestic commercial matters due to 
lack of competence1097. Once the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of EU, the 
sporting rule in question would be challenged by the Commission under the market 
access analysis to find out whether it forms a restriction on the internal market, whether 
it could be justified due to inherence and/or legitimate aim, and whether it is 
proportionate. During its analysis, specificity of sport will not be enough to protect the 
sporting rule from the application of EU law and to be classified as a restriction should 
it distorts competition within the internal market and affect cross border trade between 
the Member States. The effect of the specificity of sport argument to achieve protection 
under EU law in case of distortion of competition and/or abuse of dominant position is 




1096 Case 3651, C.U. de Lille/UEFA (Mouscron) Unpublished Commission Decision of 9 December 1999. 
1097 See competences of EU. 
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IV. Chapter Conclusion 
Commission decisions demonstrated the considerable impact of organisational 
structures of the EU on the governance of sport on the specificity of sport and on the 
autonomy of sport. Case by case analysis of each sporting rule without any exception 
demonstrates that the EU has a direct impact on the governance of the European model 
of sport. This analysis takes place once the sporting rule affecting the cross-border 
movement or trade between Member States or competition within the internal market. 
This confirms that organisation of sport enjoys conditional autonomy, supervised 
through the Commission decisions where possible, under the organisational structures 
of the EU1098. The autonomy of sport is conditioned on compliance with the EU law, 
especially under non-distortion of the proper functioning of the internal market. Every 
sporting rule is subject to the application of EU law with no exception and distortion of 
the internal market will not be negotiated.  
 
Therefore, it is established that organisational structures of the EU have a significant 
impact on the organisation of sport regarding the autonomy and specificity of sport. 
Currently, sport enjoys conditional autonomy under the organisational structures of EU. 
While the specificity of sport is acknowledged, it does not play a major role in 
contributing towards the autonomy of sport. The organisation of sport does not enjoy a 
general exception under the EU and its existence is conditional upon compliance with 
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I. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to establish to what extent can the organisational 
structures of EU and the European model of sport co-exist. This chapter comprises of 
defining good governance and supervised conditional autonomy of sport as a solution 
for European model of sport to co-exist with the organisational structures of the EU .  
 
II. Good Governance 
The concept of governance is as old as human civilization. Governance defines the 
process of decision-making and implementation or  non-implementation of 
decisions1099. Good Governance is the responsible conduct of public affairs and 
management of public resources. It  is summarised in the Council of Europe’s 12 
Principles of Good Governance1100. These twelve principles of good governance 
identified by the Council of Europe are; (1) Participation, Representation, Fair Conduct 
of Elections; (2) Responsiveness; (3) Efficiency and Effectiveness; (4) Openness and 
Transparency; (5) . Rule of Law; (6) Ethical Conduct; (7) Competence and Capacity; 
(8) Innovation and Openness to Change; (9) Sustainability and Long-term Orientation; 
 
1099 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific What is Good Governance?  
<https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf> Accessed on 19 August 2020. 
1100 Council of Europe, 12 Principles of Good Governance <https://www.coe.int/en/web/good-governance/12-
principles> accessed on 19 August 2020. 
197 
 
(10) Sound Financial Management; (11) Human Rights, Cultural Diversity and Social 
Cohesion and; (12) Accountability1101. At all levels, good governance is fundamental to 
economic growth, political stability, and security. It forms the key factor for stability 
and security1102. Good governance leads to improved economic benefits in a globalised 
world and it accelerates economic transitions1103. Nevertheless, good governance is an 
ideal which is difficult to achieve in its entirety1104. However, to ensure sustainable 
human development, actions must be taken to achieve good governance in a society. 
Good governance ensures that policies and procedures are adopted to ensure an 
organisation is well run1105. Apart from rules and regulations, good governance reflects 
an organisation’s ethical culture1106. Under the sporting context, good governance 
represents the framework and culture within which a sports body sets policy, delivers 
its strategic objectives, engages with stakeholders, monitors performance, evaluates and 
manages risk and reports to its constituents on its activities and progress including the 
delivery of effective, sustainable and proportionate sports policy and regulation1107. 
 
II.I. Good Governance in Sport 
Good governance in sport has emerged as a condition for the autonomy of sport. Action 
for good governance under international sport has identified four types of good 
governance dimensions. These are transparency and public communication, democratic 
process, checks and balances, and solidarity. First, transparency is regarded as the main 
condition for good governance of sport since failures of governance are often connected 
to disclosure of information mainly on monetary matters1108.  The sport sector heavily 
relies on public support and SGBs are charged with taking care of a public good. 
 
1101 Council of Europe, ‘12 Principles of Good Governance’ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/goodgovernance/12-
principles> accessed on 19 August 2020. 
1102 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Good Governance 
<https://www.osce.org/oceea/446335> accessed on 19 August 2020. 
1103 Ibid. 
1104 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, what is Good Governance?  
<https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf> accessed on 19 August 2020. 
1105 World Economic Forum, ‘what do we mean by governance?’ (26 February 2016) 
1106 European Parliament, ‘Good Governance in Sport’ Briefing (January 2017) 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/595904/EPRS_BRI(2017)595904_EN.pdf> accessed 
on 19 August 2020. 
1107 EU expert group on good governance, Recommendations on principles of good governance in sport, p.5  
1108 Action for Good Governance in International Sport (AGGIS), Jens Alm (eds),  Action for Good Governance in 
International Sport Organisations, (2013) p 6. 
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Therefore, they are accountable to the public and must disclose their inner workings, 
including financial reports and activities, for public scrutiny1109. Secondly, on the 
democratic process, while the high degree of autonomy allowed sport to function 
according to its own priorities and set of rules, the governing organisations mainly 
lacked the necessary internal democratic process resulting in lack of legitimacy1110. 
Therefore, democratic legitimacy can be achieved provided that the governing bodies 
and actors within the system complies with rules and norms inherent in a democratic 
grammar of conduct1111. Thirdly, the corner stone of a democratic system is the 
operation of checks and balances which limit and separate the powers of legislative, 
executive and judiciary in a state1112. Checks and balances within the sport sector is the 
main element to prevent a concentration of power and ensure robust, independent, and 
free from improper influence decision making1113. The final dimension to achieve good 
governance in sport is solidarity. Sport organisations are facing increasing high demand 
for socially, ethically, and environmentally responsible behaviour. Apart from their 
responsibility towards their stakeholders, sport organisations have a responsibility 
towards the public1114. Considering the sociocultural values and impact of sport, it has 
a massive impact on wider society and it is only fair for governing organisations to give 
something back to society since it relies heavily on public financial support and public 
funds on sport activities to build stadiums, infrastructure on public transport, public 
television contracts for competition, investments in training centres, security and traffic 
regulation during sport events1115. 
 
Likewise, Henry and Lee, suggests that transparency in procedures and decision-
making, particularly in resource allocation; accountability in relation to financial 
investors and other investors; democracy in access to representation in decision-making 
for those who make up the organisation’s internal constituencies; responsibility 
 
1109 Action for Good Governance in International Sport (AGGIS), Jens Alm (eds),  Action for Good Governance in 









regarding the sustainable development of the organisation and the sport; equity in 
treatment of constituencies, notably gender equity; effectiveness in establishing and 
monitoring of measures of effectiveness with measurable and attainable targets; and 
efficiency regarding the achievement of such goals with the most efficient use of 
resources possible are the important elements of good governance in sport1116. 
 
II.II. Good Governance in Sport under the Organisational Structures of the EU 
Traditionally, sport has exercised self-governance via self-organising 
interorganisational networks characterized by interdependence, resource exchange, 
rules of the game and noteworthy autonomy from the state without significant 
interference or challenge1117. In the last 20 years, sport has evolved dramatically. The 
commercialisation of the sport market has attracted the attention of the global capitalism 
and has exposed serious governance failures, organisational corruption, and match-
fixing within the organisation of sport1118. Media interest in sport has risen to new highs 
and the recent emergence of social media networks means sport is now subject to a 
greater and swifter level of scrutiny and public interest than ever before1119. In the past, 
while serious questions about the governance of sport surfaced in the public eye with 
irregular intervals, recently, accumulation of scandals in sport has increased greatly and 
shook the credibility of sport and its organisation threatening the public trust and the 
social importance of sport1120. The traditional system of hierarchical self-governance of 
sport authorities enjoyed for over a century faced serious pressure after the ECJ’s initial 
involvement in regulating sport in the Walrave judgment. Since then, the ECJ has 
challenged the legal autonomy of SGBs through the application of fundamental EU law 
provisions. After the Bosman judgment involvement of the EU to regulate sport, this 
 
1116 I Henry and PC Lee, ‘Governance and ethics in sport’, The Business of Sport Management, (Pearson 
Education, Harlow, 2004) p. 31. 
1117 European Commission, ‘Developing the European Dimension in Sport’ [2011] COM (2011) 12 final, p 3. 
1117 M Mrkonjic, Sport Organisations, Autonomy and Good Governance, Working Paper for Action for Good 
Governance in Internatinal Sport Organisations (AGGIS) Project, Danish Institute for Sport Studies, January 2013, 
p 133. 
1118 2002 Winter Olympic Bid Scandal in Salt Lake City. 
1119 Council of the European Union, ‘Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States’ (Meeting within the Council, on a European Union Work Plan for Sport) 2011–2014 (2011) OJ C. 
1120 Action for Good Governance in International Sport (AGGIS), Jens Alm (eds),  Action for Good Governance in 
International Sport Organisations, (2013) p2. 
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challenge has become certain1121. While after Walrave lobbying by SGBs ensured them 
that the EU institutions will respect their political autonomy1122, the past two decades 
demonstrated otherwise and as a condition for autonomy that the demand for good 
governance surfaced against the traditionally closed, self-governing network of the 
SGBs1123. While the EU has recognised the social and economic role of sport in the 
European society and that it has a specific nature, it did not provide an exemption from 
the application of the EU law to sport. In 2009, the EU acquired a degree of legal 
legitimacy in the steering of sport governance with incorporation of sport competence 
provision under Article 165 TFEU 1124.  
 
II.III. Good Governance Policy of EU as a Condition for Autonomy of Sport 
Historically, sports organisations have enjoyed considerable autonomy in regulating 
sport which safeguarded the inherent sporting values from external influence. This 
strongly defended autonomy by sports authorities  has increasingly been challenged 
under the organisational structures of the EU as demonstrated under this research. As a 
result, the autonomy of sport has been conditional on compliance with the EU law and 
policy. Conditional autonomy of sport under the EU law is established under the 
previous chapters. This chapter focuses on the conditional autonomy of sport under the 
EU policy. Under the EU policy, autonomy of sport is conditioned upon compliance 
with the EU guided good governance principles of  democracy, transparency, 
accountability in decision-making, and representative inclusiveness1125. Sport 
organisations have taken steps to improve their governance standards accordingly. 
While EU work plan reports suggest that much remains to be done1126, the EU’s action 
for good governance in sport, mainly in the form of recommendations and financial 
 
1121 Garcia, B, ‘From Regulation to Governance and Representation’, Entertainment and Sports law Journal, 5, 1. 
1122 R Parrish, Sports Law and Policy in the European Union (Manchester University Press 2003). 
1123 M Mrkonjic, Sport Organisations, Autonomy and Good Governance, Working Paper for Action for Good 
Governance in International Sport Organisations (AGGIS) Project, Danish Institute for Sport Studies, January 2013, 
p 133. 
1124 B Garcia, ‘Sport Governance After the White Paper: The Demise of the European Model?’ (2009) 3 (1) IJSPP 
267. 
1125 European Parliament, ‘Good Governance in Sport’ Briefing (January 2017) 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/595904/EPRS_BRI(2017)595904_EN.pdf> accessed 
on 19 August 2020. 
1126 Council of the European Union, ‘Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of 




support for specific initiatives, has delivered some concrete outcome such as producing 
a set of principles applicable to organisations across the whole sport movement1127. 
 
III. Supervised Conditional Autonomy of Sport under the EU Policy 
In the post-Bosman period, during the Helsinki Report1128, the Committee of the 
Regions referred to the concept of European Model of Sport to preserve the social 
function and the current structures of the organisation of sport in Europe. There was a 
need to formulate a comprehensive approach towards sport to answer challenges on 
sport, both at EU and Member States level, in compliance with the Treaty, especially 
with the principle of subsidiarity, and the autonomy of sport1129. Initially the statement 
of good governance in  sport was introduced in Europe’s first conference on the 
governance of sport in 2001 by the FIA1130. SGBs realised that good governance was an 
essential condition for sport to justify and claim its autonomy. The intention behind was 
to prevent outside intervention in sporting affairs1131. With this intention IOC’s Basic 
Universal Principles on Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement 2009, 
which was later incorporated in the IOC’s Code of Ethics, forms an integral part of the 
Olympic Charter1132. Moreover, the Olympic Agenda of 2020 launched in December 
2014 encourages acceptance and compliance with the good governance principles by all 
member organisations of the Olympic Movement and holds them accountable for 
undertaking regular self-evaluation on this matter1133.  
 
III.I. EU Competence for Taking Action to Achieve Good Governance in Sport  
Since Lisbon Treaty, the EU has a supporting competence in sport to carry out actions 
supporting, coordinating, or supplementing measures taken by the Member States1134. 
 
1127 European Parliament, ‘Good Governance in Sport’ Briefing (January 2017) 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/595904/EPRS_BRI(2017)595904_EN.pdf> accessed 
on 19 August 2020. 
1128 Commission of The European Communities, ‘The Helsinki Report on Sport’ COM(1999) 644 final. 
1129 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on "The European model of sport", CdR 37/99, 15.9.99. 
1130 H Smith, ‘Rules of the Game: Europe’s first conference on the Governance of Sport Conference Report and 
Conclusions’ (Brussels, 26 and 27 February 2001). 
1131 Ibid. 
1132   European Parliament, ‘Good Governance in Sport’ Briefing (January 2017) 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/595904/EPRS_BRI(2017)595904_EN.pdf> accessed 
on 19 August 2020. 
1133 Ibid. 
1134 Article 6 TFEU. 
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Nevertheless, the EU does not have a legislative power in the field of sport. Since Article 
165 TFEU expressly removes the possibility of  harmonisation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States, the policy tool available for the EU is limited to 
incentive measures and recommendations. Nevertheless, the EU has the power to 
regulate sport through its internal market powers. As initially established under 
Walrave1135, sport is subject to EU law, mainly free movement, and competition law 
provisions, if it constitutes an economic activity. Based on this, the ECJ and the 
Commission have increasingly been involved in solving disputes on sporting rules 
adopted by the SGBs. In certain cases, sporting rules had to be altered to comply with 
the EU law as demonstrated under the previous chapters of this research1136. 
 
III.II. Formal Supervision though Article 165 TFEU 
In 2007, the EU Commission White Paper had three main policy discussions on the 
social value, economic value, and the organisation of sport. Under the organisation of 
sport, good governance of sport was proposed as a condition for the autonomy of sport.  
Consequently, with the supervision initiated to be provided by the EU to European sport, 
the European model of sport was supervised to have a form of autonomy, under the 
organisational structures of the EU. This was an introduction of the supervised 
conditional autonomy status of sport in Europe. Following the White Paper on Sport, 
with the adoption of Article 165 TFEU, the EU institutions gained a power to coordinate 
or support the area of sport ideally to achieve uniformed governance.  With the 
articulation of Article 165 under the Lisbon Treaty, while the Union acquired a 
competence in the area it also gained the ability to obtain information through social 
dialogue and to supervise regulations for good governance to be implemented. This 
certainly helps to obtain reliable empirical evidence directly from the sport 
organisations on the difficulties with the internal workings of them. In addition, through 
Article 165, the Union supervises the governance choices  of sport to develop necessary 
regulations to achieve European standards of governance in sport. Article 165 granted 
a formal supervisory power to the EU to contribute towards the improvement of the 
 
1135 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405. 




European model of sport through obtaining recommendations and incentive measures 
helping sport to enjoy supervised conditional autonomy in Europe. For the last 45 years, 
through ECJ jurisprudence, the Union had an un-codified and informal supervisory role 
over sport to ensure that European model of sport complies with the EU law1137. Article 
165 TFEU did not have a radical effect on the EU’s powers in this effect. However, it 
did formalise the EU’s supervisory powers on the European model of sport. Since then, 
the European model of sport enjoys a supervised conditional autonomy under the 
organisational structures of the EU. Autonomy of sport’s current existence in the EU is 
on condition to accept supervision of the EU to apply good governance standards and 
comply with the EU law.  
 
After the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, Sport Directors in their first meeting concluded 
that the Treaty implied a change in the decision-making process in the field of sport 
with clearly defined roles for the different EU institutions1138. In 2008, the Parliament, 
while approving an annual budget to develop the European sporting dimension in sport, 
requested from the Commission to have due respect for the specificity of sports and to 
provide more legal certainty to supervise SGBs by creating clear guidelines on the 
applicability of European law to sports in Europe1139.  In 2011, the Council in the 
European Union Work Plan for Sport stated that the working methods and procedures 
should be formalized to supervise SGBs in the light of implementing Article 165 
TFEU1140. Further, the Council while promoting the achievements on sport through 
informal working structure prior to the Lisbon Treaty, emphasized the necessity to 
strengthen cooperation between the Member States and the Commission and ensure that 
all sport related activities in the EU should concentrate on the priority themes, actions 
and working methods listed in the Work Plan1141.  On the other hand, in 2010, the 
European Commission initiated a public consultation on the EU’s choices of 
 
1137 A Geeraert, A Rationalist Perspective on the Autonomy of International SGBs, International Journal of Sports 
policy and Politics, 2014, p 476 
1138 Spanish presidency 2010 presidency conclusions from the informal meeting of EU Sport Directors in Barcelona, 
25-26 February 2010. 
1139 European Parliament, ‘Parliament Resolution of 8 May 2008 on the White Paper on Sport’ (2007) INI/2007/2261. 
1140 Council of the European Union, ‘Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the 




implementation of Article 165 TFEU to obtain future proposals for effective 
supervision. This consultation is followed by the adoption of the first communication 
on sport; Developing the European Dimension in Sport. This communication approves 
the White Paper on Sport for facilitating the EU level cooperation and social dialogue 
in the area. On the other hand, the communication has proposals to strengthen the 
societal, economic, and organizational dimensions of sport1142. The Commission has 
stressed that they shall respect the autonomy of the sporting organisations as well as the 
competences of the Member States in sport1143.   The Commission has further distilled 
the approaches taken under the juridification of the ECJ and concluded that sport is 
considered special due to its certain characteristics and social importance and would 
enjoy a conditional autonomy on complying with the EU law.  To achieve compliance, 
the EU would provide supervision to the SGBs. In 2011, the specificity of sport has 
been defined under the Staff Working Document and explained its main characteristics 
as to be interdependence between competing adversaries, uncertainty as to result, 
freedom of internal organisation, and sport’s educational, public health, social, cultural 
and recreational functions1144. The European Commission has adopted a 
Communication on Developing the European Dimension in Sport in January 2011 while 
the European Union Sport Ministers approved European Union Work Plan on sporting 
practices for further supervision1145. 
 
In 2011, the Commission reaffirmed that good governance in sport is a condition for the 
autonomy of sport within the EU which facilitates sport to address challenges under the 
EU legal framework. To achieve good governance, sport should be within the limits of 
law, democracy, transparency and accountability in decision-making, and inclusiveness 
in the representation of interested stakeholders1146 through exchange of good practice 
and targeted support to specific initiatives1147. Further in 2013 the importance of good 
 
1142 European Commission, ‘Rapid press releases’ 2011, IP/11/43. 
1143 Ibid. 
1144 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Sport and Free Movement’ (Brussels, 18.1.2011) 
SEC(2011) 66 final  Staff Working Document < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011SC0066&from=EN> accessed on 04 February 2017. 
1145 European Commission, Developing the European Dimension in Sport [2011] COM (2011) 12 final p 7. 
1146 Ibid  p 10. 
1147 Ibid p 13. 
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governance principles and their implementation is repeated and declared that unless they 
are fulfilled as supervised, the conditional autonomy of sporting organisations will be 
threatened under the application of the legal framework of the EU1148. In 2016 the EU 
published the challenges they are facing while supervising the European model of sport 
to promote good governance under the organisational structures.1149 The EU emphasised 
that good governance is a prerequisite condition for the recognition of the autonomy of 
sport under the organisational structures of the EU1150. However, the progress made in 
supervising the European model of sport to achieve good governance was little and there 
was still much work to be done. There was a pressing need for continuous monitoring 
of how the principles of good governance in sport were being implemented and 
promoted1151. Meanwhile, the good governance principles needed to evolve to answer 
and confront changing challenges faced under the European model of sport1152. 
 
The promotion of good governance in sport is placed high on the EU sports policy 
agenda1153. EU Under the Work Plan for Sport 2011-2014, the EU opted for a 
concentrated definition for the EU standards of good governance in sport. The Expert 
Group on the good governance of sport defined good governance as the framework and 
culture within which a SGB sets policy, delivers its strategic objectives, engages with 
stakeholders, monitors performance, evaluates and manages risk and reports to its 
constituents on its activities and progress including the delivery of effective, sustainable 
 
1148 Expert Group Good Governance, ‘Deliverable 2: Principles of good governance in sport’ (European Commission, 
September 2013) <http://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/sport/library/policydocuments/xg-gg-201307-dlvrbl2-sept2013.pdf 
>   accessed 4 January 2019. 
1149 First, there have been a very low response rate by the sport organisations to the questionnaires they have published 
which created a challenge in measuring the implementation of the good governance principles suggested earlier. 
Consequently, the expert group has suggested complementary external monitoring or auditing and follow-up is 
recommended to ensure that the effect of any likely shortfalls is minimized. Secondly, there have been an 
administrative burden which could be associated with the implementation of good governance. Therefore, they have 
emphasized that Governments and public authorities could play an important role for the implementation and 
promotion of good governance in sport, with respect to autonomy of sport. 
1150Council of the European Union, ‘Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States’ (Meeting within the Council, of 21 May 2014 on the European Union Work Plan for Sport) 2014–
2017 (2014) OJ C 183/12 p 5.  
1151 Ibid  p 6. 
1152 Ibid  p 6. 
1153 European Parliament, ‘Good Governance in Sport’ Briefing (January 2017) 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/595904/EPRS_BRI(2017)595904_EN.pdf> accessed 
on 19 August 2020. 
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and proportionate sports policy and regulation1154. Good governance essentially 
comprises of a set of standards and operational practices leading to the effective 
regulation of sport while the application of good governance principles should facilitate 
the development and implementation of more effective sport regulation1155. 
 
Following the first work plan for 2011-2014, the Council supported a new framework 
to facilitate the improvement of sport policies in its second work plan for 2014-2017. In 
their resolution, the Council recognised three areas as main concerns for the EU. These 
are the integrity of sport, its economic dimension and the relationship between sport and 
society1156. Further, the Council established five ‘expert groups’ to deal with match-
fixing, good governance, the economic dimension of sport, health-enhancing physical 
activity (HEPA) and human resources development in sport1157. Moreover, the Council 
summoned the EU to ratify the Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions 
to prevent, detect, punish and discipline the manipulation of sports competitions, as well 
as enhancing the exchange of information and national and international cooperation 
between the public authorities concerned, and with sports organisations and sports 
betting operators1158.  
 
Recently,  the EU Ministers responsible for sport adopted the third work plan for sport 
supervision for 2017-2020. In the work plan, priority topics for the Commission and the 
Member States are set out as integrity of sport, the economic dimension of sport and 
sport and society. There are two expert groups on the integrity and skills and workforce 
development in sport, and new working methods such as cluster meetings shall be 
adopted. In addition. The Commission is invited to monitor the two expert groups on 
 
1154 Council of the European Union, ‘Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States’ (Meeting within the Council, on a European Union Work Plan for Sport) 2011–2014 (2011) OJ C p 
5. 
1155 Ibid 
1156 Council of the European Union, ‘Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States’ (Meeting within the Council, of 21 May 2014 on the European Union Work Plan for Sport) 2014–
2017 (2014) OJ C 183/12 p 5. 
1157 Ibid. 
1158 Council of Europe, ‘Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions’  
<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016801cdd7
e> accessed on 24 April 2017. 
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sport diplomacy and grassroots sport1159. In the third work plan for 2017-2020, after 
stressing the need for appropriate cooperation with the sport stakeholders inter alia 
through the structured dialogue, the Council outlined supervising objectives or further 
developing the European dimension in sport1160. Here, the governance of sport was 
identified as a priority of the EU under the Work Plan on the sports policy for 2017-
2020 apart from integrity of sport, support for grassroots sport, sport as a health 
enhancing activity, societal role of sport, and protection of property rights.  
 
Supporting good governance in sport and the recognition of the European model and its 
specificities is currently one of the fundamental aims of the EU under sport. To achieve 
these, first, the unique role of the organised sport structures and the benefits for various 
areas, such as the fight against physical inactivity, should be paid attention. Second, the 
European Sport Model and the specific nature of sport in Europe should be recognised 
and supported. A differentiation should be made between non-profit organisations and 
commercial providers of sport services. The final point is, with good governance being 
a pre-condition for the autonomy of sport, sport organisations welcome a detailed 
dialogue with the EU institutions to promote good governance. Therefore, the EU 
should acknowledge the ongoing developments in different sport organisations such as 
the International Olympic Committee, European Athletics and FIFA while supporting 
and encouraging them to the use of practical tools developed by the Olympic movement 
as a result of the implementation of Recommendations 28 on the autonomy of sport and 
27 on the good governance of Olympic agenda 2020 and the Support the 
Implementation of Good Governance in Sport (SIGGS) Project of the EOC EU 
Office1161. The general objective of the SIGGS project is to promote and support good 
governance in sport through providing practical guidance to National Olympic 
Committees (NOCs) and national sport federations (NFs) on the proper way to adopt 
 
1159 European Commission, <https://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/20170524-council-approves-new-work-plan-for-
sport_en> accessed on 25/06/2018,  
1160 Council of the European Union, ‘Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States’ (Meeting within the Council, on the European Union Work Plan for Sport (1 July 2017 - 31 
December 2020)) 8938/17 SPORT 33. 
1161 The House of European Sport, Priorities EU Sports policy 2017-2020, July 2017. 
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principles of good governance in to improve their governance1162.Certain values and 
traditions of the European model of sport should be promoted to ensure the proper 
functioning of the sporting activity. However, sport structures are diverse and complex. 
Therefore, it would be unrealistic to define a unified model of organisation of sport in 
Europe1163. Consequently, the reform process in sport is a challenging one. 
Nevertheless, if a SGB does not implement reforms, it risks losing not only its autonomy 
and reputation but also its most valuable sources of income. Conversely, through the 
EU supervision, by embracing good governance principles within the organisation, 
SGBs can create new opportunities to gain new revenues, new participants, and renewed 
standing in the community1164 while sustaining their long fought conditional autonomy. 
 
IV. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to define current EU policy on sport to discover under which 
circumstances organisational structures of the EU and the European model of sport 
could co-exist. In the chapter it is established that sporting practices do not operate in a 
vacuum but in a legal environment and they are, like any other body, subject to law1165. 
EU sports policy is currently formally supervising the European model of sport for it to 
achieve the EU standards of good governance. Conditional autonomy of sport under the 
EU law, which is demonstrated under the previous chapters of this thesis, is supervised 
through the EU policy on sport. Therefore, this research collectively concludes that 
currently the European model of sport enjoys supervised conditional autonomy under 
the organisational structures of the EU. The European model of sport and the 
organisational structures of the EU could only co-exist on dual condition that sport 
complies with the supervision of the EU to achieve good governance in sport while 
complying with the fundamental provisions of the EU law.  
  
 
1162 Support the Implementation of Good Governance in Sport (SIGGS) Project <https://www.siggs.eu/project> 
accessed on 23 July 2020. 
1163 Commission of the European Communities, ‘White Paper on Sport’ COM (2007) 391 final p 12. 
1164 Council of the European Union, ‘Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States’ (Meeting within the Council, of 21 May 2014 on the European Union Work Plan for Sport) 2014–
2017 (2014) OJ C 183/12 p 5.  
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DIVIDED ISLAND OF CYPRUS 
 
I. Introduction; II. The “Myth” of Sport Autonomy in Deeply Divided Regions; II.I 
Governance of Sport in Deeply Divided Regions; II.II Cyprus Issue; II.III TRNC: 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI); II.IV Current Status of Cyprus Issue; 
III. Sport in Cyprus; III.I The Myth of Sport Autonomy for Cyprus; III.II TRNC 
Model of Sport: Under the Shadows of the Cyprus Issue; III.III. Key Features of the 
TRNC Model of Sport; III.IV Organisation of the TRNC Model of Sport; IV. TRNC 
Model of Sport v European Model of Sport; V. Chapter Conclusion.  
 
I. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to discover the impact of the EU on the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) model of sport which exists under international isolation 
within the deeply divided European island of Cyprus.  This chapter explores the 
autonomy of sport in TRNC, the Cyprus issue, existence of the TRNC model of sport 
under international isolation and restrictions, the key features of the TRNC model of 
sport, and the differences between the European model of sport and TRNC model of 
sport. 
 
II. The “Myth” of Sport Autonomy in Deeply Divided Regions 
Sport is a persistent part of modern life and has the ability to affect societies all around 
the world in ways that traditional forms of diplomacy rarely can. In the last century, 
sport has become bigger, grander and more diverse than ever1166. The diffusion and 
redistribution of economic and political power is visible in international sport and its 
global media coverage.  Sport is a multi-billion dollar global business which is worth 
around $700 billion a year and it forms one per cent  of the world GDP1167. This precise 
 
1166 Ed Smith, ‘Has sport ever had it so good?’ (29 December 2015) 
<www.espncricinfo.com/magazine/content/story/956239.html> accessed on 2 March 2016. 
1167 KPMG, ‘The Business of Sport’ <https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/in/pdf/2016/09/the-business-of-
sports.pdf > accessed on 7 July 2020. 
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global reach of sport through mega sport events, such as the FIFA World Cup and the 
Olympic Games, is the main reason for it to appeal to actors seeking to use sport to 
achieve their diplomatic goals1168. Nevertheless, the role of sport in global diplomacy is 
underestimated and often disregarded1169. While it is commonly believed that sport and 
politics are distinct in nature, it has been stated that this is a “myth of autonomy” for 
sport and it does not stand up to scrutiny1170. Whether this preposition is true or false, 
sport deserves an understanding within the realm of diplomacy1171. National 
governments are the main actors seeking to use sport to achieve their diplomatic goals. 
They do not only share the visual imagery of the competitors but also they reach millions 
if not billions of people across the world though mega sport events. Through these 
events, states disseminate public diplomacy with an aim to conqure the hearts and minds 
of foreign audiences. This dissemination of public diplomacy through sport is on a 
grande scale and more persuasive than individually or nationally focused means1172. 
Due to its popularity, it has been used to promote a particular, often national, 
international image of the state1173. Apart from states, individuals have also prefered  
sporting events to stage a protest when traditional diplomacy fails to provide the grounds 
for change1174. 
 
The practice of diplomacy through sport represents the adoption of soft power to achieve 
public diplomacy and nation branding. While it is rarely linked with the global sport, 
the concept of soft power has received great scholarly attantion. Nye Jr. has argued that 
 
1168 J S Rofe, ‘Introduction: Establishing the Field of Play’ in J. Simon Rofe (eds) Sport and Diplomacy Games 
Within Games (Manchester University Press, 2018) p 1. 
1169 Ibid. 
1170 L Allison, The Politics of Sport (Manchester University Press 1986), 17–21.  
1171 J S Rofe, ‘Introduction: Establishing the Field of Play’ in J. Simon Rofe (eds) Sport and Diplomacy Games 
Within Games (Manchester University Press, 2018) p 1. 
1172 Ibid. 
1173 Ibid p 3. 
1174 Political protests have included John Carlos and Tommie Smith’s actions on the podium in 1968 at Mexico City 
supporting the American civil rights movement; teams from the National Basketball Association and Women’s 
National Basketball Association supporting Black Lives Matter and protesting the killings of unarmed African 
American citizens by law enforcement agencies in recent years; and the 2016 Olympic silver medallist Feyisa Lilesa 
making an X with his arms above his head as he crossed the marathon finish line to show his solidarity with his 
persecuted Oromo people in Ethiopia. The en masse African boycott of the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal 
contributed to the Gleneagles Agreement which ensured the sporting exclusion of apartheid states in Africa – and 
also that African states would participate in and not boycott the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton, Canada. 
Aviston D. Downes, ‘Forging Africa-Caribbean solidarity within the Commonwealth? Sport and diplomacy during 
the anti-apartheid campaign’, in Heather L. Dichter and Andrew Johns (eds), Diplomatic Games: Sport, Statecraft 
and International Relations since 1945 (University Press of Kentucky, 2014) p 117–49. 
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soft power of a state largely depends on three basic sources. These are its culture, where 
it is attractive to others, its political values, at home and abroad, and its foreign policies 
where it receives legitimacy1175. States and other actors across the world have used sport 
to reach their aims. In many cases states directly and indirectly use sport programmes 
for development and peace1176. Sport exchanges even at the most basic level, organised 
by individuals or states, have contributed to the winning of hearts and minds of people. 
On the other hand, withholding the opportunity to compete in global sport, often referred 
to as “boycott”,  or just the threat of such deprivation has been used by a variety of 
actors and states1177. Sport has been and still remains to be an integral part of 
diplomacy1178. 
 
II.I. Governance of Sport in Deeply Divided Regions 
Sport has been associated in both inter-state and intra-state conflicts, as demonstrated 
by the examples of the soccer war between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969 and the 
uprising between Dynamo Red Star Belgrade and Zagreb fans in Maksimir at Zagreb 
stadium in May 1990, where it has been identified as the symbolic begining of the 
violent dissolution of Yugoslavia1179. During intra-state conflicts, violence ruptures 
sport along linguistic, religious, national and ethnic lines1180. Nevertheless, sport is often 
seen as a tool of bringing people together and healing wounds in post-conflict societies. 
This is either facilitated through a traditional form or through more institutionalised 
“sport for development and peace” projects. These projects are undertaken by non-
governmental organisations mainly with the support of international organisations1181. 
 
1175 J S Nye, Jr, ‘Hard, soft, and smart power’, in A F Cooper, J Heine and R Thakur (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Modern Diplomacy (Oxford University Press, 2013) p 566. 
1176 J S Nye, Jr, ‘Public diplomacy and soft power’, (2008)  Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science Public Diplomacy in a Changing World, Vol. 616:94 p 108. 
1177 J S Rofe, ‘Introduction: Establishing the Field of Play’ in J. Simon Rofe (eds) Sport and Diplomacy Games 
Within Games (Manchester University Press, 2018) p 4. 
1178 Ibid, p 7. 
1179 See R Kapuściński, The Soccer War (Cambridge: Granta, 1990); A. L. Sack and Z. Suster, ‘Soccer and Croatian 
nationalism: a prelude to war’, Journal of Sport & Social Issues, 24:3 (2000); D. Brentin, ‘“A lofty battle for the 
nation”: the social roles of sport in Tudjman’s Croatia’, Sport in Society, 16:8 (2013) p 996. 
1180 J S Rofe, ‘Introduction: Establishing the Field of Play’ in J. Simon Rofe (eds) Sport and Diplomacy Games 




The institutional design of sport in deeply divided regions takes a form on a scale 
ranging between integration and accomodation1182. The integration approach disregards 
differences of people within the society, arguing that political instability and conflict 
arises as a result of group-based partisanship in political institutions1183 while rejecting 
the idea of ethnic difference reflecting into political differences1184. On the other hand, 
the accommodation approach advocates the recognition of more than one religious, 
ethnic, national and/or linguistic community in the society and promotes to maintain the 
coexistence of different communities within the society1185.  The accommodation 
approach accepts that in certain cases divisions of identities are resilient and political 
prudence and morality requires adaptation of the needs and fears of a people1186. 
Therefore, institutional design should aim to provide guarantees to these people based 
on their distinct identity1187.  
 
Sport, being a constitutive element of everyday life in popular culture, does not operate 
in a vacuum, immune from the effects of conflict in a region that are deeply divided 
along national, ethnic, religious or linguistic lines1188. In contrast with “sport for 
development and peace” projects undertaken by non-governmental organisations, sport 
highlights existing divisions1189. Sport in general, and football in particular, have 
demostrated to form significant grounds for national unity and mobilise nationalism1190. 
 
1182 J McGarry, B. O’Leary and R. Simeon, ‘Integration or accommodation? The enduring debate in conflict 
regulation’, in S. Choudhry (eds), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) p 45. To be strictly accurate, the end points of this scale are assimilation at the 
integration end and secession/partition at the accommodation end, though McGarry et al. consider these beyond the 
scope of their analysis, and in contemporary situations they are rarely employed (with some notable exceptions, such 
as Kosovo). 
1183 J McGarry, B. O’Leary and R. Simeon, ‘Integration or accommodation? The enduring debate in conflict 
regulation’, in S. Choudhry (eds), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) p 45. 
1184 S Choudhry, ‘Bridging comparative politics and comparative constitutional law: constitutional design in divided 
societies’, in Choudhry (eds), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies (Oxford University Press 2008) p 27. 
1185 J McGarry, B. O’Leary and R. Simeon, ‘Integration or accommodation? The enduring debate in conflict 
regulation’, in S. Choudhry (eds), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) p 52. 
1186 Ibid p 52–3. 
1187 J Simon Rofe, ‘Introduction: Establishing the Field of Play’ in J. Simon Rofe (eds) Sport and Diplomacy Games 
Within Games (Manchester University Press, 2018), p 15. 
1188 A Tomlinson, Sport and Leisure Cultures (University of Minnesota Press, 2005) p xiv. 
1189 J Hoberman, ‘The myth of sport as a peace-promoting political force’, SAIS Review of International Affairs, 
31:1 (2011); J. Coakley, Nationalism, Ethnicity, and the State: Making and Breaking Nations (Sage, 2012) p 131. 
1190 J Sugden and A. Tomlinson, FIFA and the Contest for World Football: Who Rules the People’s Game? 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1998) p 8. 
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Indeed, some state that sport is one of the most powerful platforms where national 
performance can take place1191. Nevertheless, while in deeply divided regions sport has 
been the subject of a few research, with little attention being paid to how sport is 
governed in such circumstances1192. 
 
II.II. Cyprus Issue 
The division of sport on the island of Cyprus has a history which dates back to 1950s. 
Profound  sporting competition actually involving both Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots ended in 1950s which is long before the formal and definite partition of the 
island in 19741193. Cyprus is a difficult and complex international political problem. It 
has a long history and remains unresolved today. Nevertheless, the dispute revolves 
around one central fact which is the existence of two distinct peoples on the island, the 
Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. Their language, culture, national origin, 
religion, history and aspirations are different. Hence, the issue of Cyprus is based on the 
issue of the relationship between these two people. Turkish Cypriot existence on the 
island dates to the conquest of Ottomans in 1571 and the Greek existence pre-dates this. 
Ottomans ruled the island until British colonisation in 1878. The British controlled the 
island until Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots received their right of self-
determination and independence from the colonisation and mutually agreed to establish 
the partnership of Republic of Cyprus in 1960.  
 
After the end of the Second World War, with the process of decolonization, the British 
terminated their colonial administrations and mandates in Pakistan, India, Transjordan 
and Palestine1194. In the mid-1950s, in colonial Cyprus, Greece and Greek Cypriots 
intensified their struggle for independence and the unification of the island with Greece 
 
1191 T Edensor, National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life (Oxford: Berg, 2002), cited in A. Bairner, 
‘Assessing the sociology of sport: on national identity and nationalism’, International Review for the Sociology of 
Sport, 50:4–5 (2015) p 376. 
1192 J S Rofe, ‘Introduction: Establishing the Field of Play’ in J S Rofe (eds) Sport and Diplomacy Games Within 
Games (Manchester University Press, 2018) p 16. 
1193 Ibid p 20. 




to achieve Enosis1195. The right to self-determination was the main argument of Greece 
and Greek Cypriots for independence from Britain. In 1952, the UN General Assembly 
invited Member States to promote the right of self-determination of people under 
resolution 637. This paved the way for the Greek Cypriots and Greece to have a 
legitimate demand for the liberation of Cyprus from the colonial rule of Britain1196. In 
1956, Lord Radcliffe, who was a British expert preparing the constitution, suggested a 
form of diarchy which required a sensitive balance between the numerical minority, 
where political will had to be safeguarded, and, the numerical majority, where the 
political will of the minority would not be allowed to impose its will on the majority1197. 
This was a “narrow jacket” for the internal dynamics of the island1198. Nevertheless, 
Lord Radcliff reserved the option of partition should the two communities of the island 
be unsatisfied with the constitutional order prepared by him1199. The British 
Government was very well aware of the fact that dual right of self-determination, where 
each community had the right to exercise it independently, would eventually necessitate 
partition as a strong option where two ethnic communities, Turkish and Greek, prevailed 
on the island1200. Nevertheless, the British were reluctant to couple the right of self-
determination with the option of partition which would possibly agitate the Irish 
secessionism in the UK1201. On the other hand, the possibility of partition of the island, 
between the two major communities, gave London a good card to play against the 
Greeks to discourage them in demanding Enosis1202. Hence, the British cabinet did not 
offer Turkish and Greek partition as its ideal option, but as a premature and unrealistic 
alternative to the Cyprus issue1203. The 1960 independence constitution of Cyprus was 
 
1195 P J Vatikiotis, ‘Between Arabism and Islam’, (1986) Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 22, No. 4  p 576–586, p 579–
580). 
1196 S G Xydis, Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958 (Ohio State University Press, 1967) p 8–9. 
1197 Cyprus ‘Constitutional proposals for Cyprus, Cover note’, Memo by SSC, 16 November 1956, CP (56) 264, TNA 
– CAB 129/84 https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1956/dec/19/cyprus-lord-radcliffes-proposals 
accessed on 4 April 2021. 
1198 Ibid. 
1199 United Kingdom, HC Deb., vol 562 cc1267-79 (19 December 1956) Cyprus (Lord Radcliffe’s Proposals). 
<https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1956/dec/19/cyprus-lord-radcliffesproposals>  accessed on 4 
April 2021. 
1200 ‘Cyprus’, Memo by SSC, 26 November 1956, CA (56) 33, TNA – CAB 129/84. 
1201 11 December 1956, CM (56) 98, minute 1, p.3, TNA – CAB 128/30. 
1202 12 December 1956, CM (56) 99, minute 2, pp.3–4, TNA – CAB 128/30. 
1203 17 December 1956, CM (56) 102, minute 1, p.4, TNA – CAB 128/30. 
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established based on the equal status of both sides, and none of the sides had superiority 
over the other1204.  
 
The separationist approach between the two communities of the island has long been 
deeply rooted within the social and cultural structure of Cyprus. Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots have had detrimental differences in their religion, language, culture, ethnic 
origin and alliance with mother countries of Turkey and Greece1205. Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot identities are based on national memories contained in the history of Greece 
and Turkey, more specifically dating back to the independence of Greece from the 
Ottoman Empire in 18211206. Both peoples of Cyprus have celebrated, and still 
celebrate, the national holidays of their respective mother country, raising Greek or 
Turkish flags while adhering to each other as traditional rivals1207. This sets the scene 
to understand the lack of people’s raison d’etre where there was no sense of belonging 
and nationhood, underlining the main reason behind the failure of the bi-communal 
constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus in 1963, only three years after its 
establishment1208.  
 
On 30th November 1963, Greek Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios, sought to 
amend 13 clauses of the constitution ensuring equal rights of the two establishing 
partners of the “Republic of Cyprus” and to remove constitutional guarantees1209. The 
Turkish Cypriots objected and the Greek Cypriots by force of violence1210, invaded the 
partnership Government. As a result, a UN peacekeeping force was positioned on the 
island to stop the violence by separating the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. At this point, 
the international community engaged with the Cyprus issue for the first time1211. Since 
then, the “Republic of Cyprus” is a de facto partitioned state under the sole control of 
 
1204 1960 Republic of Cyprus Constitution Establishment Treaties, original. 
1205 N Crawshaw, The Cypriot Revolt  ( London, George Allen and Unwin 1978). 
1206 C Hitchens Cyprus (London, Quarted Books 1984) p 151. 
1207 V D Volkan, Cyprus: War and Adaptation. A Psycoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict 
(Charlottesville, VA, University Press of Virginia 1979); P Lozios, ‘Intercommunal Killing in Cyprus Man’ (1988) 
23(4), 639-653 p 645. 
1208 P Oberling, The Road to Bellapais (New York, Colombia University Press 1982). 
1209 Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus, 13 Points (30 November 1963) 
<https://www.pio.gov.cy/assets/pdf/cyproblem/13%20points.pdf>  accessed on 9 August 2021.  
1210 H S Gibbons, The Genocide Files (Charles Bravos 1997). 
1211 UNSC Resolution 186, 1964. 
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the Greek Cypriots1212. In a very short time, the island converted into ethnically and 
administratively divided structure between the two peoples. The talks between the two 
peoples of the island started in 1968 under the auspices of the UN and until now all the 
plans to resolve the conflict failed. Inter-communal violence took place between 1963-
1974, to the detriment of the Turkish Cypriots1213. Extreme Greek Cypriot nationalists 
invaded the unlawfully converted Greek Cypriot Government on the 15th of July 1974 
for Enosis to unite the island with Greece. Turkey interfered on the 20th of July 1974 
with its rights secured under the Treaty of Guarantee to ensure the non-alignment of the 
island and to protect the island’s independence during a threat of Enosis. Since then, 
Cyprus is a bi-zonal island, with borders, Greek Cypriots living in the south, under the 
still disputed “Republic of Cyprus”, which is a sole Greek Cypriot Government, and 
Turkish Cypriots living in the north of the island, under the unilaterally declared State 
of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is a sole Turkish Cypriot Government. 
Cyprus is an example of communal partition which was not partitioned once but actually 
twice. The first partition was the outcome of 1963 coup d’état of the constitutional order 
by the Greek Cypriot side. This was not a stable partition, where it resulted in an intense 
security dilemma1214. The second partition was the outcome of 15 July 1974 coup d’état 
ended with the military interference of Turkey1215. 250,000 people from both 
communities, constituting forty per cent of the island population, became refugees and 
this action separated the two parties of the island completely1216. Since then, Greek 
Cypriots live in the South of the island under the administration of the “Republic of 
Cyprus” and Turkish Cypriots live in the North of the island under the TRNC 
administration1217. The Cyprus issue started as an intra-state conflict and evolved into 




1212 N Kliot and Y Mansfield, ‘The Political Landscape of Partition: The Case of Cyprus’ (1997) Vol.16, No.6, 495-
521 p 497. 
1213 C Kaufmann, ‘An Assessment of the Partition of Cyprus’ (2007) International Studies Perspective, Vol.8, 206-
223 p 206. 
1214 Ibid p 207. 
1215 Ibid. 
1216 Ibid. 
1217 D Isachenko, ‘The Production of Recognized Space: Statebuilding Practices of Northern Cyprus and 
Transdniestria’ (2008) Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol 2 No.3, 353-368 p 356. 
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II.III. TRNC: Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) 
Traditionally, the international community has refused to accept unilateral declarations 
of independence of states. Secessionist states, out of necessity or not, by their nature, 
which falls apart from the established international order, are not tolerated to avoid 
opening the flood gates for partition in other states with ethnic diversity. Having been 
established without the consent of the recognised state is the main reason for not being 
regarded as a recognised state1218. Consequently, de facto states, which have unilaterally 
declared independence, could not become a member of the United Nations and have 
been stigmatised1219.  Nevertheless, there is no common treatment towards the de facto 
states where some enjoy a high degree of international interaction with the UN Member 
States while not being recognised officially. Systematic factors, contextual factors and 
national factors affect the stigma attached to them1220. More importantly, the stigma 
attached to de facto states can change in time depending on the international political 
circumstances and consequently, the degree of engagement with the de facto state can 
change1221. Therefore, a recognised state can easily justify its intention on interaction or 
no interaction with a de facto state based on the notion of engagement without 
recognition1222. 
 
TRNC is established by a unilateral declaration of independence and the international 
community has expressly refused to recognise it. In 1983, UN Security Council 
condemned its unilateral declaration of independence, classified it as a secessionist 
action and called upon all states not to recognise or assist TRNC1223. Besides, the UN 
called upon all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-alignment 
of the “Republic of Cyprus”1224. TRNC has been recognised by Turkey and exchanged 
ambassadors while the UN Security Council declared this illegal and invalid and called 
for their immediate withdrawal to no avail1225. Since then, TRNC is under political, 
 
1218 J K Lindsay, The Stigmatisation of de facto States: Disapproval and ‘Engagement without Recognition’ (2018) 




1222 Ibid p 363. 
1223 UNSC Resolution 541, 1983 and UNSC Resolution 550, 1983. 
1224 UNSC Resolution 541, 1983 and UNSC Resolution 550, 1983 
1225 UNSC Resolution 541, 1983 and UNSC Resolution 550, 1983. 
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economic, social and cultural isolation by practice. While direct flights to and direct 
trade with TRNC are withheld by the “Republic of Cyprus”, sport is also under isolation 
in TRNC depriving the right of sport, youth development and participation in 
international sporting activities and competitions.  
 
II.IV. Current Status of Cyprus Issue 
International recognition of the “Republic of Cyprus” as the sole authority over the 
island constitutes an impediment in the way of TRNC model of sport. This impediment 
denies the right of sport as well as sport development and interaction with the 
international community to Turkish Cypriot people. The Cyprus issue has been on the 
agenda of the UN since 1968. During these years, numerous settlement proposals have 
been drafted by the UN. However, non of these yieled any results due to the Greek 
Cypriots unwillingness to share the power and prosperity of the island based on equity 
with Turkish Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriots not willing to give up on their inherent 
right of equal status. Therefore, the two States of the island still inhabite major 
difficulties where the TRNC is a non-recognised de facto State and the “Republic of 
Cyprus” is under Greek Cypriot administration having an agenda within the UN. 
Recently, under the Cyprus conference hosted by the UNSG in Geneva, the Turkish side 
proposed a settelement consisting of the cooperation of two States of the island based 
on sovereign equality and equal international status to achive a realistic, just and 
sustainable settlement ensuring peace and stability not only for Cyprus but for the 
region1226. 
 
III. Sport in Cyprus 
Communal sporting division in Cyprus pre-dates the political and physical division of 
the island1227. In 1930s seven Greek Cypriot teams together with one Turkish Cypriot 
team, Çetinkaya, founded Cyprus Football Association (CFA) which has become a 
 
1226 Turkish Cypriot Proposal for Sustainable Settlement, 28 April 2021 Proposal made by the Turkish Cypriot side 
during the 5+UN Informal Meeting at Gevena between 27-29 April 2021. 
1227 N L Kartakoullis and C Loizou, ‘Is sport (football) a unifying force or a vehicle to further separation? The case 
of Cyprus’ (2009) International Journal of the History of Sport, 26:11 (2009) p 1656–7. 
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member of FIFA in 1948. Çetinkaya won 1951-1952 CFA championship1228 while the 
last match held between Çetinkaya  and a Greek Cypriot team, Pezoporikos, was in the 
spring  of 19551229. During those days, Greek Cypriots intensified anti-colonial and 
nationalistic movements towards British and Turkish Cypriot teams were no longer 
allowed to play in Greek football stadia1230. Since then, Turkish Cypriot football teams 
did not compete in competitions organised by CFA1231.  Greek Cypriots prevented 
Turkish Cypriot participation in competitions justified on the grounds of “maintaining 
good community relations” during the Greek Cypriot anti-colonialist struggle initially 
towards British1232. Withholding the opportunity to participate in sporting competitions 
by the Greek Cypriots towards Turkish Cypriots was claimed to be temporary but ended 
up being permanent.  Consequently, Turkish Cypriot teams established their own 
football federation, the “Kıbrıs Türk Futbol Federasyonu” (Cyprus Turkish Football 
Association (CTFA)) in October 1955 out of necessity. After its establishment, CTFA 
requested to become a member of FIFA and UEFA but never received a  membership. 
FIFA and UEFA opted to recognise CFA, which soley represents Greek Cypriot 
football, as the legitimate Cypriot football federation, and failed to acknowledge the 
existence of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot football on the island. Nevertheless, 
under a  special agreement, Turkish Cypriot teams were able to play friendly matches 
with foreign teams until the unilateral declaration of independence of the TRNC1233. 
With the declaration of TRNC as an inependent State in 1983, CTFA was placed under 




1228 N Lekakis, ‘Can football loosen the “Gordian Knot” in Cyprus?’ (2015) International Journal of Sport Policy and 
Politics, 7:2 255 p 265. 
1229 Y N Yashin,  ‘De-ethnicizing the Ethnography of Cyprus: Political and Social Conflict Between Turkish-Cypriots 
and Settlers from Turkey’ (eds), Divided Cyprus: Modernity and an Island in Conflict Y. Papadakis, N. Peristianisand 
G. Welz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2006) p 84–99. 
1230 N Lekakis, ‘Can football loosen the “Gordian Knot” in Cyprus?’ (2015) International Journal of Sport Policy and 
Politics, 7:2 255 p 265. 
1231 N L Kartakoullis and C Loizou, ‘Is sport (football) a unifying force or a vehicle to further separation? The case 
of Cyprus’ (2009) International Journal of the History of Sport, 26:11 (2009) p 1656–7. 
1232 Ibid.  
1233 N Lekakis, ‘Can football loosen the “Gordian Knot” in Cyprus?’ (2015) International Journal of Sport Policy and 
Politics, 7:2 255 p 266. 
1234 Ibid.  FIFA 2019 statues No 11 Admission: ‘Any association which is responsible for organising and supervising 
football in all of its forms in its country may become a member association.  In this context, the expression ”country” 
shall refer to an independent state recognised by the international community.’) 
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At the begining of the 2000s, significant attempts were made to settle the Cyprus issue 
through the United Nations-led negotiations. These negotiations resulted in a proposed 
plan, known as the Annan Plan, to settle the dispute. The plan went through a few 
revisions before being put to a referendum in April 2004. During the public vote, 65 per 
cent of Turkish Cypriots approved the plan, but 76 per cent of Greek Cypriot rejected 
it1235. The Annan Plan would have established a constitutional structure for Cyprus, 
based on the principles of federalism and consociationalism, but it was not ratified1236. 
Nevertheless, shortly after the referendum, attempts were made to unify the organisation 
of Cyprus football. Following the Greek Cypriot vote against the Annan Plan, the CTFA 
made another attempt to join FIFA. During the meetings between the Turkish Cypriots 
and FIFA officials, ways to re-organise Cyprus football were addressed. Turkish 
Cypriot officials were seeking cooperation between the two sides football federations 
while Greek Cypriot officials were seeking to implement CTFA under the CFA. 
Consequently, the attempt failed with no progress towards CTFA’s sporting rights, 
representing the miniature of the Cyprus conflict but in a different context, in sport1237. 
In 2007, FIFA hosted negotiations between CFA and CTFA in an effort to help Turkish 
Cypriots end their isolation. However, it was made clear to the CTFA that their isolation 
could only come to an end if it became a CFA member1238. This would mean accepting 
the authority of CFA over CTFA. While the economic benefits for CTFA to join the 
CFA umbrella were tempting, this would indirectly mean accepting the ‘hegemonic’ 
power of the Greek Cypriots as a sole legitimate authority on the island. CTFA could 
not have been a patch to CFA since Turkish Cypriot institutions cannot be placed under 
Greek Cypriot institutions1239. On the other hand, CFA had to negotiate the matter to 
avoid the looming risk of CTFA’s international recognition1240. Under these realities, 
similar initiatives were doomed to fail.  
 
1235 C Christophorou, ‘South European briefing: the vote for a united Cyprus deepens divisions: the 24 April 2004 
referenda in Cyprus’ (2005) South European Society and Politics, 10:1.  
1236 J S Rofe, ‘Introduction: Establishing the Field of Play’ in J. Simon Rofe (eds) Sport and Diplomacy Games 
Within Games (Manchester University Press, 2018) p 1. 
1237 N L Kartakoullis and C Loizou, ‘Is sport (football) a unifying force or a vehicle to further separation? The case 
of Cyprus’ (2009) International Journal of the History of Sport, 26:11 (2009) p 1657–8. 
1238 N Lekakis, ‘Can football loosen the “Gordian Knot” in Cyprus?’ (2015) International Journal of Sport Policy and 
Politics, 7:2 255 p 266. 
1239 M A Talat, Kıbrıs Gazetesi (14 January 2009). 
1240 N Lekakis, ‘Can football loosen the “Gordian Knot” in Cyprus?’ (2015) International Journal of Sport Policy and 




A ‘new’ football initiative surfaced in December 2012/January 2013 and October 2013 
with the change in general political and economic conditions, and the relative position 
of the two communities in international organisations1241. In early 2013, the Greek 
Cypriots elected a new president who was a strong supporter of the Annan Plan and had 
to deal with both the country’s present economic crisis and the Cyprus problem which 
had not been abandoned by the UN. Most importantly, the Greek Cypriots were, and 
still are, struggling to ascertain their hydrocarbon rights in the Mediterranean in order 
to finance their economic crisis problem. The large natural gas reserves that were 
discovered within Cyprus’s territorial boundaries constitute now an incentive for 
settling the Cyprus dispute and sharing the wealth between the two parties of the 
island1242.  Within this environment, FIFA-facilitated further talks between the parties. 
In November 2013, the CFA and the CTFA agreed on a provisional agreement which 
would eventualy result in unifying football governance on the island by the CTFA 
becoming a member of the CFA1243. This proposal, again, attracted criticisms from both 
the Turkish and Greek Cypriot politicians1244. Moreover, this proposal would have 
impared the independence and equality between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the 
island.  Recent past conflict history of Cyprus, which has started as an intra-state conflict 
and eventually evolved into inter-state dispute, does not provide the right climate to 
have a unified representation due to the ethnic, religion, national and language barriers. 
Nevertheless, Turkish Cypriots are not against a cooperation between the two 
associations as equal entities. The need to achieve stability within the region due to 
hydrocarbon could possibly facilitate cooperation between the two sides of the island. 
Regarding Cyprus sport, estbalishing a new sport confederation with the involvement 
 
1241 Ibid 268. 
1242 N Lekakis, ‘Can football loosen the “Gordian Knot” in Cyprus?’ (2015) International Journal of Sport Policy and 
Politics, 7:2 255 p 269. 
1243 FIFA, ‘Cyprus Football Association and Cyprus Turkish Football Association sign landmark arrangement’ 
(Zurich: Fédération Internationale de Football Association, 5 November 2013) 
<www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2013/m=11/ news=cyprus-football-association-and-cyprus-turkish-football-
associationsign-2218369.html>  accessed on 27 May 2015. 
1244 A Warshaw, ‘CFA votes in favour of next steps to Cypriot football’s reunification’, Inside World Football, 25 
November 2013, < www.insideworldfootball.com/ world-football/europe/13673-cfa-votes-in-favour-of-next-steps-
to-cypriot-football-sreunification>  accessed on 7 December 2015. 
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of both CFA and CTFA based on their equal status could be a miniature trial paving the 
way for a settlement in Cyprus.   
 
At the moment, Turkish Cypriot football remains isolated internationally1245. This 
political isolation interferes with the right of sport and the autonomy of sport which 
needs to be independent from the political power. CTFA’s international isolation 
represents the international isolation of Turkish Cypriot football under the TRNC. This 
represents that in a conflict zone, the autonomy of sport is not respected but sport is used 
as a tool by the powerful State to achieve its political aims through the desperation of 
the less powerful State.  Consequently, it is not wrong to claim that this situation could 
represent an example of interference of politics with sporting autonomy. Therefore,  
sport enjoys autonomy or conditional autonomy only in conflict free regions of the 
world where politics are not bothered to achieve their aims through sport diplomacy.  
This area is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, further research is necessary to 
enlighten whether sport “boycott” is adopted as a soft power by the recognised State, 
the “Republic of Cyprus” to achieve its political aims over Turkish Cypriots interfering 
with the autonomy of sport. 
 
III.I. The Myth of Sport Autonomy for Cyprus 
Cyprus is a member of the EU. However, due to political difficulties present between 
the two States of the Island, EU law applies in the South under the administration of the 
“Republic of Cyprus” while it is suspended in the North under the administration of 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) until a settlement is reached between the 
two parties of the island. Meanwhile, TRNC is only recognised by Turkey and it is not 
politically recognised by the rest of the international community. Moreover, TRNC is 
under economic isolations due to the “Republic of Cyprus” practices. This has a direct 
effect on TRNC sport withholding the right to engage in international sporting activities 
and affiliation with regional and international federations. On the domestic scale, this 
situation has a significant negative effect on the development of youth as well as the 
 
1245 N L Kartakoullis and C Loizou, ‘Is sport (football) a unifying force or a vehicle to further separation? The case 
of Cyprus’ (2009) International Journal of the History of Sport, 26:11 (2009) p 1657. 
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athletes who are not even allowed to play friendly matches with international clubs. 
However, more importantly, on the global scale, this represents direct interference of 
politics with the autonomy of sport by a state to achieve political desires through sport 
“boycotts”. These practices contribute to yield the equilibrium towards the “myth” or 
no existence of autonomy of sport for TRNC. Nevertheless, at the domestic scale, the 
autonomy of sport is worth to be analysed through identifying the key features of the 
TRNC model of sport.  
 
III.II. TRNC Model of Sport: Under the Shadows of the Cyprus Issue  
The TRNC model of sport evolved under tough international isolation and grew apart 
from the European model of sport. The EU regulates sectors carrying out economic 
activity and affecting cross border trade within the internal market and sport is not 
exempted from the application of EU law. Nevertheless, as has been discussed 
elsewhere in this thesis, the specificity and autonomy of sport is recognised, while 
defining the boundaries of the European model of sport and EU law has not been easy. 
This thesis has demonstrated that the organisational structures of the EU and the 
European model of sport can co-exist on dual condition of complying with the 
fundamental provisions of EU law and accepting the supervision of the EU. Therefore, 
sport enjoys supervised conditional autonomy under the organisational structures of the 
EU. On the contrary, in general, sport does not enjoy autonomy in Cyprus where 
political aims of a stronger party have prevailed over the inferior due to lack of 
international recognition. 
 
III.III. Key Features of the TRNC Model of Sport  
The TRNC model of sport does not have a pyramidal structure and it operates 
independently from the international regulatory regimes due to the non-recognition of 
the State. TRNC sport federations are founded under Cyprus Sport Office Directorate 
within the Deputy Prime Ministry and Economy and Energy Ministry. There are 33 
national sport federations registered under the Office, one federation for each sport. This 
sporting rule is expressly established under the Physical Education and Sport Act of the 
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TRNC Parliament1246. The legislation also expressly requires complience with 
international lex sportiva in all sporting activities in TRNC1247. Sport federations and 
sport clubs are established and governed according to the acts of Parliament1248. Sport 
clubs, as well as federations, are estbalished as non-profit associations. Each federation 
has its own set of rules responsible for promoting, establishing the laws of the game, 
ensuring uniformity and regulating the sport while imposing certain requirements to be 
fulfilled by the member clubs. Each federation is responsible for organising 
competitions under various league structures depending on the merits of each club. 
Federations decide which club will be participating in which league yearly, based on 
the merits and the points received by each club. This selection is transparently made by 
each federation. The TRNC model of sport consists of solely amateur sport. Sport is 
only enjoyed at an amateur level because development of professional sport has not 
been possible due to international isolation and restrictions placed on the TRNC.  
 
The TRNC model of sport does have a three compartment pyramid structure where the 
Sport Office of the Government sits at the top, national federations in the middle and 
clubs and amateur atheletes at the bottom. The pyramid has no room to grow, develop 
and interact with the international federations due to the non-recognition of the State. 
Nevertheless, locally developed federations1249 have created an internal pyramidal 
structure. Under this structure, various leagues of competition have been created where 
clubs are placed yearly based on their merits. These league structures are based on 
promotion and relegation. They have an open league structure where at the end of each 
season, successful clubs are promoted and unsuccesful clubs are relegated to lower 
leagues. This structure demonstrates interdependence between different league levels 
on the competitive sides since competitions are organised on all league levels. This 
system, while rewarding merit, also promotes equality of opportunity and balance of 
competition amongst the competing teams. This creates a formal link between all the 
clubs registred under the federations. 
 
1246 Clause 13, Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1247 Clause 12, Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1248 Mainly Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 and specifically with each Federations Regulations approved 
by the Government. 




Even though at the top of the pyramid sits the Sports Office of the Government, each 
federation has an extensive authority to regulate their discipline. Based on the fact that 
these federations are established under the Sports Office and they are non-profit 
organisations, while promoting, regulating and guaranteeing uniform rules for their 
sport, they are not commercial actors with economic interests. Under the TRNC model 
of sport, federations are only acting as the regulatory bodies. Therefore, eventhough one 
federation for each sport might have created a monopolistic structure, non-profit 
organisation characteristic of sport in TRNC leaves no room for intermingling of 
regulatory and commercial powers which would yield inherent abuse of dominant 
position at the detriment of the inferior party.  
 
Nevertheless, the TRNC model of sport cannot delegate any duty to international bodies 
due to the non-recognition of the State. However, under each federation, there are 
various boards responsible for arbitration, anti-doping, ethical matters and dispute 
resolution. Therefore, the clubs and athletes are subject to the rules and regulations of 
the federations and federations are subject to the Sport Office of the Government 
established under the Acts of Parliament requring complience with lex sportiva. Each 
federation has a separate arbitration body and anti-doping agencies. Consequently, 
WADA and CAS have no direct impact on the TRNC model of sport. Nevertheless, 
arbitration and anti-doping rules of each federation are in compliance with the rules and 
principles set under the international lex sportiva but applied locally. Until now, all the 
sport disputes which arose in the TRNC have been handled by the relevant federation’s 
arbitration body and none have been to the courts. On the other hand, the TRNC 
constitution and laws do not allow the denial of the right to have a fair hearing at the 
courts should any of the parties are not happy with the arbitration process or its decision 
and prefers litigation. 
 
III.IV. Organisation of the TRNC Model of Sport  
The organisation of sport in the TRNC is led by the Government. The Physical 
Education and Sport Act establishes that physical education and sport are placed under 
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the authority of the related Ministry for auditing and ensuring compliance with the 
Act1250. SGBs are required to obtain permission from the Ministry1251. Failure to obtain 
permission may result in closure1252. Within this organisation, while the Government 
establishes the framework, SGBs closely cooperate with the Ministry to fill in the 
blanks1253. Sport federations are responsible for organising sporting activities amongst 
its members1254. Federations are established under the Act as non-profit organisations 
participating under only one specific area of sport1255. Each federation commences 
operation once its regulation is adopted and published in the Official Gazette1256. There 
can only be one federation for each sport and establishing alternative federation for the 
same sport is expressly not prohibited under the law1257. Provided that a federation 
fulfils all the requirements of the Act, it can be registered under the Ministry and 
officially be approved by the Government to operate1258. Federations are entitled to 
regulate, organise, promote, develop and teach their sport in line with international 
sporting rules and regulations, lex sportiva, while representing the state internally or 
externally1259. The President of each federation should be impartial and cannot be a 
member of any club during his term1260. Institutions of the federations and board 
members are served voluntarily without remuneration1261. Federations are under a strict 
duty to exhibit its financial statements and bookkeeping by the end of March and request 
monetary aid, if needed, by the end of August annually to the Ministry. On the other 
hand, sport clubs are established under the Associations Act1262 as non-profit 
associations and they cannot be privately owned1263. Clubs are required to become a 
member of one of the established federations and approved by the Ministry1264. Clubs 
 
1250 Clause 10(1), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1251 Clause 10(2), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1252 Clause 10(2)(D), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1253 Clause 11(1), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1254 Clause 11(2), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1255 Clause 12(1), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1256 Clause 13(1), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1257 Clause 13(2), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1258 Clause 14(1), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1259 Clause 12(2), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1260 Clause 12(5), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1261 Clause 15(4), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1262 Associations Act 23/2016 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1263 Clause 19(1), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1264 Clause 19(2-3), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
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are under a duty to exhibit its financial statements, operations and activities yearly at 
the General Assembly and file it with the Government District Office1265. 
 
Sport betting is allowed under the TRNC model of sport. However, all sorts of sports 
betting are organised by the Ministry as regulated under the Physical Education and 
Sport Act1266. Moreover, sport funds are available under the Ministry and the Ministry 
can only use these funds to help and promote sport. These include providing economic 
support to federations and clubs, developing, constructing or maintaining infrastructure, 
supplying equipment, supporting training and courses1267. In addition, sponsorship is 
allowed, and it is regulated under the Act to promote athlete development and training. 
Athlete licences are issued by the relevant federation, and in absence of a federation, by 
the Sport Office of the Ministry1268. Athletes without a valid licence cannot participate 
in any events organised by the federations1269. Moreover, athletes with a valid licence 
can only participate in alternative events, not organised by the federation, with 
permission1270. Transfers of players are regulated by the regulations of the federations. 
However, the Act prohibits the prevention of the transfer of licenced players after a 
certain age or experience1271. Athletes are entitled to complain against the rules and 
regulations of the federations through arbitration1272. Moreover, the right to have a fair 
hearing through litigation at the district courts is permitted and cannot be prohibited by 
the federations1273.  Sport is not undertaken professionally in TRNC. As a result, athletes 
and players are not professionals and they are not full time employed by the SGBs. 
Nevertheless, the Act provides the base for athletes and sport persons to be released 
mandatorily to participate in events considered necessary by the Ministry where 
remuneration for service and health insurance is covered by the Ministry1274.  
 
 
1265 Clause 19, 21 Associations Act 23/2016 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1266 Clause 26, Associations Act 23/2016 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1267 Clause 27, Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1268 Clause 31(1), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1269 Clause 31(3), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1270 Clause 31(5), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1271 Clause 32(1-2), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1272 Clause 36, Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1273 Clause 36, Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
1274 Clause 37(1-2), Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
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The Cyprus issue is sui generis and a long-standing problem. As a result, the TRNC 
model of sport is a sui generis model which has adapted to the political environment 
and realities of the ground. It has fundamental differences with the European model of 
sport. The TRNC model of sport is a government led model which is regulated with the 
acts of Parliament and is under international isolation. Nevertheless, fundamental sport 
legislation1275 of the Government expressly acknowledges and promotes the lex 
sportiva. This provides internal autonomy to sport under the TRNC model of sport while 
respecting and protecting specificity of sport.  
 
IV. TRNC Model of Sport v. European Model of Sport  
In the TRNC, sport has since been regarded as a leisure activity and undertaken only 
amateurly which has not yielded into commercially profitable market. Federations and 
clubs are established under the laws of TRNC as non-profit associations. These 
associations have absolute autonomy to regulate sport based on the specificity of each 
sport. There has not been a single case where TRNC model of sport is challenged in the 
TRNC courts. The TRNC model of sport is based on amateurly played leisure activity 
where it could not provide a room for a full-time employment. It is not a party to any of 
the regional or international federations due to non-recognition of the State. Each sport 
is regulated under the regulations of the respective federation, a non-profit association, 
registered at the sport office of the related ministry and established under the TRNC 
laws. Even though this is a government led model of sport and federations are 
attributable to the laws of government directly, due to their sole purpose of acting as a 
regulatory body, each federation enjoys absolute autonomy to regulate their respective 
sport as long as they are in line with international lex sportiva.  
 
Similar to the European Model of Sport but in a domestic scale, the TRNC model of 
sport does have a three-compartment monopolistic pyramid structure where each sport 
has one federation. On the other hand, unlike under the European model of sport, 
breakaway leagues and alternative federations for the same sport are strictly 
 
1275 Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 
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forbidden1276. Nevertheless, this monopolistic structure of the TRNC model of sport 
does not allow any room for the abuse of dominant position where each federation is 
established as a non-profit association free from commercial aspirations and operates as 
sole regulators of their sport. In terms of promotion and relegation, similar to the 
European model of sport, the TRNC model of sport does have a formal promotion and 
relegation system. However, unlike European model of sport, the TRNC sport model 
operates only at national levels. Similar to Europe, sports competitions take place in 
open leagues implying interdependence between all levels.  
 
The organisation of sport under the TRNC model of sport is limited due its sole local 
application. While unsanctioned and rival events, home and away rule, club location, 
and third-party ownership are not relevant due to the non-profit, amateur, and domestic 
only structure of the TRNC model under international isolation, breakaway leagues are 
forbidden to protect the integrity of sport under the Physical Education and Sport 
Act1277.  
 
The European model of sport is influential throughout the world and the TRNC model 
of sport is only applied in North Cyprus. In the EU context, in order to identify whether 
the sporting rule qualifies to fall under the specificity of sport and therefore be protected 
under the EU law, it must be tested by the Court on a case-by-case analysis, taking into 
consideration the proportionality of the measure. The organisation of sport under the 
European model of sport enjoys conditional autonomy, supervised through the EU 
Institutions. The autonomy of the European model of sport is conditioned on compliance 
with the EU law, especially under non-distortion of the proper functioning of the internal 
market. Every sporting rule is subject to the application of EU law with no exception 
and distortion of the internal market will not be negotiated. While the specificity of sport 
is acknowledged, it does not play a major role in contributing towards the autonomy of 
sport. The organisation of sport does not enjoy a general exception under the EU and its 
existence is conditional upon compliance with the EU law. 
 
1276 Clause 13(2) Physical Education and Sport Act 67/1999 of the TRNC Parliament. 




Under the TRNC model of sport, the international lex sportiva is an utmost priority and 
it is protected by the Government. Even though it is a government led and approved 
model, due to its amateur and non-profit characteristic, sport enjoys absolute autonomy 
and specificity of sport is automatically respected within the TRNC. TRNC model of 
sport is transparent, attributable, and based on equality and fairness. Based on its key 
features identified in this chapter, the TRNC model of sport would have been compatible 
with the EU law. Nevertheless, TRNC model of sport would not have been treated 
differently than the European model of sport under the organisational structures of the 
EU.   
 
As established under this thesis, sport does not enjoy automatic autonomy under the 
organisational structures of the EU.  The organisational structures of the EU have a 
significant impact on sport, and both are not mutually exclusive. The European model 
of sport enjoys exclusivity under the organisational structures of the EU on condition 
that it does not step in the boundaries of the EU law. Once it does, the European model 
of sport is challenged without an exception under the organisational structures of the 
EU and EU law will enjoy supremacy over the European model of sport. Moreover, this 
research demonstrated that sport enjoys conditional exclusivity under the organisational 
structures of the EU and the organisational structures of the EU have a significant impact 
on the organisation of sport regarding the autonomy and specificity of sport. In addition, 
EU sports policy is currently formally supervising sport for it to achieve the EU 
standards of good governance. Therefore, conditional autonomy of sport under the EU 
law is supervised though the EU policy on sport. TRNC model of sport would not have 
been treated differently and would only co-exist within the organisational structures of 
the EU based on the dual condition that TRNC sport would accept supervision of the 
EU to achieve good governance standards in its organisation and would comply with 






V. Chapter Conclusion 
TRNC model of sport sets an example on the recognition of the autonomy of sport in a 
deeply divided region within Europe. TRNC model of sport is under international 
isolation and the organisational structures of the EU does not have any impact on the 
organisation of the TRNC model of sport at the moment. Internally, TRNC sport enjoys 
absolute autonomy and specificity of sport is respected. Externally, TRNC sport does 
not have interaction with the EU. Provided that it does in the future, TRNC model of 
sport would not be treated differently than the European model of sport under the 
organisational structures of the EU. Therefore, TRNC model of sport could only co-
exist with the organisational structures of the EU based on the dual condition, which is 
applicable to the European model of sport, that TRNC sport accepts supervision of the 
EU to achieve good governance standards in its organisation while complying with the 
fundamental provisions of the EU law.  To conclude, TRNC model of sport would enjoy 





RECONCILING THE IMPACT OF THE EU ON THE EUROPEAN MODEL 
OF SPORT 
 
The objective of this conclusion chapter is to evaluate the findings of this thesis and 
summarise the impact of the organisational structures of the EU on the organisational 
structures of the European model of sport.  This comprises of briefing the findings of 
the thesis on the aims and objectives of the European integration, the reason for the EU’s 
involvement with the organisation of sport, establishment and current status of the 
European sports law, and the impact of the EU on the European model of sport. 
 
The European Union was established as an economic union to achieve an economic 
integration in Europe. The Union aimed to establish and ensure the functioning of the 
internal market, in accordance with the Treaties1278. The EU’s political action was 
nourished by its economic purpose to establish the internal market1279. Eventually, the 
economic objective of the Union generated an extensive body of knowledge which 
provided the intellectual base for its political rationality1280. From the beginning of the 
integration, the ECJ and the Commission clarified and interpreted EU law for further 
integration and the proper functioning of the internal market. The aim and objective of 
the Union to establish and ensure the proper functioning of the internal market in 
accordance with the Treaties has been promoted mainly through the free movement and 
the competition law principles. Apart from these two fundamental provisions certain 
non-economic objectives have been included within the EU to ensure harmonious 
functioning of the internal market. On the other hand, the integration became an 
evolving one to achieve magnified economic prosperity through the mutual pursuit of 
equally beneficial goals. Member States accepted that significant difficulties could not 
be handled beneficially unless political powers were transferred to the Union1281. From 
 
1278 Article 26(1) TFEU. 
1279 M Bartl, ‘Internal Market Rationality, Private Law and the Direction of the Union: Resuscitating the Market as 
the Object of the Political’ (2015) European Law Journal **, 2. 
1280 Ibid. 
1281 EB Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stevens & Sons 1958). 
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thereon, with the transfer of such powers, new self-reinforcing dynamic relying on the 
spill-over mechanism was triggered1282. Integration within the Union became an 
ongoing process based on spill-over from one initially agreeable technical area to other 
areas of possibly greater political controversy. The process took place without an 
explicit proactive choice by the Member State governments to increase the Union’s 
competences1283. Further integration was an automatic process where economic 
interests joined politics1284. Once the sovereignty in a policy area was transferred to the 
Union, supranational institutions looked for further integration grounds starting with 
connected areas1285. The EU dynamically enlarged competences of the Union in central 
policy areas1286 especially though the ECJ and the European Commission judgments 
and decisions which demonstrated that supranational actors drove forward the 
integration process1287. The emergence of the EU sports law is an example of the spill-
over of the EU law into a policy area which was not predicted or intended by the 
Member States1288. The EU interfered with the organisation of sport in Europe to ensure 
cross border trade between the Member States within the internal market is not hindered. 
 
The EU sports law discovers the approach of the organisational structures of the EU 
to the European model of sport under four main turning points. These are the 
Walrave judgment, the Bosman judgment, the Meca Medina judgment and the 
adoption of the Article 165 TFEU. Initially, the Union did not have a sport 
competence. The foundations of the EU sports law were established under Walrave 
and developed through the judgments and the decisions of the ECJ and the 
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Commission. In Walrave1289, the ECJ established that sport is subject to the EU law 
if it constitutes an economic activity1290. The ECJ created a sporting exception of 
purely sporting rules and separated sporting and economic aspects of the activity. 
This demonstrated the initial reluctance of the ECJ to interfere with the autonomy 
of sport. While the ECJ refused the absolute autonomy of sport from the application 
of the EU law, specificity of sport was recognised. 20 years later, this initial 
approach of the EU to sport was analysed by the ECJ in Bosman1291 and established 
that sporting rules do not have an absolute autonomy but only a conditional 
autonomy under the organisational structures of the EU law1292. The autonomy and 
specificity of sport declared to be conditional on compliance with the fundamental 
free movement provisions of the EU law 1293 based on objective justification and 
proportionality1294.  On the other hand, the EU was not insensitive to sport and 
provided a room for purely sporting rules to prove its case for a special treatment 
due to the specificity of sport. Therefore, with Bosman sport enjoyed conditional 
autonomy while specificity of sport was recognised by the Court.  
The development of the EU sports policy entered the third phase of development1295 
with Meca-Medina1296. Until the Meca-Medina judgment, the ECJ demonstrated 
reluctance to analyse organisation of sport under the competition law provisions. In 
Meca-Medina, the ECJ rejected the argument of a purely sporting rule and ruled 
that a purely sporting rule with economic effects on the cross-border trade between 
the Member States in the internal market must also be tested against the demands 
of the EU law1297. The ECJ adopted the market access analysis approach which is 
adopted under the general application of the EU competition law on rules having 
restrictive effect of competition to ensure the completion and proper function of the 
internal market. The case demonstrated that rules with purely sporting interest in 
 
1289 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405. 
1290 Ibid at para 8. 
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nature could have an economic effect. This possibility formed the intersection 
between the sporting rules and the EU law. The case indicated that sport does not 
enjoy a difference of application under the organisational structures of the EU. 
However, it has a room to prove specificity and necessity to achieve competitive 
sport within the internal market.  
The Commission approached each individual complaint with an objective of enhancing 
the integration process and ensuring proper functioning of the internal market. Sport has 
not been treated differently. The Commission did not grant any exception to sport due 
to its specificity and instead it examined the compatibility of each sporting rule on a 
case-by-case analysis as guided by the ECJ under the Meca Medina judgment. The 
Commission acts only when commercial cross border activity, trade and/or movement, 
is affected between Member States1298. The Commission approached sport related 
complaints from the market access perspective. During its analysis, the specificity of 
sport may or may not be expressly relied on by the Commission. However, even if the 
specificity of sport is expressly referred to and acknowledged, it is not enough to protect 
the sporting rule from the application of the EU law. A rule is classified as a restriction 
if it distorts competition within the internal market and affect cross border trade between 
the Member States. Moreover, the Commission supervises the SGBs to achieve 
compliance under the EU law where possible. Therefore, Commission decisions 
demonstrates the considerable impact of organisational structures of the EU on the 
governance of sport on the specificity of sport and on the autonomy of sport.  
 
The development of the EU sports policy entered the fourth phase with the adoption of 
the Article 165 TFEU under the Lisbon Treaty. The article did not change the impact of 
the EU law on the European model of sport. Sport enjoys a conditional autonomy while 
the specificity of sport gained a combined reading with discrimination provisions and 
achieved a possibility to have a same effect on the internal market rules. Nevertheless, 
the Article did not have any effect in achieving an exemption to sport from the 
application of the EU law. On the other hand, Article 165 TFEU provided a formal 
 
1298 Case 3651, C.U. de Lille/UEFA (Mouscron) Unpublished Commission Decision of 9 December 1999. 
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competence on sport to the EU. Moreover, it had a significant effect on supervising 
structures of the European model of sport through contributing, supporting, and 
supplementing sporting issues to ensure compliance with the EU law. The article 
effectively supervises structures of the European model of sport through contributing to 
the development of sport and, if necessary, supports and supplements European sporting 
issues. Consequently, the time for the supervised conditional autonomy of sport 
emerged under the organisational structures of the EU. Currently, the organisation of 
sport enjoys supervised conditional autonomy of sport under the organisational 
structures of the EU.  
 
TRNC model of sport sets an example on the recognition of the autonomy of sport in a 
deeply divided region within Europe. TRNC model of sport is under international 
isolation and the organisational structures of the EU does not have any impact on the 
organisation of the TRNC model of sport at the moment. Internally, TRNC sport enjoys 
absolute autonomy and specificity of sport is respected. Externally, TRNC sport does 
not have interaction with the EU. Provided that it does in the future, TRNC model of 
sport would not be treated differently than the European model of sport under the 
organisational structures of the EU. Therefore, TRNC model of sport could only co-
exist with the organisational structures of the EU should it accept supervision of the EU 
to achieve good governance standards and comply with the fundamental provisions of 
the EU law.   
 
Therefore, this research accomplishes that, first, the organisational structures of the EU 
have a significant impact on the European model of sport, and both are not mutually 
exclusive. The European model of sport enjoys exclusivity under the organisational 
structures of the EU on condition that it does not step in the boundaries of the EU law. 
Once it does, the European model of sport is challenged without an exception under the 
organisational structures of the EU and EU law will enjoy supremacy over the European 
model of sport. Therefore, it is established that the European model of sport enjoys 
conditional exclusivity under the organisational structures of the EU. Second, the 
decisions and judgments of the ECJ and the Commission demonstrated that the 
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organisational structures of the EU have a significant impact on the organisation of sport 
regarding the autonomy and specificity of sport. Third, it is demonstrated that EU sports 
policy is currently formally supervising the European model of sport for it to achieve 
the EU standards of good governance. Therefore, conditional autonomy of sport under 
the EU law is supervised though the EU policy on sport. Fourth, TRNC model of sport 
would not have been treated differently than the European model of sport and would 
only co-exist with the organisational structures of the EU based on the supervised 
conditional autonomy.   
 
Therefore, this research collectively concludes that currently the European model of 
sport enjoys supervised conditional autonomy under the organisational structures of the 
EU. The organisational structures of the EU and sport could co-exist on dual condition 
that sport accepts supervision of the EU to achieve good governance standards in its 
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